Measuring the Effectiveness of the U.S. IMP Program

Author(s):  
Terry Boss ◽  
David Johnson ◽  
Bernie Selig ◽  
John Zurcher

The requirement to perform Integrity Management Programs (IMP) in the U.S. was mandated by Congress at the end of 2002. Actual inspections began in 2004. The Interstate Natural Gas Association of America, (INGAA), began a program to measure the effectiveness of the IMP (Integrity Management Program) with some of its member companies, representing approximately 120,000 miles of transmission pipeline. The U.S. has 295,000miles of on shore gas transmission piping. This paper provides 6 years of gathered data on IMP activities and compares them to PHMSA data. The INGAA participating companies have inspected more than 80% of their High Consequence Areas (HCAs) while the total for all PHMSA miles is more than 90% by the end of 2009. The number of PHMSA reported immediate and scheduled repairs being made in HCAs is 0.17 repairs/mile of assessed HCA averaged over the 6 year period. The total number of all repairs reported for the INGAA companies is an average of 0.11 repairs per mile of HCA inspected. There were 6 reportable incidents in HCAs in 2009 for all onshore gas transmission piping, 5 of which were due to third party caused damage. Reassessments, re-inspection of pipe that already had a baseline inspection, are reported for the INGAA program. For calendar years 2007 through 2009, a total of 641 HCA miles of pipeline have been reassessed. There were 19 repairs made in the reassessed pipe, equating to 0.03 repairs/mile, a 73% reduction in the number of repairs in reassessed pipeline.

Author(s):  
Terry Boss ◽  
J. Kevin Wison ◽  
Charlie Childs ◽  
Bernie Selig

Interstate natural gas transmission pipelines have performed some standardized integrity management processes since the inception of ASME B3.18 in 1942. These standardized practices have been always preceded by new technology and individual company efforts to improve processes. These standardized practices have improved through the decades through newer consensus standard editions and the adoption of pipeline safety regulations (49 CFR Part 192). The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act which added to the list of these improved practices was passed at the end of 2002 and has been recently reaffirmed in January of 2012. The law applies to natural gas transmission pipeline companies and mandates additional practices that the pipeline operators must conduct to ensure the safety and integrity of natural gas pipelines with specific safety programs. Central to the 2002 Act is the requirement that pipeline operators implement an Integrity Management Program (IMP), which among other things requires operators to identify so-called High Consequence Areas (HCAs) on their systems, conduct risk analyses of these areas, and perform baseline integrity assessments and reassessments of each HCA, according to a prescribed schedule and using prescribed methods. The 2002 Act formalized, expanded and standardized the Integrity Management (IM) practices that individual operators had been conducting on their pipeline systems. The recently passed 2012 Pipeline Safety Act has expanded this effort to include measures to improve the integrity of the total transmission pipeline system. In December 2010, INGAA launched a voluntary initiative to enhance pipeline safety and communicate the results to stakeholders. The efforts are focused on analyzing data that measures the effectiveness of safety and integrity practices, detects successful practices, identifies opportunities for improvement, and further focuses our safety performance by developing an even more effective integrity management process. During 2011, a group chartered under the Integrity Management Continuous Improvement initiative(IMCI) identified information that may be useful in understanding the safety progress of the INGAA membership as they implemented their programs that were composed of the traditional safety practices under DOT Part 192, the PHMSA IMP regulations that were codified in 2004 and the individual operator voluntary programs. The paper provides a snapshot, above and beyond the typical PHMSA mandated reporting, of the results from the data collected and analyzed from this integrity management activity on 185,000 miles of natural gas transmission pipelines operated by interstate natural gas transmission pipelines. Natural gas transmission pipeline companies have made significant strides to improve their systems and the integrity and safety of their pipelines in and beyond HCAs. Our findings indicate that over the course of the data gathering period, pipeline operators’ efforts are shown to be effective and are resulting in improved pipeline integrity. Since the inception of the IMP and the expanded voluntary IM programs, the probability of leaks in the interstate natural gas transmission pipeline system continues on a downward slope, and the number of critical repairs being made to pipe segments that are being reassessed under integrity programs, both mandated and voluntary, are decreasing dramatically. Even with this progress, INGAA members committed in 2011 to embarking on a multi-year effort to expand the width and depth of integrity management practices on the interstate natural gas transmission pipeline systems. A key component of that extensive effort is to design metrics to measure the effectiveness to achieve the goals of that program. As such, this report documents the performance baseline before the implementation of the future program.


Author(s):  
Robert A. McElroy

Recently enacted U.S. regulations will require distribution system operators to develop Distribution Integrity Management Programs (DIMP). The purpose of this regulation is to reduce system operating risks and the probability of failure by requiring operators to establish a documented, systematic approach to evaluating and managing risks associated with their pipeline systems. Distribution Integrity Management places new and significant requirements on distribution operators’ Geographic Information System (GIS). Operators already gather much of the data needed for meeting this regulation. The challenge lies in efficiently and accurately integrating and evaluating all system data so operators can identify and implement measures to address risks, monitor progress and report on results. Similar to the role geospatial solutions played in helping transmission pipeline operators meet Integrity Management Program requirements, this paper will discuss the role GIS can play in helping operators meet the DIMP regulations. Data requirements, storage and integration will also be presented. The paper will give examples of how risk-based decision making can improve operational efficiency and resource allocation.


2005 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirby S. Chapman ◽  
Prakash Krishniswami ◽  
Virg Wallentine ◽  
Mohammed Abbaspour ◽  
Revathi Ranganathan ◽  
...  

Author(s):  
Syed Haider ◽  
Millan Sen ◽  
Doug Lawrence ◽  
Angela Rodayan

Abstract There is demonstrated potential for failures to occur on station piping assets in facilities, therefore it is critical to take measures to manage preventable releases. In 2018, Enbridge developed a reliability model that uses available asset information to quantify the likelihood of failure of station piping assets. Enbridge based this model on the CFER PIRIMID software, with some modifications to minimize the use of default values and to meet the company’s integrity management program requirements. With successful implementation of station piping model, Enbridge realized opportunity to develop a much-needed flange model leveraging the station piping model. Historical leak data indicates that flanged connections often experience a higher leak frequency than other assets in a facility. While there are industry guidelines that provide guidance for the assembly of process flange connections in a facility, there are few that discuss integrity management of flange connections once they are operational. Most published condition assessment flange models require inputs which are not readily available, e.g. condition of flange faces and gaskets. These inputs often require the flange to be disassembled just to obtain the data. For pipeline operators, data gathering is even more challenging as there are stations (with numerous flanges) that are spread out along the entire pipeline. Given the high number of flange connections and their wide variation in parameters within transmission pipeline facilities, there is benefit in developing a reliability-based model to guide the integrity management of flange connections. A reliability model that works in two stages was developed for this purpose. The pre-inspection assessment stage was designed to utilize available inputs to prioritize groups of flanges for inspection, and the post-inspection assessment (second) stage is then applied to select the specific flanges that require maintenance action. Enbridge utilized industry guidelines, relevant standards, historical failure data, and subject matter experts’ inputs to develop the station piping and flange models. This paper will discuss the design concepts, model architectures, the contributing factors, and their sensitivities to the likelihood of failure results. These concepts may be utilized by any operator managing such assets, and the model designs may be tailored to suit a wide range of facility environments.


Author(s):  
Reena Sahney ◽  
Mike Reed ◽  
Darren Skibinsky

The Canadian Energy Pipeline Association (CEPA) is a voluntary, non-profit industry association representing major Canadian transmission pipeline companies. With the advent of changes in both CSA Z6621 as well as the National Energy Board Onshore Pipeline Regulations (OPR)2, the membership determined a Recommended Practice regarding a Management Systems Approach for Facilities Integrity was needed. As such, the Pipeline Integrity Working Group (PIWG) within CEPA formed a task group to support the initiative. The outlined approach was intended to have two main philosophical underpinnings: it must comprehensively support safe pipeline system operations and it must provide a practical mechanism for implementing a management systems approach for Facilities Iintegrity. The main challenge in developing a framework for a Facilities Integrity Management System lies in the broad range of equipment and system types that the management system must encompass. That is, equipment, in the context of Facilities Integrity Management, must encompass not only station equipment (such as rotating equipment, valves, meters etc.,) but also categories such as high pressure station piping and fuel lines. Further, there was the recognition that Operators already have an array of tools, processes and techniques in place to manage their various equipment and systems. In light of these observations, the Recommended Practice describes a framework that uses major equipment types as a key differentiator. This is an approach that can be easily aligned with existing corporate computerized maintenance management systems (CMMS) such as SAP™ or Maximo™. Once the equipment categorization has been established, the Recommended Practice then provides guidance regarding the specific requirements that should be addressed for each equipment category based on the framework in CSA Z662-11 Annex N. Specific suggestions are provided in the areas of: alignment with corporate goals and objectives, scope, definitions, performance metrics, risk assessments, competency of personnel, change management as well as documentation. The approach also maximizes the opportunity to leverage existing systems and processes to the extent possible. Overall the Recommended Practice should provide operators with a practical way to achieve a greater degree of rigor and alignment of facilities integrity management while ensuring detailed study and analysis is focused in the most appropriate areas.


2007 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
E. DeMichele ◽  
P. S. Machno ◽  
L. A. Stone

The U.S. National Biosolids Partnership (NBP), an alliance of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), National Association of Clean Water Agencies (NACWA) and Water Environment Federation (WEF), was formed in 1997 in response to public acceptance issues dealing with biosolids management. The United States Congress provides funding to assist public agencies to improve existing biosolids management programs to maintain/achieve public support. The key to a successful program is systematic management and an independent third party audit to assure organizations are managing biosolids to meet the requirements of an excellent biosolids management program. The NBP program utilizes the ISO 14001 Environmental Management System principles. The program has defined 17 components of excellent biosolids management and the independent third party audit program. One hundred organizations are participating in the program and 16 agencies have been “certified” though a third party audit. The smallest agency serves a community of 200 people and the largest treats over a billion gallons a day. Participants are benefiting through cost savings, efficiencies and better public trust.


Author(s):  
Pedro M. Hryciuk ◽  
Eduardo Carzoglio ◽  
Jose A. Minellono ◽  
Leonardo Martinetto ◽  
Pedro M. Guillen ◽  
...  

This paper describes the activities and stages completed as part of the Integrity Management Program for SCC in the natural gas system of Transportadora de Gas del Norte (TGN-Argentina) which started in 2000. This document focuses in a pipeline section of the system, which suffered an in-service failure in 2002 due to high pH SCC. This event triggered a series of activities, whose results are detailed in this paper. These activities involved soil analysis to determine the susceptibility to develop SCC along the system pipelines. For susceptible sections, the program included hydrostatic testing to levels of 100% and 110% of SMYS followed by replacement of degraded coating. The paper also details the experience in the use of new internal inspection tools with EMAT technology. The capability of the EMAT tool to detect and size SCC defects and the possibility of discriminating between SCC colonies that have been recoated and those that may still be active due to degraded coating is discussed. Finally, the severity of SCC cracks detected by in-line inspection is assessed using API 579 methodology, and the feasibility of using this assessment results to determine the critical SCC defect sizes for detection by ILI tools is analyzed.


Author(s):  
Eduardo Bomfim Boszczowski ◽  
Carlos Renato Aragonez de Vasconcellos ◽  
Kleber Vini´cius da Cruz ◽  
Ozias Pereira Filho ◽  
Sarah Marcela C. Cartagena

The present paper describes the tasks developed along 550 kilometers of PETROBRAS TRANSPORTE South Region right-of-way where there are more than 1000 kilometers of onshore pipelines. This work was based on the company Integrity Management Program, with focus on risk reduction due to third party damage, promoting social accountability and environment preservation. On the Introduction there are presented pipeline failures stats in USA and Europe. It’s visible in the stats that third party damage is one of the most common pipeline failures responsibleness. In the next topics we list the mitigation methods based on the Integrity Management Program that involves risk analysis; inspection plans based on risk; plan check and program audits. On the Detailed Plan we present standards and normal requirement for pipeline integrity; the Company GIS — Geographic Information System — where you find the pipeline data with its position and depth from ground level; the action plan to correct anomalies found during inspections; and the awareness programs performed through the Communication System to answer the solicitations registered at TRANSPETRO Call Center. We also present the social and environment Responsibility Program that includes the Identification of the communities around our right-of-way, the social and environment classification and the projects development to guaranty the installation integrity that contribute to the communities quality life raise. The Communication Plan for the stakeholders is based on API 1162 – Public Awareness Programs for Pipeline Operators. This plan is accomplished by a team of different professionals such as communication and social service professionals and others. They visit Public Officials (City Hall, Civil Defense, Fire Department, Road Police and Public Services Providers), Excavators, land owners and communities with the objective to guide and publicize safe and co-responsible manners to pipeline installations. It’s remarkable the creation of especial projects in the communities along the right-of-way, such as Communitarian vegetable fields, mobile movie theaters and educational effort in high schools. We also present the results from the Integrity Program to prevent third party damage, the improvement promoted and the recommendations to make it better. At the end we present the costs involved in all actions to prevent third party damage by Brazil South Region Pipeline Operator.


Author(s):  
Carly Meena ◽  
Neil Gulewicz ◽  
Carl Kennedy ◽  
Tim Collis

Abstract The risk associated with third-party damage to transmission pipelines in areas of urban development is high. Distributed monitoring is a modern technique that uses fiber optic cables as sensors to continuously monitor pipeline parameters such as acoustics, vibration, strain and temperature. The fiber optic system notifies the operator in real-time of ongoing events allowing decisions to be made to prevent external interference or quickly address an incident that has already occurred. Traditional methods used to install distributed monitoring systems on pipelines have limitations and are not feasible for all transmission pipelines. For instance, it can be both challenging and expensive to trench in fiber optics in developed areas and other installation techniques require the pipeline to be temporarily taken out of service. SaskEnergy Incorporated’s transmission line subsidiary, TransGas Limited partnered with a Canadian pipeline monitoring service provider to install fiber optics inside of a natural gas transmission pipeline using a pig, steel capillary tubing and a pack-off hanger. A disengagement system was incorporated to release the fiber optics after the desired monitoring distance was reached. It was decided to perform the pilot project on a newly constructed NPS 6 natural gas transmission pipeline located in Humboldt, Saskatchewan. Nitrogen was used as a medium to simulate an in-service pipeline in order to reduce the risks associated with the first attempt of the project designs. The fiber optics were inserted into steel capillary tubing and connected to a disengagement system located at the back of a pig. A pack-off hanger was used to maintain pipeline pressure during and after the installation was completed. The spool holding the steel capillary tubing was stopped once the maximum monitoring distance was reached and the differential pressure activated the disengagement system located at the back of the pig. The pig continued to the receive location and the fiber optics remained in the pipeline for continuous monitoring. The deployment was successful and the fiber optics will remain in the pipeline for a one (1) year monitoring period. The primary limitation to this pilot project was the strength of the steel capillary tubing. The steel capillary tubing’s ultimate tensile strength would have to be higher to accommodate a pipeline with a larger outside diameter, multiple bends, large changes in wall thickness or large elevation changes. In addition, the steel capillary tubing must be removed from the pipeline in order to perform pigging activities.


Author(s):  
Godfrey Omonefe Ariavie ◽  
Joseph Oyetola Oyekale

Gas transmission pipelines mainly transport flammable fluids across the length and breadth of the country especially in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The associated risk to both the individuals’ encroaching and inhabiting areas along the right-of-way (ROW) and the society at large cannot be underestimated. Thus safety concerns considering the individual and societal risk of pipeline failures has become important. This paper attempts to develop a model for both individual and societal risk assessment for a 12km length natural gas transmission pipeline in Utekon community (commencing from the Benin-Auchi through Uhuwmunode Osina town and terminating in the Benin-Agbor axis) in Edo State using the Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis Method (CPQRA). The CPQRA is used because it examines the hazard zones within a pipeline ROW and the number of persons that would be affected by fire/explosion. Finally, field data was used in this study to validate the model which can be applied to any natural gas pipeline risk assessment scenario.


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