China will build buffer with Afghanistan

Subject Chinese security assistance to Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Significance China is reportedly providing direct aid to Afghanistan's security forces, including base-building, contributions of equipment and joint patrols to strengthen links and capacity. Some interpret this as a sign of a rising power expanding its military activities beyond its borders and expect Beijing to become more active in the region's political affairs. Impacts Chinese economic involvement in Tajikistan may eventually bring some political leverage. Expanding Chinese economic involvement with Central Asia does not necessarily mean a greater military presence will follow. Regional governments and Western stakeholders alike will be frustrated by China's unwillingness to take a leadership role in Afghanistan.

Significance Moscow is a key partner in opposing Western hegemony, but Pakistan is the closest thing China has to an ally and depends increasingly on Chinese support. Territorial and economic conflicts with India are pushing Delhi closer to Washington and Tokyo. Impacts Russia would probably oppose any attempt to increase China’s overt military presence in Central Asia. Despite the return home of militants from Islamic State territories in Syria and Iraq, the threat from radical Islamism remains low. Divergences of interest will not prevent China-Russia cooperation for now, but Beijing cannot rely on Moscow to defer to its wishes.


Subject Central Asian militaries Significance Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are leading other Central Asian governments in increased spending on military and security forces and the procurement of modern equipment. Regional governments have long-standing fears of potential Russian military interference and remain concerned about the situation in Afghanistan. The increase in military expenditures is expanding capabilities, although the degree and pace of improvement varies from country to country, and regional militaries still lag Russian and NATO forces. Impacts Russian forces presence in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan will increase. Turkmenistan will place greater emphasis on modern weapons procurement and naval assets. Mobile and counter-terrorism focused forces will be seen as more important than conventional land forces.


Subject Russia security and military interests in Central Asia. Significance On January 8, Dushanbe announced the names of four Tajikistani soldiers abducted by unidentified Afghanistan groups. With international forces largely ending their mission in Afghanistan on December 28, concern is growing regarding the threat posed to Central Asia. Central Asian nations are likely to have to cooperate more and rely on Russian military support. Moscow maintains a sizeable military presence in Tajikistan and an air base in Kyrgyzstan. In January, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allowing foreigners to serve in the Russian military, which could lead to sizeable numbers of Central Asians enlisting. Impacts Russian military capability for deniable foreign operations will grow if significant numbers of foreigners enlist. A security clampdown in Uzbekistan in the run-up to the March presidential election is likely. States will probably arm local non-governmental groups to help police borders with Afghanistan.


Significance Manama is gradually rolling back some of the reforms to limit the power of the security forces that were put in place after the post-2011 Arab uprisings. The government has been emboldened by Saudi backing and by its security alliance with key Western powers. The new US administration’s more confrontational policy towards Iran’s regional role, which has been echoed by the UK government, could strengthen that alliance. Impacts The strategic importance to Washington of its military presence in Bahrain will rise as tensions with Iran increase. Spillover from US and Saudi confrontations with Iran in Yemen or Gulf shipping lanes could affect Bahrain’s internal stability. Iranian-linked Shia militant groups such as Saraya al-Ashtar or Saraya al-Mukhtar may escalate hostilities. The US and UK governments will seek to increase base security, but could also quietly pressure Manama to make concessions to the Shia.


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-138
Author(s):  
Vinay Kaura

Purpose The main purpose of paper is to analyse the political, military and strategic significance of China’s rising power and its influence on Sino-Indian relations, while addressing the question as to why India has not been able to develop a long-term, stable and friendly relationship with China. Design/methodology/approach The paper is structured as follows: historical overview of India-China relations; various tools of China’s policy in Indian sub-continent; and India’s response. The paper employs a qualitative analysis of secondary literature, with media reports, official documents and public statements providing important sources for understanding the dynamics underlying bilateral relationship. Findings India needs to be prepared to face challenges as China’s charm offensive in India’s neighbourhood is primarily aimed at establishing a new Asian order in which Beijing would play the leading role. As China institutionalizes its military presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, India should adopt an innovative response mechanism, also involving counter-presence in areas considered China’s traditional sphere of influence. Originality/value The primary value of the paper lies in the fact that it covers most of the key dimensions of bilateral ties that impair a stable relationship between India and China. A proper understanding of the dynamics underlying bilateral ties may help the policymakers, scholars and academics to suggest ways to reduce sources of tensions, while also helping the Indian Government to prepare effective countermeasures.


Significance Fear of Afghanistan-related instability spilling into Central Asia has already prompted the Kremlin to announce that it will reinforce its military presence in Tajikistan. Impacts Its Central Asian military build-up will aid Russian regional prestige, dented by financial woes and contagion issues. Central Asian authorities may use Afghanistan worries to justify repressive domestic policies. Turkmenistan may seek new security partners and rethink its permanent neutrality status.


Significance Thousands of Central Asians travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight for IS and other Islamist groups in 2014 and some are returning home. Despite attacks in Central Asia attributable to home-grown IS supporters, the threat of IS expansion is less immediate than sometimes asserted by commentators, regional governments and jihadists themselves. Impacts A further deterioration in Afghan security would create space for IS to consolidate and then infiltrate Central Asia. IS may support Central Asian attacks as an indirect way of pressuring Russia. The Taliban pose no threat to Central Asia despite their militant connections.


Significance The new regional counterterrorism force is deemed necessary to counter increased terrorist attacks both within and across regional boundaries of the G5 states (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger). In August, 19 people were killed in a deadly terrorist assault in the Burkinabe capital, Ouagadougou. The militant resurgence is pushing the Burkinabe government to react more quickly and aggressively than before, while simultaneously fast-tracking several development programmes to placate its domestic critics. Impacts Public pressure will increase on regional governments to make the G5 counterterrorism force operational. The government’s new emergency development plan for the north will temporarily ease citizens' concern over the security forces' limitations. Sensitive forthcoming trials of former regime officials will make government security gains even more important to avoid public unrest.


2017 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ann Leaf ◽  
George Odhiambo

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to report on a study examining the perceptions of secondary principals, deputies and teachers, of deputy principal (DP) instructional leadership (IL), as well as deputies’ professional learning (PL) needs. Framed within an interpretivist approach, the specific objectives of this study were: to explore the extent to which DPs are perceived as leaders of learning, to examine the actual responsibilities of these DPs and to explore the PL that support DP roles. Design/methodology/approach The researchers used multiple perspective case studies which included semi-structured interviews and key school document analysis. A thematic content analysis facilitated qualitative descriptions and insights from the perspectives of the principals, DPs and teachers of four high-performing secondary schools in Sydney, Australia. Findings The data revealed that deputies performed a huge range of tasks; all the principals were distributing leadership to their deputies to build leadership capacity and supported their PL in a variety of ways. Across three of the case study schools, most deputies were frequently performing as instructional leaders, improving their school’s performance through distributing leadership, team building and goal setting. Deputy PL was largely dependent on principal mentoring and self-initiated but was often ad hoc. Findings add more validity to the importance of principals building the educational leadership of their deputies. Research limitations/implications This study relied upon responses from four case study schools. Further insight into the key issues discussed may require a longitudinal data that describe perceptions from a substantial number of schools in Australia over time. However, studying only four schools allowed for an in-depth investigation. Practical implications The findings from this study have practical implications for system leaders with responsibilities of framing the deputies’ role as emergent educational leaders rather than as administrators and the need for coherent, integrated, consequential and systematic approaches to DP professional development. Further research is required on the effect of deputy IL on school performance. Originality/value There is a dearth of research-based evidence exploring the range of responsibilities of deputies and perceptions of staff about deputies’ IL role and their PL needs. This is the first published New South Wales, Australian DP study and adds to the growing evidence around perceptions of DPs as instructional leaders by providing an Australian perspective on the phenomenon. The paper raises important concerns about the complexity of the DP’s role on the one hand, and on the other hand, the PL that is perceived to be most appropriate for dealing with this complexity.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma van Santen

Purpose This paper aims to examine the shift away from the traditional distinction between organised crime and terrorist groups towards their conceptual convergence under the crime-terror nexus narrative in the context of international security and development policy in post-Soviet Central Asia. It assesses the empirical basis for the crime-terror and state-crime nexus in three Central Asian countries – Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – and argues that the exclusion of the state from the analytical framework undermines the relevance of the crime-terror paradigm for policy-making. Design/methodology/approach This paper draws on a literature review of academic research, recent case studies highlighting new empirical evidence in Central Asia and international policy publications. Findings There is a weak empirical connection between organised crime and Islamic extremists, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizbut Tahrir, in Central Asia. The state-crime paradigm, including concepts of criminal capture, criminal sovereignty and criminal penetration, hold more explanatory power for international policy in Central Asia. The crime-terror paradigm has resulted in a narrow and ineffective security-oriented law enforcement approach to counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism but does not address the underlying weak state governance structures and political grievances that motivate organised crime and terrorist groups respectively. Originality/value International policy and scholarship is currently focussed on the areas of convergence between organised crime and terrorist groups. This paper highlights the continued relevance of the traditional conceptual separation of terrorist and organised crime groups based on their different motives, methods and relationship with the state, for security and democratic governance initiatives in the under-researched Central Asian region.


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