Unstable Central Asia will drive Russian regional ties

Subject Russia security and military interests in Central Asia. Significance On January 8, Dushanbe announced the names of four Tajikistani soldiers abducted by unidentified Afghanistan groups. With international forces largely ending their mission in Afghanistan on December 28, concern is growing regarding the threat posed to Central Asia. Central Asian nations are likely to have to cooperate more and rely on Russian military support. Moscow maintains a sizeable military presence in Tajikistan and an air base in Kyrgyzstan. In January, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allowing foreigners to serve in the Russian military, which could lead to sizeable numbers of Central Asians enlisting. Impacts Russian military capability for deniable foreign operations will grow if significant numbers of foreigners enlist. A security clampdown in Uzbekistan in the run-up to the March presidential election is likely. States will probably arm local non-governmental groups to help police borders with Afghanistan.

Significance Fear of Afghanistan-related instability spilling into Central Asia has already prompted the Kremlin to announce that it will reinforce its military presence in Tajikistan. Impacts Its Central Asian military build-up will aid Russian regional prestige, dented by financial woes and contagion issues. Central Asian authorities may use Afghanistan worries to justify repressive domestic policies. Turkmenistan may seek new security partners and rethink its permanent neutrality status.


2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emma van Santen

Purpose This paper aims to examine the shift away from the traditional distinction between organised crime and terrorist groups towards their conceptual convergence under the crime-terror nexus narrative in the context of international security and development policy in post-Soviet Central Asia. It assesses the empirical basis for the crime-terror and state-crime nexus in three Central Asian countries – Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – and argues that the exclusion of the state from the analytical framework undermines the relevance of the crime-terror paradigm for policy-making. Design/methodology/approach This paper draws on a literature review of academic research, recent case studies highlighting new empirical evidence in Central Asia and international policy publications. Findings There is a weak empirical connection between organised crime and Islamic extremists, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Hizbut Tahrir, in Central Asia. The state-crime paradigm, including concepts of criminal capture, criminal sovereignty and criminal penetration, hold more explanatory power for international policy in Central Asia. The crime-terror paradigm has resulted in a narrow and ineffective security-oriented law enforcement approach to counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism but does not address the underlying weak state governance structures and political grievances that motivate organised crime and terrorist groups respectively. Originality/value International policy and scholarship is currently focussed on the areas of convergence between organised crime and terrorist groups. This paper highlights the continued relevance of the traditional conceptual separation of terrorist and organised crime groups based on their different motives, methods and relationship with the state, for security and democratic governance initiatives in the under-researched Central Asian region.


Significance The Taliban victory creates threats and some opportunities for Central Asian republics, three of which -- Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan -- border on Afghanistan. All except Tajikistan have indicated they will work with the new Afghan authorities. Impacts Russia and Central Asian states, except Tajikistan up to a point, will not back anti-Taliban resistance groups. Weak Afghan governance creates more scope for heroin trafficking through Central Asia. Although China is the more important economic player in Central Asia, it will defer to Russia on security matters.


Subject Russian foreign policy in 2016. Significance Russian foreign policy is driven by an amalgam of realpolitik, nationalism and anti-Western ideology, and consists of both defensive and offensive strategies. The robust, confrontational approach championed by President Vladimir Putin in recent years has produced successes in such areas as the military campaign in Syria, but an undecided outcome in Ukraine and mixed results in other parts of the former Soviet Union. Impacts A NATO summit this July may result in a tougher, more coordinated stance on Russia. Following its official partial withdrawal from Syria, the Russian military will conduct selective attacks. Russia will need careful diplomacy to keep Belarus and Kazakhstan from drifting away as allies.


Subject Russia's Arctic strategy. Significance Russia has identified the Arctic as a strategic priority and future resource base, and is working systematically to expand its territorial claim and consolidate control of the Northern Sea Route (NSR). While it seeks cooperation with like-minded Arctic states, it is upgrading its military capacity to defend its interests in what it sees as an increasingly competitive environment as outside players try to make inroads. Impacts NATO states will respond to Moscow's growing military presence by upgrading their Arctic capacity. Russian military expansion will be constrained by procurement delays affecting the defence sector generally. A relaxation in US sanctions would facilitate technology transfers for developing Arctic hydrocarbons deposits.


Subject Russia's diversified military capacity in Syria. Significance Russian armed forces played an active role in the Syrian government's recapture of Palmyra in March, despite the partial withdrawal of Russian aircraft from Syria. As well as air strikes, months of Russian military training and arms deliveries enhanced the Syrian army's combat capacity, contributing to a rapid collapse of Islamic State group (ISG) resistance. The operation showed how Russia has widened the instruments available: it can scale conventional air strikes up or down, provide fire support from helicopters or artillery, and use these elements to compensate for deficiencies in the Syrian military, while supplying weaponry, training and coordination to local forces. Impacts Russian military support can ensure the Syrian regime's survival, but that will require a long-term presence. The recapture of Aleppo would constitute a near fatal blow to the Syrian rebel movement. The Russian military will learn lessons about weaponry and coordination from the Syrian operation. Elements of these lessons including control of proxy forces may be applied in future foreign interventions. The use of mercenaries, trialled in Syria, offers Moscow a useful and deniable instrument abroad.


Subject Chinese security assistance to Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Significance China is reportedly providing direct aid to Afghanistan's security forces, including base-building, contributions of equipment and joint patrols to strengthen links and capacity. Some interpret this as a sign of a rising power expanding its military activities beyond its borders and expect Beijing to become more active in the region's political affairs. Impacts Chinese economic involvement in Tajikistan may eventually bring some political leverage. Expanding Chinese economic involvement with Central Asia does not necessarily mean a greater military presence will follow. Regional governments and Western stakeholders alike will be frustrated by China's unwillingness to take a leadership role in Afghanistan.


Significance The population is set to shrink until at least 2036. To support labour productivity as a factor for GDP growth, President Vladimir Putin has set out plans to encourage families and reduce premature death that may realistically slow but not reverse the trend. Impacts Opposition groups will try to capitalise on popular discontent provoked by impending increases in retirement age. New individual financial savings products are needed to help working people plan for future. Permanent immigration from Central Asia and the Caucasus will deplete those countries' labour forces, harming growth prospects.


Significance The last major rebel-held area in Syria, Idlib province is under the military control of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a salafi-jihadist rebel alliance. Jaysh al-Ahrar, the largest non-al-Qaida faction in HTS, announced on September 13 it was leaving the organisation. This followed the resignation of one of HTS’s top clerics, Abdullah al-Muhaysini, after the leaking of telephone conversations in which the military leadership criticised him harshly. Impacts Renewed unity talks between mainstream rebel factions will encourage another round of pre-emptive attacks by HTS. Likely rejection of HTS’s outreach initiative by the mainstream opposition will empower the hawks within the group. Possible regime operations against HTS would be limited to peripheral strategic positions such as Jisr al-Shughur. US-backed and pro-Damascus forces will seek to avoid clashes around Deir ez-Zour city in their separate offensives against Islamic State. A Russian military presence will deter Turkey from attacking the Syrian Kurds in Afrin and elsewhere.


Subject Climate change in Central Asia. Significance As the Central Asian states emerge from months of sweltering summer temperatures, attention is increasingly turning to the effects of climate change. In a region always short of rainfall and dependent on glacier-fed rivers, rising global temperatures look set to have deeper and swifter impacts than in many other parts of the world. Impacts International climate change responses will have limited impacts on Central Asian specifics. Regional structures may become more effective as the situation's urgency becomes apparent. One part-solution involves repairing irrigation canals to reduce massive leakage.


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