Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: A Case for Credibility Excess as Testimonial Injustice

Hypatia ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-501 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmalon Davis
Keyword(s):  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
Miranda Fricker

Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial injustice is a matter of credibility deficit, not excess. In this article, I argue that this restricted characterization of testimonial injustice is too narrow. I introduce a type of identity‐prejudicial credibility excess that harms its targets qua knowers and transmitters of knowledge. I show how positive stereotyping and prejudicially inflated credibility assessments contribute to the continued epistemic oppression of marginalized knowers. In particular, I examine harms such as typecasting, compulsory representation, and epistemic exploitation and consider what hearers are obligated to do in response to these injustices. I argue that because epistemic harms to marginalized knowers also arise from prejudicially inflated assessments of their credibility, the virtue of testimonial justice must be revised to remedy them.

scholarly journals Is Testimonial Injustice Epistemic? Let Me Count the Ways

Hypatia ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Manuel Almagro Holgado ◽  
Llanos Navarro Laespada ◽  
Manuel de Pinedo García
Keyword(s):  
Close Connection ◽  
Epistemic Agency ◽  
Knowledge Ascriptions ◽  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
Miranda Fricker ◽  
Do So ◽  
Secondary Sense

Abstract Miranda Fricker distinguishes two senses in which testimonial injustice is epistemic. In the primary sense, it is epistemic because it harms the victim as a giver of knowledge. In the secondary sense, it is epistemic, more narrowly, because it harms the victim as a possessor of knowledge. Her characterization of testimonial injustice has raised the following objection: testimonial injustice is not always an epistemic injustice, in the narrow, secondary sense, as it does not always entail that the victim is harmed as a knowledge-possessor. By adopting a perspective based on Robert Brandom's normative expressivism, we respond to this objection by arguing that there is a close connection, conceptual and constitutive rather than merely causal, between the primary and the secondary epistemic harms of testimonial injustice, such that testimonial injustice always involves both kinds of epistemic harm. We do so by exploring the logic and functioning of belief and knowledge ascriptions in order to highlight three ways in which the secondary epistemic harm caused by testimonial injustice crystallizes: it undermines the epistemic agency of the victim, the epistemic friction necessary for knowledge, and the possibility of occupying particular epistemic nodes.

scholarly journals Objects or Others? Epistemic Agency and the Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 831-845 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aidan McGlynn
Keyword(s):  
Cluster Analysis ◽  
Epistemic Agency ◽  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
Miranda Fricker

AbstractThis paper re-examines the debate between those who, with Miranda Fricker, diagnose the primary, non-contingent harm of testimonial injustice as a kind of epistemic objectification and those who contend it is better thought of as a kind of epistemic othering. Defenders of the othering account of the primary harm have often argued for it by presenting cases of testimonial injustice in which the testifier’s epistemic agency is affirmed rather than denied, even while their credibility is unjustly impugned. In previous work, I have instead argued that such cases suggest that we need to enrich our conception of epistemic objectification in ways encouraged by Martha Nussbaum’s cluster analysis of objectification. Here I continue to make the case for this approach, and I consider the othering account in more detail. I focus in particular on Gaile Pohlhaus Jr.’s arguments for a version of the othering account in terms of the notion of derivatization, which turns on the idea that only such an account can enable us to properly understand the harms of testimonial injustice, in particular the ways in which it interferes with a subject’s epistemic agency and autonomy, and I’ll argue that such arguments should not sway us. Finally, I’ll further support my contention that it is illuminating and helpful to think of the primary harm of testimonial injustice in terms of epistemic objectification, though I will concede that the notion of epistemic othering may offer further helpful resources for understanding how subjects can be harmed by testimonial injustice.

Testimonial Injustice and Mindreading

Hypatia ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 858-873 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krista Hyde
Keyword(s):  
Human Behavior ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Cognitive Capacity ◽  
Conscious Awareness ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Transmission Of Knowledge ◽  
Level Of Consciousness ◽  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Miranda Fricker

Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial responsibility is the proper corrective to testimonial injustice. She proposes a perceptual‐like “testimonial sensibility” to explain the transmission of knowledge through testimony. This sensibility is the means by which a hearer perceives an interlocutor's credibility level. When prejudice causes a hearer to inappropriately deflate the credibility attributed to a speaker, the sensibility may have functioned unreliably. Testimonial responsibility, she claims, will make the capacity reliable by reinflating credibility levels to their proper degree. I argue that testimonial sensitivity may be or involve “mindreading,” the cognitive capacity by which we predict human behavior and explain it in terms of mental states. Further, I claim that, if testimonial sensibility is or involves mindreading, and mindreading is a function of brain processes (as claimed by cognitive neuroscientists), testimonial injustice cannot be corrected by testimonial responsibility. This is because 1) it appears to rely on conscious awareness of prejudice, whereas much bias occurs implicitly, and 2) it works at the individual level, whereas testimonial injustice occurs both individually and socially. I argue that the remedy for testimonial injustice is, instead, engaging in social efforts that work below the level of consciousness.

LEARNING TO LISTEN: EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE AND THE CHILD

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Burroughs ◽  
Deborah Tollefsen
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Race And Class ◽  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
Detrimental Impact ◽  
Miranda Fricker ◽  
Learning To Listen

AbstractInEpistemic InjusticeMiranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice in which someone is wronged specifically in his or her capacity as a knower. Fricker's examples of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit primarily involve gender, race, and class, in which individuals are given less credibility due to prejudicial stereotypes. We argue that children, as a class, are also subject to testimonial injustice and receive less epistemic credibility than they deserve. To illustrate the prevalence of testimonial injustice against children we document examples of negative prejudicial treatment in forensic contexts where children frequently act as testifiers. These examples, along with research on the child's competence and reliability as a testifier, reveal widespread epistemic prejudice against children. Given that subjection to prejudice can have a detrimental impact on children we discuss ways to ameliorate this form of testimonial injustice. We argue that, both in formal and natural contexts, the child's testimony should be evaluated alongside the relationships that support (or fail to support) her development as a testifier. The adult can play a central role in creating successful testimonial interactions with children by acting as a “responsible hearer.”

UNDERSTANDING ASSERTION TO UNDERSTAND SILENCING: FINDING AN ACCOUNT OF ASSERTION THAT EXPLAINS SILENCING ARISING FROM TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 423-440
Author(s):  
David C. Spewak
Keyword(s):  
Speech Acts ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Constitutive Norms ◽  
Correct Account ◽  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
Miranda Fricker

ABSTRACTRae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby provide accounts of how pornography silences women by appealing to J.L. Austin's account of speech-acts. Since their accounts focus only on instances of silencing where the hearer does not grasp the type of speech-act the speaker intends to perform, their accounts of silencing do not generalize to explain silencing that arises from what Miranda Fricker calls “testimonial injustice.” I argue that silencing arising from testimonial injustice can only be explained by what we shall call the dialectical account of assertion, according to which assertion is the undertaking of a commitment in reasoned discourse. In doing so, I show that accounts of assertion based on speakers' intentions, proposals to common ground, and constitutive norms do not provide the necessary framework to explain silencing within the context of testimonial injustice. Having shown the strength of the dialectical account in explaining silencing, I conclude that the dialectical account also provides a way to remedy some instances of silencing arising from testimonial injustice providing further evidence that the dialectical account is the correct account of assertion.

Empathy and a Life of Moral Endeavor

Hypatia ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-186
Author(s):  
Barrett Emerick
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Awareness ◽  
Implicit Biases ◽  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
Miranda Fricker ◽  
The Way

Over the course of her career, Jean Harvey contributed many invaluable insights that help to make sense of both injustice and resistance. Specifically, she developed an account of what she called “civilized oppression,” which is pernicious in part because it can be difficult to perceive. One way that we ought to pursue what she calls a “life of moral endeavor” is by increasing our perceptual awareness of civilized oppression and ourselves as its agents. In this article I argue that one noxious form of civilized oppression is what Miranda Fricker calls “testimonial injustice.” I then follow Harvey in arguing that one of the methods by which we should work to avoid perpetrating testimonial injustice is by empathizing with others. This is true for two reasons. The first is that in order to manifest what Fricker calls the virtue of testimonial justice, we must have a method by which we “correct” our prejudices or implicit biases, and empathy serves as such a corrective. The second is that there are cases where the virtue of testimonial justice wouldn't in fact correct for testimonial injustice in the way that Fricker suggests, but that actively working to empathize would.

scholarly journals Credibility Excess and the Social Imaginary in Cases of Sexual Assault

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey S Yap
Keyword(s):  
Complex System ◽  
Sexual Assault ◽  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Victim Blaming ◽  
Social Imaginary ◽  
The Social ◽  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
Miranda Fricker

This paper will connect literature on epistemic injustice with literature on victims and perpetrators, to argue that in addition to considering the credibility deficit suffered by many victims, we should also consider the credibility excess accorded to many perpetrators. Epistemic injustice, as discussed by Miranda Fricker, considers ways in which someone might be wronged in their capacity as a knower. Testimonial injustice occurs when there is a credibility deficit as a result of identity-prejudicial stereotypes. However, criticisms of Fricker have pointed out that credibility is part of a more complex system that includes both deficits and excesses. I will use these points to argue that we should look closer at sources of credibility excess in cases of sexual assault. This means that in addition to considering sources of victim blaming by looking at ways in which “ideal” victims are constructed, we also need to consider ways in which “ideal” perpetrators are constructed.

Morphological Characterization of Mycobacteriophage R1

1974 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 254-255
Author(s):  
B. L. Soloff ◽  
T. A. Rado
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Source ◽  
Stationary Phase ◽  
Growth Phase ◽  
Minimal Medium ◽  
Morphological Characterization ◽  
Logarithmic Growth Phase ◽  
Complete Lysis ◽  
Lysogenic Culture ◽  
Logarithmic Growth

Mycobacteriophage R1 was originally isolated from a lysogenic culture of M. butyricum. The virus was propagated on a leucine-requiring derivative of M. smegmatis, 607 leu−, isolated by nitrosoguanidine mutagenesis of typestrain ATCC 607. Growth was accomplished in a minimal medium containing glycerol and glucose as carbon source and enriched by the addition of 80 μg/ ml L-leucine. Bacteria in early logarithmic growth phase were infected with virus at a multiplicity of 5, and incubated with aeration for 8 hours. The partially lysed suspension was diluted 1:10 in growth medium and incubated for a further 8 hours. This permitted stationary phase cells to re-enter logarithmic growth and resulted in complete lysis of the culture.

AEM analysis of crystallization in Ti-based amorphous alloys

1983 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
pp. 270-271
Author(s):  
A.R. Pelton ◽  
A.F. Marshall ◽  
Y.S. Lee
Keyword(s):  
Magnetic Properties ◽  
Amorphous Alloys ◽  
Amorphous Materials ◽  
Isothermal Annealing ◽  
Amorphous Matrix ◽  
Nucleation And Growth ◽  
Current Interest ◽  
Amorphous Films ◽  
Electrical And Magnetic Properties

Amorphous materials are of current interest due to their desirable mechanical, electrical and magnetic properties. Furthermore, crystallizing amorphous alloys provides an avenue for discerning sequential and competitive phases thus allowing access to otherwise inaccessible crystalline structures. Previous studies have shown the benefits of using AEM to determine crystal structures and compositions of partially crystallized alloys. The present paper will discuss the AEM characterization of crystallized Cu-Ti and Ni-Ti amorphous films.Cu60Ti40: The amorphous alloy Cu60Ti40, when continuously heated, forms a simple intermediate, macrocrystalline phase which then transforms to the ordered, equilibrium Cu3Ti2 phase. However, contrary to what one would expect from kinetic considerations, isothermal annealing below the isochronal crystallization temperature results in direct nucleation and growth of Cu3Ti2 from the amorphous matrix.

Characterization of Coherent, Ordered Precipitates in Nickel-Base Alloys

1973 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 144-145
Author(s):  
B. H. Kear ◽  
J. M. Oblak
Keyword(s):  
Stable Phase ◽  
Nickel Base Superalloy ◽  
Alloy 718 ◽  
Commercial Alloy ◽  
Precipitate Morphology ◽  
Continuous Precipitation ◽  
Nickel Base ◽  
Base Superalloy ◽  
Strengthening Precipitate

A nickel-base superalloy is essentially a Ni/Cr solid solution hardened by additions of Al (Ti, Nb, etc.) to precipitate a coherent, ordered phase. In most commercial alloy systems, e.g. B-1900, IN-100 and Mar-M200, the stable precipitate is Ni3 (Al,Ti) γ′, with an LI2structure. In A lloy 901 the normal precipitate is metastable Nis Ti3 γ′ ; the stable phase is a hexagonal Do2 4 structure. In Alloy 718 the strengthening precipitate is metastable γ″, which has a body-centered tetragonal D022 structure.Precipitate MorphologyIn most systems the ordered γ′ phase forms by a continuous precipitation re-action, which gives rise to a uniform intragranular dispersion of precipitate particles. For zero γ/γ′ misfit, the γ′ precipitates assume a spheroidal.

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