Integrity Management of Flange Connections Using Reliability Model

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Syed Haider ◽  
Millan Sen ◽  
Doug Lawrence ◽  
Angela Rodayan
Keyword(s):  
Data Gathering ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Reliability Model ◽  
Contributing Factors ◽  
Design Concepts ◽  
Failure Data ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Transmission Pipeline ◽  
Integrity Management

Abstract There is demonstrated potential for failures to occur on station piping assets in facilities, therefore it is critical to take measures to manage preventable releases. In 2018, Enbridge developed a reliability model that uses available asset information to quantify the likelihood of failure of station piping assets. Enbridge based this model on the CFER PIRIMID software, with some modifications to minimize the use of default values and to meet the company’s integrity management program requirements. With successful implementation of station piping model, Enbridge realized opportunity to develop a much-needed flange model leveraging the station piping model. Historical leak data indicates that flanged connections often experience a higher leak frequency than other assets in a facility. While there are industry guidelines that provide guidance for the assembly of process flange connections in a facility, there are few that discuss integrity management of flange connections once they are operational. Most published condition assessment flange models require inputs which are not readily available, e.g. condition of flange faces and gaskets. These inputs often require the flange to be disassembled just to obtain the data. For pipeline operators, data gathering is even more challenging as there are stations (with numerous flanges) that are spread out along the entire pipeline. Given the high number of flange connections and their wide variation in parameters within transmission pipeline facilities, there is benefit in developing a reliability-based model to guide the integrity management of flange connections. A reliability model that works in two stages was developed for this purpose. The pre-inspection assessment stage was designed to utilize available inputs to prioritize groups of flanges for inspection, and the post-inspection assessment (second) stage is then applied to select the specific flanges that require maintenance action. Enbridge utilized industry guidelines, relevant standards, historical failure data, and subject matter experts’ inputs to develop the station piping and flange models. This paper will discuss the design concepts, model architectures, the contributing factors, and their sensitivities to the likelihood of failure results. These concepts may be utilized by any operator managing such assets, and the model designs may be tailored to suit a wide range of facility environments.

Advanced Integrity Management Framework for Pipelines

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Len LeBlanc ◽  
Walter Kresic ◽  
Sean Keane ◽  
John Munro
Keyword(s):  
Continuous Improvement ◽  
Program Effectiveness ◽  
Level Structure ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Lessons Learned ◽  
Management Framework ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Safety Case ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
High Level

This paper describes the integrity management framework utilized within the Enbridge Liquids Pipelines Integrity Management Program. The role of the framework is to provide the high-level structure used by the company to prepare and demonstrate integrity safety decisions relative to mainline pipelines, and facility piping segments where applicable. The scope is directed to corrosion, cracking, and deformation threats and all variants within those broad categories. The basis for the framework centers on the use of a safety case to provide evidence that the risks affecting the system have been effectively mitigated. A ‘safety case’, for the purposes of this methodology is defined as a structured argument demonstrating that the evidence is sufficient to show that the system is safe.[1] The decision model brings together the aspects of data integration and determination of maintenance timing; execution of prevention, monitoring, and mitigation; confirmation that the execution has met reliability targets; application of additional steps if targets are not met; and then the collation of the results into an engineering assessment of the program effectiveness (safety case). Once the program is complete, continuous improvement is built into the next program through the incorporation of research and development solutions, lessons learned, and improvements to processes. On the basis of a wide range of experiences, investigations and research, it was concluded that there are combinations of monitoring and mitigation methods required in an integrity program to effectively manage integrity threats. A safety case approach ultimately provides the structure for measuring the effectiveness of integrity monitoring and mitigation efforts, and the methodology to assess whether a pipeline is sufficiently safe with targets for continuous improvement. Hence, the need for the safety case is to provide transparent, quantitative integrity program performance results which are continually improved upon through ongoing revalidations and improvement to the methods utilized. This enables risk reduction, better stakeholder awareness, focused innovation, opportunities for industry information sharing along with other benefits.

Measuring the Effectiveness of the U.S. IMP Program

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Terry Boss ◽  
David Johnson ◽  
Bernie Selig ◽  
John Zurcher
Keyword(s):  
Natural Gas ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Transmission Pipeline ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
The U.S ◽  
Made In

The requirement to perform Integrity Management Programs (IMP) in the U.S. was mandated by Congress at the end of 2002. Actual inspections began in 2004. The Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, (INGAA), began a program to measure the effectiveness of the IMP (Integrity Management Program) with some of its member companies, representing approximately 120,000 miles of transmission pipeline. The U.S. has 295,000miles of on shore gas transmission piping. This paper provides 6 years of gathered data on IMP activities and compares them to PHMSA data. The INGAA participating companies have inspected more than 80% of their High Consequence Areas (HCAs) while the total for all PHMSA miles is more than 90% by the end of 2009. The number of PHMSA reported immediate and scheduled repairs being made in HCAs is 0.17 repairs/mile of assessed HCA averaged over the 6 year period. The total number of all repairs reported for the INGAA companies is an average of 0.11 repairs per mile of HCA inspected. There were 6 reportable incidents in HCAs in 2009 for all onshore gas transmission piping, 5 of which were due to third party caused damage. Reassessments, re-inspection of pipe that already had a baseline inspection, are reported for the INGAA program. For calendar years 2007 through 2009, a total of 641 HCA miles of pipeline have been reassessed. There were 19 repairs made in the reassessed pipe, equating to 0.03 repairs/mile, a 73% reduction in the number of repairs in reassessed pipeline.

Optimizing the Management of Excavation and Repair Data From Inline Inspection Programs

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miaad Safari ◽  
David Shaw
Keyword(s):  
Condition Monitoring ◽  
Data Gathering ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Data Uncertainty ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
System Integrity ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
External Corrosion ◽  
Inspection Data ◽  
Superior Approach

Abstract As integrity programs mature over the life of a pipeline, an increasing number of data points are collected from second, third, or further condition monitoring cycles. Types of data include Inline Inspection (ILI) or External Corrosion Direct Assessment (ECDA) inspection data, validation or remediation dig information, and records of various repairs that have been completed on the pipeline system. The diversity and massive quantity of this gathered data proposes a challenge to pipeline operators in managing and maintaining these data sets and records. The management of integrity data is a key element to a pipeline system Integrity Management Program (IMP) as per the CSA Z662[1]. One of the most critical integrity datasets is the repair information. Incorrect repair assignments on a pipeline can lead to duplicate unnecessary excavations in the best scenario and a pipeline failure in the worst scenario. Operators rely on various approaches to manage and assign repair data to ILIs such as historical records reviews, ILI-based repair assignments, or chainage-based repair assignments. However, these methods have significant gaps in efficiency and/or accuracy. Failure to adequately manage excavation and repair data can lead to increased costs due to repeated excavation of an anomaly, an increase in resources required to match historical information with new data, uncertainty in the effectiveness of previous repairs, and the possibility of incorrect assignment of repairs to unrepaired features. This paper describes the approach adopted by Enbridge Gas to track and maintain repairs, as a part of the Pipeline Risk and Integrity Management (PRIM) platform. This approach was designed to create a robust excavation and repair management framework, providing a robust system of data gathering and automation, while ensuring sufficient oversight by Integrity Engineers. Using this system, repairs are assigned to each feature in an excavation, not only to a certain chainage along the pipeline. Subsequently, when a new ILI results report is received, a process of “Repair Matching” is completed to assign preexisting repairs and assessments to the newly reported features at a feature level. This process is partially automated, whereby pre-determined box-to-box features matched between ILIs can auto-populate repairs for many of the repaired features. The proposed excavation management system would provide operators a superior approach to managing their repair history and projecting historical repairs and assessments onto new ILI reports, prior to assessing the ILI and issuing further digs on the pipeline. This optimized method has many advantages over the conventional repair management methods used in the industry. This method is best suited for operators that are embarking on their second or third condition monitoring cycle, with a moderate number of historical repairs.

Using Geospatial Solutions to Meet Distribution Integrity Management Requirements

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert A. McElroy
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Distribution System ◽  
Systematic Approach ◽  
Probability Of Failure ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Transmission Pipeline ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
System Data ◽  
Data Requirements ◽  
System Operating

Recently enacted U.S. regulations will require distribution system operators to develop Distribution Integrity Management Programs (DIMP). The purpose of this regulation is to reduce system operating risks and the probability of failure by requiring operators to establish a documented, systematic approach to evaluating and managing risks associated with their pipeline systems. Distribution Integrity Management places new and significant requirements on distribution operators’ Geographic Information System (GIS). Operators already gather much of the data needed for meeting this regulation. The challenge lies in efficiently and accurately integrating and evaluating all system data so operators can identify and implement measures to address risks, monitor progress and report on results. Similar to the role geospatial solutions played in helping transmission pipeline operators meet Integrity Management Program requirements, this paper will discuss the role GIS can play in helping operators meet the DIMP regulations. Data requirements, storage and integration will also be presented. The paper will give examples of how risk-based decision making can improve operational efficiency and resource allocation.

Total Pipeline Integrity Management System Implemented for KOC Pipelines: A Case Study

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Robb Isaac ◽  
Saleh Al-Sulaiman ◽  
Monty R. Martin ◽  
Sandeep Sharma
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Significant Loss ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Initial Assessment ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
Transit System ◽  
Integrity Assessment ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Integrity Management

In early 2005, Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) initiated a Total Pipeline Integrity Management System (TPIMS) implementation in order to carry out a major integrity assessment of its operating facilities, equipment, buried plant piping and pipeline network and to establish a continuing integrity management program. KOC Transit System is a complex infrastructure consisting of over three hundred pipelines, thousands of wellhead flow lines, and consumer and offshore lines for which there was a significant loss of data when the facilities were destroyed during a military invasion in 1990. An initial pipeline system assessment identified issues and actions regarding condition of the pipelines, corridors, requirements on in-line inspection (ILI), documentation, RISK assessment, status of international code compliance, and overall state of the system. Following recommendations from that initial assessment led to the development of a long term strategy; the execution of which required the implementation of a comprehensive integrity management program. This case study discusses the results obtained after five years of implementation of TPIMS at KOC. It will demonstrate some of the complex components involved in managing the integrity of the Transit System that have been made possible through the implementation of the system. The general concept and structure of TPIMS will be described, and how it deals with the complexity of the KOC pipeline system. The system made it possible to integrate and manage data from various sources, by conducting integrity assessment using ILI, Direct Assessment and hydrostatic testing, as well as structure a comprehensive RISK & Decision Support mechanism. This is one of the world’s first implementations of this magnitude which encompasses such a wide range of services and variables; all being managed in a single environment and utilized by a multitude of users in different areas at KOC. The biggest challenge in a project of this scope is data management. Examples will be shown of the integration structure to illustrate the benefits of using a single comprehensive and versatile platform to manage system requirements; ultimately providing system reliability and improving overall operational efficiency.

The Development of a Facilities Integrity Management Program Recommended Practice for Canadian Energy Pipelines

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Reena Sahney ◽  
Mike Reed ◽  
Darren Skibinsky
Keyword(s):  
Management System ◽  
Performance Metrics ◽  
Systems Approach ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Management Systems ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
Main Challenge ◽  
Transmission Pipeline ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Major Equipment

The Canadian Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA) is a voluntary, non-profit industry association representing major Canadian transmission pipeline companies. With the advent of changes in both CSA Z6621 as well as the National Energy Board Onshore Pipeline Regulations (OPR)2, the membership determined a Recommended Practice regarding a Management Systems Approach for Facilities Integrity was needed. As such, the Pipeline Integrity Working Group (PIWG) within CEPA formed a task group to support the initiative. The outlined approach was intended to have two main philosophical underpinnings: it must comprehensively support safe pipeline system operations and it must provide a practical mechanism for implementing a management systems approach for Facilities Iintegrity. The main challenge in developing a framework for a Facilities Integrity Management System lies in the broad range of equipment and system types that the management system must encompass. That is, equipment, in the context of Facilities Integrity Management, must encompass not only station equipment (such as rotating equipment, valves, meters etc.,) but also categories such as high pressure station piping and fuel lines. Further, there was the recognition that Operators already have an array of tools, processes and techniques in place to manage their various equipment and systems. In light of these observations, the Recommended Practice describes a framework that uses major equipment types as a key differentiator. This is an approach that can be easily aligned with existing corporate computerized maintenance management systems (CMMS) such as SAP™ or Maximo™. Once the equipment categorization has been established, the Recommended Practice then provides guidance regarding the specific requirements that should be addressed for each equipment category based on the framework in CSA Z662-11 Annex N. Specific suggestions are provided in the areas of: alignment with corporate goals and objectives, scope, definitions, performance metrics, risk assessments, competency of personnel, change management as well as documentation. The approach also maximizes the opportunity to leverage existing systems and processes to the extent possible. Overall the Recommended Practice should provide operators with a practical way to achieve a greater degree of rigor and alignment of facilities integrity management while ensuring detailed study and analysis is focused in the most appropriate areas.

Results of a Mitigation Technique Used to Reduce Pipeline Strains in Unstable Slopes

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria F. Contreras ◽  
Mauricio Pereira Ordoñez ◽  
Jon Hernández ◽  
Carlos Vergara
Keyword(s):  
Cost Reduction ◽  
Young Modulus ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
Geotechnical Investigation ◽  
Buried Pipe ◽  
Soil Movement ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
Mitigation Technique

The OCENSA pipeline system crosses a wide range of geological zones, finding different stability problems. Those problems related with landslides are stabilized with different kinds of geotechnical works within the pipeline maintenance programs, but sometimes these problems reach big dimensions making very difficult to stabilize them, so mitigation techniques are necessary in order to guarantee the pipe integrity. A mitigation technique using EPS (Expanded Poly-Styrene) blocks is being used in the OCENSA pipeline system (Colombia) in order to reduce the buried pipe response due to soil displacements during landslide events and in creeping slopes. OCENSA is the first operator in Latin America using this technique. Prior to the use of this technique, numerical modeling studies were done with the support of SOLSIN S.A.S. These studies were focused on determining the viability and effectiveness of the proposed technique. The purpose of the EPS blocks is to constitute a low-density fill with very low Young modulus reducing the soil-pipeline interaction forces. These blocks are located near the landslide limits in both, the stable and un-stable zones in order to reduce the stiffness of the materials around the pipe. These blocks allow the pipe to move beyond the landslide limits, reducing the bending strains. The extension of the EPS backfill is determined by means of the geotechnical investigation of the place in study and using the in-line inspection tools data to determine the length of the pipe affected by the soil movement. In this paper, three case studies are presented in which the proposed mitigation technique effectiveness was proved. In this part, data analyses coming from the in line inspection program was done. The inertial tool data showed that the EPS blocks had a significant effect on the pipe response, reducing the total strains compared with those obtained with a normal backfill. This technique can be used to reduce the frequency of the strain-relief excavations in unstable slopes. That means a cost reduction in the pipe maintenance activities and a more efficient integrity management program.

System-Wide Response to Incidents: Case Study

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Zhang ◽  
S. Kariyawasam ◽  
R. Sutherby ◽  
J. Upadhyaya
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
Thermal Expansion ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Energy Industry ◽  
Major Incident ◽  
Pipeline System ◽  
Contributing Factors ◽  
Major Incidents ◽  
Integrity Management

This paper presents a systematic and comprehensive procedure for the system-wide response to incidents (SWRI). This SWRI process has been used for identifying emerging threats and incorporating the learnings from major incidents into a pipeline integrity management program (IMP). This process also complements the IMP for threat identification and system wide risk assessment, thus giving consideration to all known threats and their interactions. A recent major incident due to thermal expansion on a TransCanada pipeline system was used to demonstrate the process of SWRI and the use of SWRI to identify the contributing factors of thermal expansion. An example was used to illustrate the engineering assessment for thermal expansion driven by the construction of two new compressor stations on an existing pipeline. The process documented in this case study has the potential to augment the integrity management programs and systemic corrective actions for pipeline systems in the energy industry.

Essential Elements of an Asset Integrity Management Program for Ammonia and Methanol Plants

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carl E. Jaske ◽  
Steven J. Weichel ◽  
Michiel P. H. Brongers
Keyword(s):  
Risk Management ◽  
Emergency Response ◽  
Essential Elements ◽  
Pressure Vessels ◽  
Management Program ◽  
Near Misses ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
Integrity Management ◽  
World Class

World-class ammonia and methanol plants typically produce more than 500,000 metric tons of ammonia or methanol per year. These plants utilize pressure vessels, piping, and tanks that operate over a wide range of temperatures and pressures. The materials of construction range from carbon steel to corrosion-resistant and heat-resistant alloys. Ensuring the safe and reliable operation of these facilities requires an effective asset integrity management program. This paper reviews the essential elements of an asset integrity management program and provides recommendations for judging the effectiveness of the program. The essential elements of an asset integrity management program include leadership, risk management, personnel and contractor competence, management of change, learning from events, emergency response, and implementation of quality assurance, maintenance, inspection, fitness-for-service assessment, repair, and replacement. Management commitment to the program is a key factor in leadership. Risk is managed by mitigating the consequences of an incident as well as minimizing its likelihood; a robust risk-based inspection (RBI) program is typically part of the risk management. In-service degradation mechanisms of the materials that are used in pressure vessels, piping, and tanks include corrosion, fatigue, creep, and metallurgical embrittlement. If defects are identified by inspection, fitness for service assessment is performed to determine what action is to be taken. Training and certification of personnel and contractors is required to make sure that this work is properly performed. Incidents and near misses that occur in the plant and in the industry need to be reviewed to identify areas for potential program improvements. Timely and appropriate emergency response can minimize the consequences of an incident.

Impacts of State-Specific Policy and Legislation on Safety Advancement by Departments of Transportation

2018 ◽  
Vol 2672 (32) ◽  
pp. 107-119
Author(s):  
Jennifer H. Ogle ◽  
Sababa Islam ◽  
Kweku Brown ◽  
William J. Davis ◽  
Wayne A. Sarasua
Keyword(s):  
South Carolina ◽  
Emergency Services ◽  
Motor Vehicle ◽  
Safety Management ◽  
Substantial Reduction ◽  
Management Program ◽  
The State ◽  
Data Driven ◽  
Successful Implementation ◽  
Wide Range

The overall goal of this research was to identify proven successful safety programs used in other states and assess the potential for safety improvement if similar programs were implemented in South Carolina. The research team not only sought out engineering solutions, but also expanded the search to include programs for enforcement, education, licensing, legal proceedings, and emergency services—therefore incorporating a wide range of stakeholder groups. South Carolina has, for many years, had one of the highest mileage death rates of any state in the nation—far exceeding the national fatality rate. While South Carolina Department of Transportation has a federal requirement to develop and maintain the Strategic Highway Safety Plan, which identifies the state’s key safety needs and guides investment decisions toward strategies and countermeasures with the most potential to save lives and prevent injuries, South Carolina legislation and state policies have effectively blocked many paths to safety improvements. Tree protection ordinances, limited policies for graduated drivers licensing, bans on camera enforcement, and lack of universal helmet laws continue to undermine efforts to improve motor vehicle safety in the state. Using a data-driven approach to safety program selection will yield support for changes in programs, policies, and standards, and have positive impacts on safety, operational, and economic aspects of the South Carolina roadway system. Further, the implementation of a data-driven safety management program will help to assure that the most appropriate strategies are implemented. The successful implementation of this research would likely result in a substantial reduction in loss of life and injuries associated with motor vehicle crashes in the state of South Carolina.

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