Modeling the Antecedents of Preferences for Incomplete Contracts in Bilateral Trade: An Experimental Investigation

2012 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fabienne Miller ◽  
Christine A. Denison ◽  
Linda J. Matuszewski

ABSTRACT: Contracts constitute an important control mechanism. Their design is influenced by the preferences of the contracting parties, in addition to firm-level economic transaction costs. This study conducts an experiment to explore the antecedents of preferences for a less complete contract in a trade setting. Results from an experiment indicate that the preference for a more complete versus a less complete contract depends on the perceived riskiness of the incomplete contract, which is influenced by the perceived bargaining power and fairness preferences (namely, distributive and procedural fairness preferences) of the contracting parties. In other words, we find evidence that suggests that choosing the completeness of a contract is a form of risk-taking, and that the preference for a more incomplete contract is influenced by perceived power and fairness preferences.

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 105-114
Author(s):  
Shin’ya Okuda ◽  
◽  
Takaya Kubota ◽  
Yoshimi Chujo ◽  
◽  
...  

The objective of our paper is to provide the reason why the headquarters voluntarily transfer its bargaining power to the business unit by stylizing an incomplete contract model. Our model shows that the equilibrium bargaining power selected by the headquarters is negatively correlated with the importance attached to the business unit’s operations. It means when incomplete contracts severely restrict an important business unit’s incentive to invest because of holdup problem, then the headquarters should necessarily provide the business unit with some degree of bargaining power. This result is consistent with the fact that the independence of a business unit (e.g., spin-offs) is a commonly observable practice. Building on our model, independence of the business unit can be interpreted as a consequence of a gradual delegation of authority by the headquarters. Our paper contributes to both of economics and management accounting literature through providing a model concerning to a decision of organizational structure. Keywords: bargaining power; cost structure; independence of business unit


2005 ◽  
Vol 95 (5) ◽  
pp. 1369-1385 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergei Guriev ◽  
Dmitriy Kvasov

The paper shows how time considerations, especially those concerning contract duration, affect incomplete contract theory. Time is not only a dimension along which the relationship unfolds, but also a continuous verifiable variable that can be included in contracts. We consider a bilateral trade setting where contracting, investment, trade, and renegotiation take place in continuous time. We show that efficient investment can be induced either through a sequence of constantly renegotiated fixed-term contracts; or through a renegotiation-proof “evergreen” contract—a perpetual contract that allows unilateral termination with advance notice. We provide a detailed analysis of properties of optimal contracts.


2015 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 330-354
Author(s):  
Bruno Brandão Fischer ◽  
José Molero

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to verify the impacts of the transaction costs rationale on economic agents’ innovative results when they engage in European R & D networks, supplying both firms and policymakers with empirical support for improved decision making toward economic competitiveness and construction of the European research area. Furthermore, unlike many transaction cost economics assessments, the authors evaluate the existence of transaction costs following a dynamic framework of analysis (instead of using solely ex ante governance choice as a driver of inter-firm “friction” management), offering a novel perspective on these phenomena. Design/methodology/approach – Data consist of firm-level information from Eureka’s Final Reports (1995-2006) for Spanish, Italian, French, British and German firms. Empirical assessments were performed through a two-step approach of direct and indirect effects of network management and potential sources of disturbances. Ordinal regressions were applied in order to identify transaction costs’ relevance as drivers of firms’ technological and commercial outcomes, as well as on managerial quality of alliances. Statistical controls include microeconomic and project-specific variables. Findings – Results highlight the role played by transactional aspects as drivers of companies’ outcomes and managerial complexity. Furthermore, the authors find robust evidence that formal ex ante governance structures are incapable of satisfactorily addressing dynamic disturbances that take place within R & D networks. Whereas such findings are directly related to existing transaction costs, the authors find no support for the usual variables attributed to increased complexity in international inter-firm relationships. Research limitations/implications – Self-selection issues are inherently related to the research instrument (i.e. Eureka’s Reports), while further firm-level data could not be obtained since confidentiality issues protected companies’ names and sectors. Also, network-level data are not available, allowing the evaluation of individual perceptions only. Originality/value – While literature addresses the issue of transaction costs in R & D networks via theoretical assumptions and rough proxies, this assessment offers an in-depth evaluation of a set of valuable indicators with direct implications for researchers, managers and policymakers. Main contributions concern the identification of dynamic interactions (and their respective disturbances) as a key feature of the overall performance of R & D networks, stressing the non-linearity of economic processes in these hybrid relationships, an issue that has been poorly tackled by previous empirical investigations.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 (5) ◽  
pp. 3-21
Author(s):  
Elena Nikishina

The paper deals with the concept of culture and cultural capital in the economic theory. The concept of culture is analyzed through the points of criticism of social capital by R.Solow. The paper suggests a refined definition of culture and cultural capital. Several ways of productive use of cultural capital are described. Among them: through reduction of uncertainty and transaction costs, through use of competitive advantages, based on culture and harmonization of formal and informal rules. The effect of cultural capital on bilateral trade through reduction in uncertainty and transaction costs is tested in the empirical part of the paper. A suggested approach to cultural capital, based on transaction costs theory can be useful for institutional design, and policy-advice, aiming at the increase in competitiveness of society and the efficiency of formal institutions.


2020 ◽  
pp. 019251212094073
Author(s):  
Gabriel Cepaluni ◽  
Ivan Filipe Fernandes

Coalition formation is considered an important tool to leverage bargaining power in GATT/WTO negotiations. While most of the literature has focused on developing countries, we show that sizable economies are the primary users of coalitions at the GATT/WTO. We also find evidence that middle powers do not exhibit distinctive collectivist behavior at the WTO. There is a linear and strong relationship between countries’ economic power—measured as real GDP—and coalition participation within the GATT/WTO system. We explain these results, presenting evidence that large economies—countries that have greater trade negotiations power—join coalitions more often because they are better equipped to absorb transaction costs and more prepared to deal with the uncertainty of WTO negotiations. We also found a relationship between coalition entry and trade openness, with countries more open to trade joining coalitions more often.


2017 ◽  
Vol 08 (02) ◽  
pp. 1750011
Author(s):  
Satyendra Kumar Gupta ◽  
Ashima Goyal

We analyze prospects for the Chinese renminbi to become a major international currency, along with the US dollar, in a multiple reserve currency world. Analytical models on switching costs in networks and on currency choice under direct and indirect transaction costs are used to derive variables for empirical analysis. While network size and financial market depth (lower transaction costs) favor incumbents, changes in trade-related bargaining power and in currency volatility could favor newcomers. The models also point to political determinants affecting currency choice. We develop indices to quantify some of these. When the bargaining power index is used in estimation, it shows capital account openness and currency stability have to complement a rise in trade share for an aspiring reserve currency.


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