The Anywhere, Anytime Market: The 800-Number, Direct Marketing, and the New Networks of Consumption

This article explores how 800-service, or toll-free long-distance (In-WATS) lines, became an institutionalized part of direct marketing in the United States between the mid-1960s and early 1980s. Introduced by AT&T in 1967, 800-service attracted immediate attention in mail-order circles, where marketers saw it as means of automating long-distance selling and catering to an increasingly decentralized and credit-dependent populace. Although early initiatives, like that of catalog giant Aldens, fell flat, 800-service gained traction by the mid-1970s as a call-center industry developed and mail-order operations began using In-WATS lines in combination with bank-issued credit cards and private delivery services. By decade’s end, this trio of networks—long-distance telephony, credit/payment, and parcel delivery—were densely interwoven, forming the infrastructural basis for a new kind of “anywhere, anytime,” upscale shopping exemplified by the newly refashioned Spiegel. Ultimately, the article helps historicize the rise of electronic retailing and the marketization of telecommunications infrastructure.

Letting Go? The Federal Communications Commission in the Era of Deregulation

Alfred Kahn's book, Letting Go: Deregulating the Process of Deregulation, suggested that regulators step aside once they have set basic rules for entry into erstwhile monopolized markets. Unfortunately, communications regulators have not heeded Professor Kahn's advice. I provide an analysis of the effects of three exercises in U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulation or "deregulation": (1) the post-1996 unbundling regime designed to facilitate entry into local telecommunications markets; (2) the continuation and extension of the high-cost "universal service" program funded by the taxation of long-distance telephony; and (3) the FCC's attempt to regulate cable television rates.

Competition in Long-Distance Telephony: A Critical Analysis of Telecom Decision CRTC 92-12

In 1992 the agency responsible for regulating Canadian Telecommunications, the CRTC (Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission), authorized Unitel Communications Inc. to provide a public long-distance telephone service. For the first time Bell Canada, and six of the other telephone companies that comprise the Stentor common carrier consortium, would face competition in the market for public telephony (CRTC, 1992a). This article is critical of the CRTC decision. It analyzes the content and to a lesser extent the process that led to the CRTC decision in order to demonstrate: (1) that in order to justify its decision the Commission was obliged to ignore the initial objectives it had set for the proceedings; (2) that the ultimate ruling was based on a bogus problematic which by definition the monopoly common carriers could not respond to; (3) that the decision to liberalize was based on a selective and inconsistent use of economic theory; and (4) the decision was not grounded in a rational consideration of the evidence presented before the Commission, but rather it was the culmination of a piecemeal shift in policy in favour of competition that had begun in the early 1980s. Résumé: En 1992, l'agence responsable de la réglementation des télécommunications canadiennes, le CRTC (Le Conseil de la radiodiffusion et des télécommunications canadiennes), a autorisé Unitel Communications Inc. à offrir un service interurbain public (CRTC, 1992a). Pour la première fois, Bell Canada et les six autres compagnies téléphoniques membres du groupe Stentor devront faire face à un marché interurbain compétitif. Dans cet article, nous analysons la décision du CRTC, d'une perspective critique. On examine le contenu de la décision et à moindre degré le processus décisionnel qui a abouti à cette décision. Nous effectuons cette analyse dans le but: (1) de démontrer comment, pour justifier sa décision, le Conseil a été obligé d'abandonner en cours de route les objectifs initiaux qu'il s'était donnés; (2) de démontrer que la décision a été fondée sur une fausse problématique qui ne donnait presque aucune chance à Bell et aux autres membres de Stentor de défendre l'option du monopole; (3) de démontrer comment la décision d'ouvrir le marché interurbain à la compétition a été fondée sur une utilisation sélective et parfois contradictoire de la théorie économique; et (4) de démontrer jusqu'à quel point la décision n'a pas été fondée sur une évaluation équilibrée et rationnelle des arguments et témoignages présentés devant le Conseil; elle a été l'aboutissement d'un virage politique déjà commencé depuis le début des années 1980, virage qui a été effectué par morceaux (pièce à pièce) et qui n'a jamais été assujetti à une évaluation compréhensive et globale.

Industrial Research and the Pursuit of Corporate Security: The Early Years of Bell Labs

Among the industries that owe their existence to technological innovation, voice communication by wire and by radio is an outstanding example. Professor Reich explains that during its first quarter century, however, the telephone enterprise developed a “business-technology mind-set” (he credits Reese Jenkins with the term) that held back further progress until after the thoroughgoing reorganization of American Telephone & Telegraph in 1907. Thereafter, an initial strong focus on applied science was gradually modified as the company sought to solve problems that stood in the way of important new services, such as long-distance telephony; to stay in the vanguard of major innovations, such as radio, that threatened the dominance of wired telephone systems; and to extend new capabilities into as many alternative techniques as necessary to “box the compass” of the patent laws. In the process, AT&T developed a highly structured research and development facility that pushed businessmen's respect for science and technology to new heights.