Tension on China’s inland frontier may grow over time

Significance Moscow is a key partner in opposing Western hegemony, but Pakistan is the closest thing China has to an ally and depends increasingly on Chinese support. Territorial and economic conflicts with India are pushing Delhi closer to Washington and Tokyo. Impacts Russia would probably oppose any attempt to increase China’s overt military presence in Central Asia. Despite the return home of militants from Islamic State territories in Syria and Iraq, the threat from radical Islamism remains low. Divergences of interest will not prevent China-Russia cooperation for now, but Beijing cannot rely on Moscow to defer to its wishes.

Subject Chinese security assistance to Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Significance China is reportedly providing direct aid to Afghanistan's security forces, including base-building, contributions of equipment and joint patrols to strengthen links and capacity. Some interpret this as a sign of a rising power expanding its military activities beyond its borders and expect Beijing to become more active in the region's political affairs. Impacts Chinese economic involvement in Tajikistan may eventually bring some political leverage. Expanding Chinese economic involvement with Central Asia does not necessarily mean a greater military presence will follow. Regional governments and Western stakeholders alike will be frustrated by China's unwillingness to take a leadership role in Afghanistan.


Significance The last major rebel-held area in Syria, Idlib province is under the military control of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a salafi-jihadist rebel alliance. Jaysh al-Ahrar, the largest non-al-Qaida faction in HTS, announced on September 13 it was leaving the organisation. This followed the resignation of one of HTS’s top clerics, Abdullah al-Muhaysini, after the leaking of telephone conversations in which the military leadership criticised him harshly. Impacts Renewed unity talks between mainstream rebel factions will encourage another round of pre-emptive attacks by HTS. Likely rejection of HTS’s outreach initiative by the mainstream opposition will empower the hawks within the group. Possible regime operations against HTS would be limited to peripheral strategic positions such as Jisr al-Shughur. US-backed and pro-Damascus forces will seek to avoid clashes around Deir ez-Zour city in their separate offensives against Islamic State. A Russian military presence will deter Turkey from attacking the Syrian Kurds in Afrin and elsewhere.


Subject Central Asian policies on repatriating nationals associated with Middle East insurgency. Significance Central Asian governments' concerns about radicalisation among Muslim-majority populations were amplified when hundreds of nationals went to Syria and Iraq in 2014-15 to join Islamic State (IS) and other jihadist groups. They are prioritising the repatriation of women and children, in contrast to European governments' reluctance to approve blanket returns. Impacts The security drive against local extremists will be sustained across Central Asia. Policies towards returning women will not be affected by IS-attributed attacks unless a direct link is made. In Russia, Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov is leading on repatriation efforts focused on children.


Subject Prospects for Central Asia in 2016. Significance In October, both the World Bank and the IMF downgraded Central Asia's economic growth outlook for 2016. The previous month, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had signalled the rising influence of extremist organisations, first and foremost the Islamic State group (ISG) across the region. Central Asian regimes are faced with a multitude of risks, including political destabilisation.


Significance The operation, authorised by US President Donald Trump, killed Qassem Soleimani, longstanding chief of the Quds Force -- the external action wing of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC). Others also died, notably Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the leader of Iran-backed Iraqi militia Kata’ib Hezbollah, which had been targeted in earlier US strikes. Impacts Baghdad’s parliament will consider a bill to evict the US military presence. The confrontation with Iran will undermine efforts to combat the residual Islamic State presence. As the responses play out, oil prices are likely to rise further. The 2015 Iran nuclear deal could at last collapse. Damascus may increase its dependence on Moscow in the absence of Soleimani’s personal networks.


Author(s):  
M. Konarovskiy

Against the background of wide range of the “Islamic state” terrorismin the Middle East, the aggravating civil war in Afghanistan does not reduce the threat of destabilization beyond Russia’s southern borders. The Taliban’s terrorism in IRA is recently becoming even more diversified through the infiltration of the IS ideology and militancy to IRA northern enclave. Reshaping of the US and NATO military presence in that country did not help to stabilize the situation that is facing the whole complex of unresolved problems. This reality urged Washington to prolong the military presence till 2017 amid new efforts to strengthen its positions in Central Asia.


Subject Russia security and military interests in Central Asia. Significance On January 8, Dushanbe announced the names of four Tajikistani soldiers abducted by unidentified Afghanistan groups. With international forces largely ending their mission in Afghanistan on December 28, concern is growing regarding the threat posed to Central Asia. Central Asian nations are likely to have to cooperate more and rely on Russian military support. Moscow maintains a sizeable military presence in Tajikistan and an air base in Kyrgyzstan. In January, President Vladimir Putin signed a decree allowing foreigners to serve in the Russian military, which could lead to sizeable numbers of Central Asians enlisting. Impacts Russian military capability for deniable foreign operations will grow if significant numbers of foreigners enlist. A security clampdown in Uzbekistan in the run-up to the March presidential election is likely. States will probably arm local non-governmental groups to help police borders with Afghanistan.


Subject Islamic State group's following in Central Asia. Significance Over the last 18 months, officials in Central Asia have frequently cited the recruitment of citizens by Islamic State group (ISG) as a major threat to national security. Governments fear that some of those who return will build networks and launch jihadist attacks. Their responses target suspected sympathisers and returning fighters but also alienate the broader community of devout but not extremist Muslims. Impacts Civil and political rights will be curbed as part of counter-terrorism programmes. Tajikistan and other states will look for Russian assurances including through the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. China will strengthen security ties although there is little Uighur activism in Central Asia.


Subject Prospects for Central Asia in 2019. Significance Central Asia may face economic headwinds in the coming year due to uncertain oil prices and at best modest growth in Russia, the destination for labour migrants and many regional exports. Increasing intra-regional cooperation may blunt some of that effect. The region remains stable but all countries have concerns about the Islamic State (IS) group, especially its presence in nearby Afghanistan.


Significance Fear of Afghanistan-related instability spilling into Central Asia has already prompted the Kremlin to announce that it will reinforce its military presence in Tajikistan. Impacts Its Central Asian military build-up will aid Russian regional prestige, dented by financial woes and contagion issues. Central Asian authorities may use Afghanistan worries to justify repressive domestic policies. Turkmenistan may seek new security partners and rethink its permanent neutrality status.


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