A Structured Approach for Managing Engineering Assessments

Author(s):  
Mike Reed ◽  
Reena Sahney ◽  
Darren Skibinsky

Alliance Pipeline, (Alliance), an integrated Canadian and U.S. high-pressure rich natural gas transmission pipeline system, conducts Engineering Assessments for a variety of reasons related to integrity activities such as investigative digs, right-of-way crossings, encroachments and program review; however, the need for a consistent and systematic approach to perform work of this nature was identified. As such, the company launched an initiative to develop a structured approach for undertaking, reviewing and approving Engineering Assessments. The specific challenge in developing a framework for conducting Engineering Assessments is twofold: the framework must be scalable, to address a broad range of situations, while remaining practical to use and understand. In light of these requirements, Alliance chose to adopt a “Tiered” approach to identifying requirements associated with each engineering assessment. The Tier of the Engineering Assessment is defined based on two primary factors: the complexity of the analysis (i.e., whether the methodology of the analysis is well established or not) and the nature of the underlying assumptions (i.e., whether the assumptions associated with the analysis are within established parameters). Once the appropriate Tier has been selected, the framework then provides guidance regarding the specific requirements in the areas of: responsibilities and qualifications of individuals for preparation, review and approval of the assessment as well as documentation. The implementation and use of the structured approach was intended to ensure the Engineering Assessments undertaken within pipeline integrity were technically sound, while recognizing that a broad range of technical complexity, skill level and decision making are associated with Engineering Assessment. Overall, this approach will allow Alliance to achieve a degree of uniformity of its Engineering Assessments in order to manage risks effectively, while addressing the needs of a broad range of scenarios that rely on the methodology.

Author(s):  
Danielle Demers ◽  
Arti Bhatia

Alliance Pipeline (Alliance), an integrated Canadian and U.S. high-pressure, high-energy natural gas transmission pipeline system, is committed to the development and application of best practices for the full lifecycle of its pipeline system. Currently, there are several publications which individually set out minimum pipeline separation requirements, and discuss considerations for establishing an appropriate separation distance between adjacent pipelines or other buried structures sharing the same right-of-way (RoW). Alliance has reviewed these existing publications, and has consolidated the requirements, guidance, and best practices discussed therein for application in its own company practices. This paper summarizes the review and consolidation of these requirements, guidance, and best practices.


Author(s):  
David Cheng

Abstract Data from the distributed control system (DCS) or supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system provide useful information critical to the evaluation of the performance and transportation efficiency of a gas pipeline system with compressor stations. The pipeline performance data provide correction factors for compressors as part of the operation optimization of natural gas transmission pipelines. This paper presents methods, procedures, and an example of model validation-based performance analysis of a gas pipeline based on actual system operational data. An analysis approach based on statistical methods is demonstrated with actual DCS gas pipeline measurement data. These methods offer practical ways to validate the pipeline hydraulics model using the DCS data. The validated models are then used as performance analysis tools in assessing the pipeline hydraulics parameters that influence the pressure drop in the pipeline such as corrosion (inside diameter change), roughness changes, or basic sediment and water deposition.


Author(s):  
Terry Boss ◽  
J. Kevin Wison ◽  
Charlie Childs ◽  
Bernie Selig

Interstate natural gas transmission pipelines have performed some standardized integrity management processes since the inception of ASME B3.18 in 1942. These standardized practices have been always preceded by new technology and individual company efforts to improve processes. These standardized practices have improved through the decades through newer consensus standard editions and the adoption of pipeline safety regulations (49 CFR Part 192). The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act which added to the list of these improved practices was passed at the end of 2002 and has been recently reaffirmed in January of 2012. The law applies to natural gas transmission pipeline companies and mandates additional practices that the pipeline operators must conduct to ensure the safety and integrity of natural gas pipelines with specific safety programs. Central to the 2002 Act is the requirement that pipeline operators implement an Integrity Management Program (IMP), which among other things requires operators to identify so-called High Consequence Areas (HCAs) on their systems, conduct risk analyses of these areas, and perform baseline integrity assessments and reassessments of each HCA, according to a prescribed schedule and using prescribed methods. The 2002 Act formalized, expanded and standardized the Integrity Management (IM) practices that individual operators had been conducting on their pipeline systems. The recently passed 2012 Pipeline Safety Act has expanded this effort to include measures to improve the integrity of the total transmission pipeline system. In December 2010, INGAA launched a voluntary initiative to enhance pipeline safety and communicate the results to stakeholders. The efforts are focused on analyzing data that measures the effectiveness of safety and integrity practices, detects successful practices, identifies opportunities for improvement, and further focuses our safety performance by developing an even more effective integrity management process. During 2011, a group chartered under the Integrity Management Continuous Improvement initiative(IMCI) identified information that may be useful in understanding the safety progress of the INGAA membership as they implemented their programs that were composed of the traditional safety practices under DOT Part 192, the PHMSA IMP regulations that were codified in 2004 and the individual operator voluntary programs. The paper provides a snapshot, above and beyond the typical PHMSA mandated reporting, of the results from the data collected and analyzed from this integrity management activity on 185,000 miles of natural gas transmission pipelines operated by interstate natural gas transmission pipelines. Natural gas transmission pipeline companies have made significant strides to improve their systems and the integrity and safety of their pipelines in and beyond HCAs. Our findings indicate that over the course of the data gathering period, pipeline operators’ efforts are shown to be effective and are resulting in improved pipeline integrity. Since the inception of the IMP and the expanded voluntary IM programs, the probability of leaks in the interstate natural gas transmission pipeline system continues on a downward slope, and the number of critical repairs being made to pipe segments that are being reassessed under integrity programs, both mandated and voluntary, are decreasing dramatically. Even with this progress, INGAA members committed in 2011 to embarking on a multi-year effort to expand the width and depth of integrity management practices on the interstate natural gas transmission pipeline systems. A key component of that extensive effort is to design metrics to measure the effectiveness to achieve the goals of that program. As such, this report documents the performance baseline before the implementation of the future program.


Author(s):  
Robert A. McElroy

Recently enacted U.S. regulations will require distribution system operators to develop Distribution Integrity Management Programs (DIMP). The purpose of this regulation is to reduce system operating risks and the probability of failure by requiring operators to establish a documented, systematic approach to evaluating and managing risks associated with their pipeline systems. Distribution Integrity Management places new and significant requirements on distribution operators’ Geographic Information System (GIS). Operators already gather much of the data needed for meeting this regulation. The challenge lies in efficiently and accurately integrating and evaluating all system data so operators can identify and implement measures to address risks, monitor progress and report on results. Similar to the role geospatial solutions played in helping transmission pipeline operators meet Integrity Management Program requirements, this paper will discuss the role GIS can play in helping operators meet the DIMP regulations. Data requirements, storage and integration will also be presented. The paper will give examples of how risk-based decision making can improve operational efficiency and resource allocation.


2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirby S. Chapman ◽  
Prakash Krishniswami ◽  
Virg Wallentine ◽  
Mohammed Abbaspour ◽  
Revathi Ranganathan ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Chris Alexander ◽  
Eelco Jorritsma

An API 579 Level 3 assessment was performed to determine the stresses in a 2% dent in a 20-inch × 0.406-inch pipeline. The intent was to determine the stress concentration factor (SCF) in the dent with a finite element model using geometry data provided from an in-line inspection caliper run. In addition to the analytically-derived SCF, data were also evaluated from a recent experimental study involving a plain dent subjected to cyclic pressure conditions with a profile comparable to the dent in question. This sample was cycled at a stress range of 70% SMYS and failed after 10,163 cycles had been applied. Using the DOE-B mean fatigue curve, combined with the experimental fatigue life, the resulting SCF factor was derived to be 4.20. This value is within 1% of the calculated FEA-based SCF and served to confirm the technical validity of the SCF. The operator provided historical pressure data covering a 12-month period and a rainflow count analysis was performed on the data. Using this data, along with the API X′ design fatigue curve, the estimated remaining life was determined for the dent in question and conservatively estimated to be 65 years. This paper provides details on the analysis methodology and associated results, discussions on the empirically-derived SCF with its use in validating the analytical SCF, and application of the results to estimate the remaining life of the pipeline system. It is the intent of the authors to provide the pipeline industry with a systemic approach for evaluating dent severity using caliper and operating pressure history data.


Author(s):  
Stephen Westwood ◽  
Arti Bhatia

The Alliance Pipeline System consists of 2664 Km of NPS 36 high pressure transmission pipeline and 339 Km of NPS 42 high pressure transmission pipeline. The mainline systems are connected by lateral and interconnect pipeline sections ranging in diameter from NPS 4 to NPS 24. The pipeline system extends from northeast British Columbia to Illinois. The Trans border nature of the pipeline means that it needs to satisfy both the Canadian and US regulatory requirements related to pipeline integrity management. Part of the approval process for the pipeline system was that it had to be inspected on a regular basis with a baseline inspection program to be initiated upon start-up of the pipeline system in 2000. This paper outlines some of the unique challenges the high pressure transmission pipeline presented to both the operator and the inline inspection (ILI) vendor in developing a successful in line inspection program. It discusses the vendor selection criteria used by the pipeline operator and the design process undertaken by the ILI Vendor to meet the requirements of this unique pipeline system. By the end of 2004, the mainline sections in Canada and the US will have been inspected as well as most of the smaller diameter interconnect and lateral system. Results are presented from the ILI inspection of both the high pressure system and the smaller diameter system. While the inspections have used Magnetic Flux leakage (MFL) Technology to detect metal loss features, the use of integrated technology in particular the inertial navigation system aboard the vendor’s inspections tools has allowed geometric features to be detected as well. Lessons learned from both the operator and the ILI Vendor will be presented on the execution of the inline inspection program as well as discussion on ways of ensuring that the ILI process goes smoothly and if not how to address these concerns.


2021 ◽  
Vol 146 ◽  
pp. 432-440
Author(s):  
Guoyun Shi ◽  
Weichao Yu ◽  
Kun Wang ◽  
Fuhua Dang ◽  
Jing Gong ◽  
...  

2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 567-580 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volkan Yildirim ◽  
Tahsin Yomralioglu ◽  
Recep Nisanci ◽  
H. Ebru Çolak ◽  
Şevket Bediroğlu ◽  
...  

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