Test Generation for Hardware Trojan Detection Using Correlation Analysis and Genetic Algorithm

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Zhendong Shi ◽  
Haocheng Ma ◽  
Qizhi Zhang ◽  
Yanjiang Liu ◽  
Yiqiang Zhao ◽  
...  

Hardware Trojan (HT) is a major threat to the security of integrated circuits (ICs). Among various HT detection approaches, side channel analysis (SCA)-based methods have been extensively studied. SCA-based methods try to detect HTs by comparing side channel signatures from circuits under test with those from trusted golden references. The pre-condition for SCA-based HT detection to work is that the testers can collect extra signatures/anomalies introduced by activated HTs. Thus, activation of HTs and amplification of the differences between circuits under test and golden references are the keys to SCA-based HT detection methods. Test vectors are of great importance to the activation of HTs, but existing test generation methods have two major limitations. First, the number of test vectors required to trigger HTs is quite large. Second, the HT circuit’s activities are marginal compared with the whole circuit’s activities. In this article, we propose an optimized test generation methodology to assist SCA-based HT detection. Considering the HTs’ inherent surreptitious nature, inactive nodes with low transition probability are more likely to be selected as HT trigger nodes. Therefore, the correlations between circuit inputs and inactive nodes are first exploited to activate HTs. Then a test reordering process based on the genetic algorithm (GA) is implemented to increase the proportion of the HT circuit’s activities to the whole circuit’s activities. Experiments on 10 selected ISCAS benchmarks, wb_conmax benchmark, and b17 benchmark demonstrate that the number of test vectors required to trigger HTs reduces 28.8% on average compared with the result of MERO and MERS methods. After the test vector reordering process, the proportion of the HT circuit’s activities to the whole circuit’s activities is improved by 95% on average, compared with the result of MERS method.

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Tapobrata Dhar ◽  
Surajit Kumar Roy ◽  
Chandan Giri

Covert Hardware Trojan Horses (HTH) introduced by malicious attackers during the fabless manufacturing process of integrated circuits (IC) have the potential to cause malignant functions within the circuit. This article employs a Design-for-Security technique to detect any HTHs present in the circuit by inserting tri-state buffers (TSB) in the ICs that inject the internal nets with weighted logic values during the test phase. This increases the transitions in the logic values of the nets within the IC, thereby stimulating any inserted HTH circuits. The TSBs are efficiently inserted in the IC considering various circuit parameters and testability measures to bolster the transitions in logic values of the nets throughout the IC while minimising the area overhead. Simulation results show a significant increase in transitions in logic values within HTH triggers using this method, thus aiding in their detection through side-channel analysis or direct activation of the payload.


2013 ◽  
Vol 401-403 ◽  
pp. 1776-1780
Author(s):  
Xu Xu ◽  
Xiong Wei Li ◽  
Yang Zhang ◽  
Fang Fang Xie

Aim at the feasibility of using electromagnetic emanation side-channel to detect hardware Trojan in IC chips, the structure of EM side-channel signal of chip is analyzed and the leaked model about signal is designed. With explaining the principle of Karhunen-Loeve transform, a method that uses KL transform to obtain characteristic signal of EM emanation side-channel is introduced. It detects hardware Trojan by analyzing the difference between the characteristic signal of chip with and without Trojan. Experiments of detecting hardware Trojan in FPGA cipher chip show that we can distinguish effectively the difference between the EM signals of Trojan chip and genuine chip, then the Trojan in chip can be detected.


Author(s):  
Fakir Sharif Hossain ◽  
Tomokazu Yoneda ◽  
Michihiro Shintani ◽  
Michiko Inoue ◽  
Alex Orailoglo

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (09) ◽  
pp. 1850138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atieh Amelian ◽  
Shahram Etemadi Borujeni

Hardware Trojan Horses (HTHs) are malicious modifications inserted in Integrated Circuit during fabrication steps. The HTHs are very small and can cause damages in circuit function. They cannot be detected by conventional testing methods. Due to dangerous effects of them, Hardware Trojan Detection has become a major concern in hardware security. In this paper, a new HTH detection method is presented based on side-channel analysis that uses path delay measurement. In this method, we find and observe the paths that Trojans have most effect on them. Most of the previous works add some structures to the circuit and need a large overhead cost. But, in our method, there is no modification in the circuit and we can use it for testing the circuits received after fabrication. The proposed method is evaluated with Xilinx FPGA over a number of test circuits. The results show that measuring the delays on 20 paths with an accuracy of 0.01[Formula: see text]ns can detect more than 80% of Trojans.


2014 ◽  
Vol 536-537 ◽  
pp. 558-561
Author(s):  
Wen Feng Feng ◽  
Lei Li ◽  
Zhen Li

In recent years, integrated circuits subject to hardware Trojans attack in the design and manufacturing process, the security of chip and hardware security was threatened. Some detection methods of have been proposed, the most common of those methods is based on side-channel signal analysis, however, since the effect of process noise, considering only the unilateral information that is difficult to effectively distinguish the noise and Trojans circuit. In this paper, the method still based on side-channel signal, but it is a combination of power and delay which was called the power-delay product (PDP). The idea proposed is verified by the benchmark circuit iscas85, the experimental results show that this method can effectively improve detection probability.


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