Analisis Structure-Conduct-Performance Pasar Ternak Sapi Dan Kerbau untuk Meningkatkan Efisiensi Pemasaran

This study aims to analyze the market structure of cattle and buffalo in the livestock market based on the concentration of traders and buyers, barriers to market entry, market behavior and market performance of livestock, and their relationship to marketing efficiency. The sampling technique used is Stratified Random Sampling. Data analysis used Market Share analysis, Hirschman Herfindahl Index (IHH), CR4 (Concentration ratio for the biggest four), concentration ratio (Kr), market entry barriers with Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) analysis, and Price – Cost – Margin (PCM). The market structure of cattle and buffalo in the livestock market based on the concentration of traders is oligopsony with low concentration, based on the concentration of buyers it is an oligopsonistic market, and based on barriers to market entry it is categorized as high barriers to market entry. There is a relationship between market structure, market behavior and market performance on marketing efficiency in the livestock market.

Analisis Struktur Pasar Ternak Sapi Di Kabupaten Batanghari

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menganalisis struktur pasar ternak sapi di Kabupaten Batanghari berdasarkan konsentrasi penjual dan konsentrasi pembeli, mengetahui struktur pasar dan hambatan masuk (barrier to entry) di pasar ternak sapi Kabupaten Batanghari dengan 18 pedagang tetap. Penelitian ini dilaksanakan pada tanggal 14 Desember 2018 sampai 25 Januari 2019 berlokasi di pasar ternak Kabupaten Batanghari Provinsi Jambi. Data penelitian bersumber dari data primer dan data sekunder. Data primer terdiri dari ternak sapi masuk, ternak sapi keluar, karakteristik pedagang dan pembeli ternak sapi. Pada penelitian ini dilihat dari konsentrasi pembeli menggunakan rumus Konsentrasi ratio (Kr) dan pangsa pasar (market share), dimana hasil dari Kr dan market share sebesar 72,73% dengan 8 (delapan) pedagang terbesar yang berada di pasar ternak sapi Kabupaten Batanghari. Selain itu, struktur pasar ternak sapi di Kabupaten Batanghari juga dihitung melalui konsentrasi penjual, dengan rumus Indeks Hirschman Herfindahl ( IHH ) dan Concentration ratio for biggest four (Cr4) dengan hasil IHH sebesar 0,17 dan Cr4 sebesar 0,68. Dari hambatan masuk pasar diperoleh nilai Minimum Efficient Scale (MES) adalah 14,83%. Hasil ini lebih besar dari pendapat Aliastar (2004), menyebutkan nilai MES jika lebih besar dari 10% menggambarkan hambatan masuk pasar tinggi. Berdasarkan hasil tersebuat dapat ditarik kesimpulan bahwa pasar ternak sapi di Kabupaten Batanghari berdasarkan konsentrasi penjual dengan menggunakan pendekatan market share merupakan struktur pasar oligopoli dengan konsentrasi longgar, jika dilihat berdasarkan konsentrasi pembeli dengan pendekatan IHH pasar ternak di Kabupaten Batanghari merupakan pasar ternak persaingan oligopsoni dengan nilai IHH<0,18 sedangkan dengan pendekatan CR4 adalah struktur pasar bersifat oligopsoni dengan nilai CR4 <0,8, untuk hambatan masuknya menggunakan pendekatan MES, pasar ternak sapi di Kabupaten Batanghari menggambarkan bahwa hambatan masuk ke pasar ternak sapi di Kabupaten Batanghari sangat tinggi.

An Analysis of the Efficiency of Local Government Expenditure and the Minimum Efficient Scale in Vietnam

The purposes of this study were to; (i) estimate the efficiency of local government expenditure by province and city in Vietnam, (ii) test if there was a change in the efficiency of local government expenditure with the rapid development of Vietnam, and (iii) estimate the size of the population that is improving local government expenditures. By using the stochastic frontier cost function method to estimate the cost inefficiency, we found that Vietnam has been improving the efficiency of local government expenditure while achieving rapid economic growth from FY2005 to FY2009. In addition, we simulated a minimum efficient scale (MES) to determine the size of the province population that is improving local government expenditures. We found that the MES in Vietnam is 1,394,859.

Economies of Scale in the South Korean Natural Gas Industry

The South Korean natural gas (NG) import volume in 2017 was 33.7 million tonnes per annum (13.1%), making it the second-largest NG-importing country in the world after Japan. Nevertheless, the NG wholesale market in South Korea has remained monopolistic since the Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS) was established in 1983. Thus, the purpose of this study is to determine whether the NG wholesale market in South Korea has economies of scale by estimating the translog cost function and estimating the minimum efficient scale (MES) using robust linear regression. We used quarterly business reports of KOGAS from the first quarter of 2000 to the second quarter of 2018 to construct the data. The results showed that diseconomies of scale existed in all the years in the first and fourth quarters, and the second quarter showed the same result during 2010–2014. From 2011, the production quantity of all the quarters has exceeded the MES (5.81 million tons). The reason for these results is that the demand for NG power generation and city gas has surged since 2000, while the monopolistic structure of the past has been maintained. This study implies that it would be more efficient to allocate some of KOGAS’s additional import volume to the existing private NG companies and mitigate the regulation on resale.

Is Gibrat’s law valid for travel agencies and tour operators? Evidence from the Visegrad group countries

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the validity of Gibrat’s law for a sample of travel agents from the Visegrad group (V4) countries and to identify the size-growth relationship. Using a linear auto-regressive model and ordinary least squares estimator, we rejected the validity of Gibrat’s law in the V4 countries (except Poland, where the results were mixed). The smallest firms tend to grow faster than their larger counterparts. Using quantile regression models, we concluded that the size-growth link differed depending on actual firm size. Before reaching minimum efficient scale (MES), there is a positive relationship between firm growth and firm size. This relationship is negative after reaching MES: the smaller firms grow faster than bigger ones. Gibrat’s law tends to be valid in the population of firms that have reached MES. This shows that economies and diseconomies of scale could play a significant role in explaining the size-growth relationship of travel agents.

“After End-2008 Structural Changes in Containership Market” and Their Impact on Industry’s Policy

The inability of carriers to forecast “demand for containerships” led them to order larger ships. Maritime economists were also unable to forecast it. The new-buildings cut cost per TEU, but “estimated economies of scale” are exhausted with ships beyond 21,000 TEUs, higher than the present. As average cost-AC was not at minimum, carriers did not produce at minimum efficient scale (MES). As larger ships are more competitive, smaller ships led to laid-up, and eventually scrapped. This strategy, however, did not bring the desirable balance between demand and supply. Due to falling demand, following the meltdown at the end of 2008, carriers priced their services at marginal cost-MC, and thus they accumulated losses. As a result, carriers resorted to frequent GRIs (freight rate increases). Supply exceeded demand and average distances fell after 2008. Containership market will remain depressed if economies of scale lead carriers to shipyards. Scrapping—the last hope—removed only 1/7 of the oversupply. Revenue, operating profits, and net profits, due to increased financial expenses, were lower than in the past. Aggressive ship-building programs could not be carried-out, because the depression meant that there are available only limited funds. The estimated funds required for new buildings were as high as $4 billion per carrier. So, the sector is in a vicious circle. The only helpful sign was the reduction in fuel prices after 2011 from $800/ton to $278 (2015). We also showed that ports and canals, through their traditional charging policy on size, penalized containerships for their efficiency—if volume discounts are not provided. Port dues and container handling and canal dues account for as much as 40% of the annualized containership cost. Finally, to study the relationship between concentration (market share) and revenue, operating profit and net profit, we ran three regressions; but only one gave a high correlation coefficient (0.97). This suggests that the containership market is purely competitive. We also showed that the Herfindahl index was 683 units (i.e., <1000) and Lerner’s index was 0.55—both indicating oligopolistic trends. Our model shows that containership market is either oligopolistic or purely competitive. This finding shows the double face of containership markets, which so much confused maritime economists.

Potential Sources of Value from Mergers and Their Indicators

Firms engage in mergers for many reasons, some of which create value for both the firm’s shareholders and society, some that create value only for the firm’s shareholders, and some that fail even to do that. A considerable body of research concludes that most mergers do not create value for anyone, except perhaps the investment bankers who negotiated the deal. For a merger to create value, it will usually be necessary that one or both parties is below minimum efficient scale or has valuable underutilized assets. Furthermore, unless heavy coordination and long-term commitment are required, many sources of value from mergers can be achieved through collaboration agreements or other contracts, with less risk to the firms and to economic efficiency. This article outlines the major sources of potential value in mergers, and indicators that can give us insight into a merger’s true motives and its likelihood of creating value.