Using Geospatial Solutions to Meet Distribution Integrity Management Requirements

Author(s):  
Robert A. McElroy

Recently enacted U.S. regulations will require distribution system operators to develop Distribution Integrity Management Programs (DIMP). The purpose of this regulation is to reduce system operating risks and the probability of failure by requiring operators to establish a documented, systematic approach to evaluating and managing risks associated with their pipeline systems. Distribution Integrity Management places new and significant requirements on distribution operators’ Geographic Information System (GIS). Operators already gather much of the data needed for meeting this regulation. The challenge lies in efficiently and accurately integrating and evaluating all system data so operators can identify and implement measures to address risks, monitor progress and report on results. Similar to the role geospatial solutions played in helping transmission pipeline operators meet Integrity Management Program requirements, this paper will discuss the role GIS can play in helping operators meet the DIMP regulations. Data requirements, storage and integration will also be presented. The paper will give examples of how risk-based decision making can improve operational efficiency and resource allocation.

Author(s):  
Terry Boss ◽  
David Johnson ◽  
Bernie Selig ◽  
John Zurcher

The requirement to perform Integrity Management Programs (IMP) in the U.S. was mandated by Congress at the end of 2002. Actual inspections began in 2004. The Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, (INGAA), began a program to measure the effectiveness of the IMP (Integrity Management Program) with some of its member companies, representing approximately 120,000 miles of transmission pipeline. The U.S. has 295,000miles of on shore gas transmission piping. This paper provides 6 years of gathered data on IMP activities and compares them to PHMSA data. The INGAA participating companies have inspected more than 80% of their High Consequence Areas (HCAs) while the total for all PHMSA miles is more than 90% by the end of 2009. The number of PHMSA reported immediate and scheduled repairs being made in HCAs is 0.17 repairs/mile of assessed HCA averaged over the 6 year period. The total number of all repairs reported for the INGAA companies is an average of 0.11 repairs per mile of HCA inspected. There were 6 reportable incidents in HCAs in 2009 for all onshore gas transmission piping, 5 of which were due to third party caused damage. Reassessments, re-inspection of pipe that already had a baseline inspection, are reported for the INGAA program. For calendar years 2007 through 2009, a total of 641 HCA miles of pipeline have been reassessed. There were 19 repairs made in the reassessed pipe, equating to 0.03 repairs/mile, a 73% reduction in the number of repairs in reassessed pipeline.


Author(s):  
Vlad Semiga ◽  
Aaron Dinovitzer

Fitness for service assessments of oil and gas pipelines, conducted either at the design stage or to evaluate an indentified anomaly, are generally carried out in a deterministic manner based on conservative estimates of the required input parameters. The following paper presents a probabilistic Fitness-for-Service (FFS) assessment approach which can be used in a risk based pipeline integrity management program. The probabilistic assessment utilizes an Advanced Monte Carlo simulation based approach and the fracture mechanics techniques described in BS 7910. The paper presents an overview of the basic approach and provides a demonstration of its capabilities in terms of estimating the risk of failure (or probability of failure) associated with a pipeline over time, due to the presence of a crack like flaw. The paper also discusses the sources of data and inherent assumptions used to model various input parameters required for a typical FFS analysis carried out according to BS 7910.


Author(s):  
Syed Haider ◽  
Millan Sen ◽  
Doug Lawrence ◽  
Angela Rodayan

Abstract There is demonstrated potential for failures to occur on station piping assets in facilities, therefore it is critical to take measures to manage preventable releases. In 2018, Enbridge developed a reliability model that uses available asset information to quantify the likelihood of failure of station piping assets. Enbridge based this model on the CFER PIRIMID software, with some modifications to minimize the use of default values and to meet the company’s integrity management program requirements. With successful implementation of station piping model, Enbridge realized opportunity to develop a much-needed flange model leveraging the station piping model. Historical leak data indicates that flanged connections often experience a higher leak frequency than other assets in a facility. While there are industry guidelines that provide guidance for the assembly of process flange connections in a facility, there are few that discuss integrity management of flange connections once they are operational. Most published condition assessment flange models require inputs which are not readily available, e.g. condition of flange faces and gaskets. These inputs often require the flange to be disassembled just to obtain the data. For pipeline operators, data gathering is even more challenging as there are stations (with numerous flanges) that are spread out along the entire pipeline. Given the high number of flange connections and their wide variation in parameters within transmission pipeline facilities, there is benefit in developing a reliability-based model to guide the integrity management of flange connections. A reliability model that works in two stages was developed for this purpose. The pre-inspection assessment stage was designed to utilize available inputs to prioritize groups of flanges for inspection, and the post-inspection assessment (second) stage is then applied to select the specific flanges that require maintenance action. Enbridge utilized industry guidelines, relevant standards, historical failure data, and subject matter experts’ inputs to develop the station piping and flange models. This paper will discuss the design concepts, model architectures, the contributing factors, and their sensitivities to the likelihood of failure results. These concepts may be utilized by any operator managing such assets, and the model designs may be tailored to suit a wide range of facility environments.


Author(s):  
Alex Nemeth ◽  
Sherif Hassanien ◽  
Len Leblanc

The use of integrity reliability science is becoming a prevalent element in the pipeline integrity management process. One of the key elements in this process is defining what integrity reliability targets to achieve in order to maintain the safety of the system. IPC2016-64425 presented different industry approaches around the area of defining reliability target levels for pipelines. It discussed the importance of setting operators’ specific integrity target reliability levels, how to choose such targets, and how to determine the safety of a pipeline asset by comparing the probability of failure (PoF) against an integrity permissible probability of failure (PoFp) while keeping an eye on the estimated expected number of failures. Building upon the previous discussion, this paper reviews a risk-based approach for estimating integrity reliability targets that account for the consequence of a potential release. Given available technical publications, the as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) concept, and operators’ specific risk tolerances, there is room for improving the communication of integrity reliability along with selected targets. The paper describes how codes, standards, and operators set reliability targets, how operator specific targets can be chosen, and how industry currently recommends liquid pipelines reliability targets. Moreover, the paper proposes different approaches to define practical reliability targets coupled with an integrity risk-informed decision making framework.


Author(s):  
Iain R. Colquhoun ◽  
Evelyn Choong ◽  
Richard Kania ◽  
Ming Gao ◽  
Pat Wickenhauser

When the benefits of using risk-based decision making in pipeline integrity management programs have been identified, operators are immediately faced with the challenge of large amounts of risk analysis work. This work frequently has to be done with minimum resources and/or in logistic situations that require a graduated approach extending over several years. In answering this challenge, a starting point must be identified that focuses resources where the risks are greatest. Since these locations are generally unknown in the first instance, the need exists to have a tool available to perform a first or high-level assessment to identify areas requiring further or more detailed study to support the integrity management program. The need also exists to have a robust tool that can be used to direct the assessments of smaller lines that might not require the detailed attention generally given to larger diameter transmission lines. This paper describes the extension of a simple indexing methodology comprising both theoretical and historical components to produce such a tool. It describes the use of so-called “smart” defaults to account for missing data, and a rudimentary decision model that can be used to grade the risk results. Examples are given of applications of the methodology to a gathering system and to the high-level evaluation of a transmission system. The paper also compares the results obtained to other, more detailed methodologies.


Author(s):  
Reena Sahney ◽  
Mike Reed ◽  
Darren Skibinsky

The Canadian Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA) is a voluntary, non-profit industry association representing major Canadian transmission pipeline companies. With the advent of changes in both CSA Z6621 as well as the National Energy Board Onshore Pipeline Regulations (OPR)2, the membership determined a Recommended Practice regarding a Management Systems Approach for Facilities Integrity was needed. As such, the Pipeline Integrity Working Group (PIWG) within CEPA formed a task group to support the initiative. The outlined approach was intended to have two main philosophical underpinnings: it must comprehensively support safe pipeline system operations and it must provide a practical mechanism for implementing a management systems approach for Facilities Iintegrity. The main challenge in developing a framework for a Facilities Integrity Management System lies in the broad range of equipment and system types that the management system must encompass. That is, equipment, in the context of Facilities Integrity Management, must encompass not only station equipment (such as rotating equipment, valves, meters etc.,) but also categories such as high pressure station piping and fuel lines. Further, there was the recognition that Operators already have an array of tools, processes and techniques in place to manage their various equipment and systems. In light of these observations, the Recommended Practice describes a framework that uses major equipment types as a key differentiator. This is an approach that can be easily aligned with existing corporate computerized maintenance management systems (CMMS) such as SAP™ or Maximo™. Once the equipment categorization has been established, the Recommended Practice then provides guidance regarding the specific requirements that should be addressed for each equipment category based on the framework in CSA Z662-11 Annex N. Specific suggestions are provided in the areas of: alignment with corporate goals and objectives, scope, definitions, performance metrics, risk assessments, competency of personnel, change management as well as documentation. The approach also maximizes the opportunity to leverage existing systems and processes to the extent possible. Overall the Recommended Practice should provide operators with a practical way to achieve a greater degree of rigor and alignment of facilities integrity management while ensuring detailed study and analysis is focused in the most appropriate areas.


Author(s):  
Mike Reed ◽  
Reena Sahney ◽  
Darren Skibinsky

Alliance Pipeline, (Alliance), an integrated Canadian and U.S. high-pressure rich natural gas transmission pipeline system, conducts Engineering Assessments for a variety of reasons related to integrity activities such as investigative digs, right-of-way crossings, encroachments and program review; however, the need for a consistent and systematic approach to perform work of this nature was identified. As such, the company launched an initiative to develop a structured approach for undertaking, reviewing and approving Engineering Assessments. The specific challenge in developing a framework for conducting Engineering Assessments is twofold: the framework must be scalable, to address a broad range of situations, while remaining practical to use and understand. In light of these requirements, Alliance chose to adopt a “Tiered” approach to identifying requirements associated with each engineering assessment. The Tier of the Engineering Assessment is defined based on two primary factors: the complexity of the analysis (i.e., whether the methodology of the analysis is well established or not) and the nature of the underlying assumptions (i.e., whether the assumptions associated with the analysis are within established parameters). Once the appropriate Tier has been selected, the framework then provides guidance regarding the specific requirements in the areas of: responsibilities and qualifications of individuals for preparation, review and approval of the assessment as well as documentation. The implementation and use of the structured approach was intended to ensure the Engineering Assessments undertaken within pipeline integrity were technically sound, while recognizing that a broad range of technical complexity, skill level and decision making are associated with Engineering Assessment. Overall, this approach will allow Alliance to achieve a degree of uniformity of its Engineering Assessments in order to manage risks effectively, while addressing the needs of a broad range of scenarios that rely on the methodology.


Symmetry ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 1115 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peng Jiang ◽  
Yixin Wang ◽  
Chao Liu ◽  
Yi-Chung Hu ◽  
Jingci Xie

The infectious disease COVID-19 has swept across the world in 2020, and it continues to cause massive losses of life and severe economic problems in all countries. Providing emergency supplies such as protective medical equipment and materials required to secure people’s livelihood is thus currently prioritized by governments. Establishing a reliable emergency logistics system is critical in this regard. This paper used the Delphi method to design a formal decision structure to assess emergency logistics system reliability (ELSR) by obtaining a consensus from a panel of experts. Assessing ELSR is a typical multiple-attribute decision making (MADM) problem, and the related MADM methods are usually on the basis of symmetry principles. A hybrid MADM model, called the Decision Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL)-based Analytical Network Process (D-ANP), was developed to identify the critical factors influencing ELSR. An analysis of empirical evidence showed that the emergency logistics command and coordination system and the emergency material supply system play important roles in ELSR, while the emergency logistics transportation and distribution system and the emergency information system are not so important. This conclusion is different from previous research about traditional disaster emergency logistics. Moreover, the cause–effect relationships among the key factors indicated that the system of command and coordination for emergency logistics and the supply system for emergency materials should be improved. Accordingly, effective suggestions for emergency logistics services for epidemic prevention are provided in this paper. The main contributions of this paper are (1) establishing a comprehensive and systematic evaluating index of ELSR for epidemic prevention; (2) employing a kind of structured, namely D-ANP, to identify the critical factors with non-commensurable and conflicting (competing) characteristics; and (3) comparing the differences of reliable criteria between the emergency logistics of epidemic prevention and the traditional disaster emergency logistics.


Author(s):  
Shahani Kariyawasam ◽  
Warren Peterson

Reliability methods have being adopted by oil and gas operators for integrity management decisions. These methods explicitly account for all relevant uncertainties and are designed to provide consistent safety. Consequently, a risk or reliability based approach is a very appropriate basis for decision making in the face of uncertainties. However, as in the effective use of any powerful methodology the sensitivities of the method to assumptions and limitations of applicability need to be well understood. This paper presents how improvements were made to reliability based integrity program by understanding its limitations and sensitivities. First the inputs that have the highest impact on the results were identified. These inputs are the most appropriate areas for improvement and data gathering. It is also very important to understand how the results are to be used and for what purpose. The results of this particular inline inspection based reliability assessment are used to make better excavation and repair decisions. A defect-based and joint-based decision making process is essential for determining with sufficient confidence if each defect and joint is in a safe condition. Consequently, the improvements are focused on discriminating between the myriad of defects found during an inline inspection run. Distinct field characteristics of corrosion growth are also taken into account in these improvements. The paper presents the implementation of effective area methods for future integrity probabilistic evaluations. It also describes the benefit of applying defect-specific growth rates. Finally, case studies are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the changes.


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