Uncertainty, Ambiguity and Risk Taking: An Experimental Investigation of Consumer Behavior and Demand for Insurance

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Desrochers ◽  
J. Francois Outreville
1978 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 625-630 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. McIlvaine Parsons

Based on a new motivational model of driving and/or pedestrian behavior, a technique has been developed for simulating highway accidents to include both the favorable consequences of completing a trip without an accident and the unfavorable consequences (including injury and pain) of having one. Thereby trip-making, accident-avoidance behavior, and risk-taking behavior can be brought into the laboratory for experimental examination of variables that might make accidents less likely. Appropriate simulation of vehicular accidents can bring them into the laboratory for experimental investigation of variables that could be manipulated on the highway to reduce accident frequency. Such simulation should include both making a trip and having an accident, including simulation of the accident's unfortunate effects on a driver (or pedestrian). Before I describe how these have been simulated in a laboratory environment, let us consider the premises on which the simulation is based.


2013 ◽  
Vol 129 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 163-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eleonora Cavalca ◽  
Grace Kong ◽  
Thomas Liss ◽  
Elizabeth K. Reynolds ◽  
Ty S. Schepis ◽  
...  

1969 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 110
Author(s):  
Donald F. Blankertz ◽  
Donald F. Cox

1974 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond C. Battalio ◽  
Edwin B. Fisher, Jr. ◽  
John H. Kagel ◽  
Robert L. Basmann ◽  
Robin C. Winkler ◽  
...  

2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabienne Miller ◽  
Christine A. Denison ◽  
Linda J. Matuszewski

ABSTRACT: Contracts constitute an important control mechanism. Their design is influenced by the preferences of the contracting parties, in addition to firm-level economic transaction costs. This study conducts an experiment to explore the antecedents of preferences for a less complete contract in a trade setting. Results from an experiment indicate that the preference for a more complete versus a less complete contract depends on the perceived riskiness of the incomplete contract, which is influenced by the perceived bargaining power and fairness preferences (namely, distributive and procedural fairness preferences) of the contracting parties. In other words, we find evidence that suggests that choosing the completeness of a contract is a form of risk-taking, and that the preference for a more incomplete contract is influenced by perceived power and fairness preferences.


2010 ◽  
Vol 44 (10) ◽  
pp. 32
Author(s):  
PATRICE WENDLING
Keyword(s):  

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