Empathy and a Life of Moral Endeavor

Hypatia ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 171-186
Author(s):  
Barrett Emerick
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Awareness ◽  
Implicit Biases ◽  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
Miranda Fricker ◽  
The Way

Over the course of her career, Jean Harvey contributed many invaluable insights that help to make sense of both injustice and resistance. Specifically, she developed an account of what she called “civilized oppression,” which is pernicious in part because it can be difficult to perceive. One way that we ought to pursue what she calls a “life of moral endeavor” is by increasing our perceptual awareness of civilized oppression and ourselves as its agents. In this article I argue that one noxious form of civilized oppression is what Miranda Fricker calls “testimonial injustice.” I then follow Harvey in arguing that one of the methods by which we should work to avoid perpetrating testimonial injustice is by empathizing with others. This is true for two reasons. The first is that in order to manifest what Fricker calls the virtue of testimonial justice, we must have a method by which we “correct” our prejudices or implicit biases, and empathy serves as such a corrective. The second is that there are cases where the virtue of testimonial justice wouldn't in fact correct for testimonial injustice in the way that Fricker suggests, but that actively working to empathize would.

scholarly journals Objects or Others? Epistemic Agency and the Primary Harm of Testimonial Injustice

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 831-845 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aidan McGlynn
Keyword(s):  
Cluster Analysis ◽  
Epistemic Agency ◽  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
Miranda Fricker

AbstractThis paper re-examines the debate between those who, with Miranda Fricker, diagnose the primary, non-contingent harm of testimonial injustice as a kind of epistemic objectification and those who contend it is better thought of as a kind of epistemic othering. Defenders of the othering account of the primary harm have often argued for it by presenting cases of testimonial injustice in which the testifier’s epistemic agency is affirmed rather than denied, even while their credibility is unjustly impugned. In previous work, I have instead argued that such cases suggest that we need to enrich our conception of epistemic objectification in ways encouraged by Martha Nussbaum’s cluster analysis of objectification. Here I continue to make the case for this approach, and I consider the othering account in more detail. I focus in particular on Gaile Pohlhaus Jr.’s arguments for a version of the othering account in terms of the notion of derivatization, which turns on the idea that only such an account can enable us to properly understand the harms of testimonial injustice, in particular the ways in which it interferes with a subject’s epistemic agency and autonomy, and I’ll argue that such arguments should not sway us. Finally, I’ll further support my contention that it is illuminating and helpful to think of the primary harm of testimonial injustice in terms of epistemic objectification, though I will concede that the notion of epistemic othering may offer further helpful resources for understanding how subjects can be harmed by testimonial injustice.

Typecasts, Tokens, and Spokespersons: A Case for Credibility Excess as Testimonial Injustice

Hypatia ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 485-501 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmalon Davis
Keyword(s):  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
Miranda Fricker

Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial injustice is a matter of credibility deficit, not excess. In this article, I argue that this restricted characterization of testimonial injustice is too narrow. I introduce a type of identity‐prejudicial credibility excess that harms its targets qua knowers and transmitters of knowledge. I show how positive stereotyping and prejudicially inflated credibility assessments contribute to the continued epistemic oppression of marginalized knowers. In particular, I examine harms such as typecasting, compulsory representation, and epistemic exploitation and consider what hearers are obligated to do in response to these injustices. I argue that because epistemic harms to marginalized knowers also arise from prejudicially inflated assessments of their credibility, the virtue of testimonial justice must be revised to remedy them.

scholarly journals Reconstructing the narratives around young Muslim men in the GTA

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huda Hussain
Keyword(s):  
Social Work ◽  
Qualitative Study ◽  
Key Words ◽  
Master Narrative ◽  
Self Perception ◽  
Implicit Biases ◽  
Muslim Men ◽  
Social Work Practitioners ◽  
The Way

This research explores the narratives of young Muslim men and challenges social work practitioners to be more critical about their own implicit biases towards them. Existing literature on young Muslim men have not focused on the positive narratives that I personally and professionally know of them. This research examined the harmful impact the historical and current master narrative has on young Muslim men. This was a qualitative study examining Canadian Muslim men. Participants were interviewed through open-ended questions to examine how they continued to thrive regardless of the problematic notions that surround them, the strategies they used to navigate to be successful and their self-perception. The findings present a compelling case for rethinking about the way young Muslim men are perceived, using orientalism in reconstructing how we perceive them. In conclusion, although themes were common amongst both participants, the experiences of young Muslim men cannot be generalized. Key words: Young Muslim men, anti-Muslim racism, orientalism, narrative resistance, social work

Implicit Bias and Reform Efforts in Philosophy

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 71-102
Author(s):  
Jules Holroyd ◽  
Jennifer Saul ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Empirical Data ◽  
Implicit Bias ◽  
Marginalized Groups ◽  
Implicit Biases ◽  
Accurate Picture ◽  
The Way

This paper takes as its focus efforts to address particular aspects of sexist oppression and its intersections, in a particular field: it discusses reform efforts in philosophy. In recent years, there has been a growing international movement to change the way that our profession functions and is structured, in order to make it more welcoming for members of marginalized groups. One especially prominent and successful form of justification for these reform efforts has drawn on empirical data regarding implicit biases and their effects. Here, we address two concerns about these empirical data. First, critics have for some time argued that the studies drawn upon cannot give us an accurate picture of the workings of prejudice, because they ignore the intersectional nature of these phenomena. More recently, concerns have been raised about the empirical data supporting the nature and existence of implicit bias. Each of these concerns, but perhaps more commonly the latter, are thought by some to undermine reform efforts in philosophy. In this paper, we take a three-pronged approach to these claims. First, we show that the reforms can be motivated quite independently of the implicit bias data, and that many of these reforms are in fact very well suited to dealing with intersectional worries. Next, we show that in fact the empirical concerns about the implicit bias data are not nearly as problematic as some have thought. Finally, we argue that while the intersectional concerns are an immensely valuable criticism of early work on implicit bias, more recent work is starting to address these worries.

Testimonial Injustice and Mindreading

Hypatia ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 858-873 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krista Hyde
Keyword(s):  
Human Behavior ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Cognitive Capacity ◽  
Conscious Awareness ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Transmission Of Knowledge ◽  
Level Of Consciousness ◽  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Miranda Fricker

Miranda Fricker maintains that testimonial responsibility is the proper corrective to testimonial injustice. She proposes a perceptual‐like “testimonial sensibility” to explain the transmission of knowledge through testimony. This sensibility is the means by which a hearer perceives an interlocutor's credibility level. When prejudice causes a hearer to inappropriately deflate the credibility attributed to a speaker, the sensibility may have functioned unreliably. Testimonial responsibility, she claims, will make the capacity reliable by reinflating credibility levels to their proper degree. I argue that testimonial sensitivity may be or involve “mindreading,” the cognitive capacity by which we predict human behavior and explain it in terms of mental states. Further, I claim that, if testimonial sensibility is or involves mindreading, and mindreading is a function of brain processes (as claimed by cognitive neuroscientists), testimonial injustice cannot be corrected by testimonial responsibility. This is because 1) it appears to rely on conscious awareness of prejudice, whereas much bias occurs implicitly, and 2) it works at the individual level, whereas testimonial injustice occurs both individually and socially. I argue that the remedy for testimonial injustice is, instead, engaging in social efforts that work below the level of consciousness.

LEARNING TO LISTEN: EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE AND THE CHILD

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Burroughs ◽  
Deborah Tollefsen
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Injustice ◽  
Race And Class ◽  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
Detrimental Impact ◽  
Miranda Fricker ◽  
Learning To Listen

AbstractInEpistemic InjusticeMiranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice in which someone is wronged specifically in his or her capacity as a knower. Fricker's examples of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit primarily involve gender, race, and class, in which individuals are given less credibility due to prejudicial stereotypes. We argue that children, as a class, are also subject to testimonial injustice and receive less epistemic credibility than they deserve. To illustrate the prevalence of testimonial injustice against children we document examples of negative prejudicial treatment in forensic contexts where children frequently act as testifiers. These examples, along with research on the child's competence and reliability as a testifier, reveal widespread epistemic prejudice against children. Given that subjection to prejudice can have a detrimental impact on children we discuss ways to ameliorate this form of testimonial injustice. We argue that, both in formal and natural contexts, the child's testimony should be evaluated alongside the relationships that support (or fail to support) her development as a testifier. The adult can play a central role in creating successful testimonial interactions with children by acting as a “responsible hearer.”

False Confessions and Subverted Agency

2021 ◽  
Vol 89 ◽  
pp. 11-35
Author(s):  
Jennifer Lackey
Keyword(s):  
Legal System ◽  
Gold Standard ◽  
False Confessions ◽  
Epistemic Agency ◽  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
Criminal Legal System ◽  
The Way

AbstractIn the criminal legal system, confessions have long been considered the ‘gold standard’ in evidence. An immediate problem arises for this gold standard, however, when the prevalence of false confessions is taken into account. In this paper, I take a close look at false confessions in connection with the phenomenon of testimonial injustice. I show that false confessions provide a unique and compelling challenge to the current conceptual tools used to understand this epistemic wrong. In particular, I argue that we cannot make sense of the unjust ways in which false confessions function in our criminal legal system by focusing exclusively on speakers getting less credibility than they deserve. I conclude that the way we conceive of testimonial injustice requires a significant expansion to include what I call agential testimonial injustice – where an unwarranted credibility excess is afforded to speakers when their epistemic agency has been denied or subverted in the obtaining of their testimony.

Which Moral Properties Are Eligible for Perceptual Awareness?

2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 290-319
Author(s):  
Preston J. Werner
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Perception ◽  
Perceptual Awareness ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Open Question ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Way

Abstract: Moral perception has made something of a comeback in recent work on moral epistemology. Many traditional objections to the view have been argued to fail upon closer inspection. But it remains an open question just how far moral perception might extend. In this paper, I provide the beginnings of an answer to this question by assessing the relationship between the metaphysical structure of different normative properties and a plausible constraint on which properties are eligible for perceptual awareness which I call the Counterfactual Strengthening Test. Along the way I consider and reject a few other possible constraints on perceptual awareness. I defend the view that moral perception is restricted to the perception of evaluative and pro tanto deontic properties. I conclude with a few gestures toward what this limitation on moral perception may mean for broader moral epistemology.

scholarly journals Black Lives Matter in Information Literacy

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 ◽  
pp. 100-102
Author(s):  
Angela Pashia
Keyword(s):  
Information Literacy ◽  
Academic Libraries ◽  
Institutional Racism ◽  
College Level ◽  
Scholarly Literature ◽  
Black Lives Matter ◽  
Implicit Biases ◽  
The Way

The institutional racism addressed by the Black Lives Matter movement is encoded in many of the structures of academia, including academic libraries. A librarian who teaches information literacy asks students to think about which voices are represented in the scholarly literature, make explicit the implicit biases of the way scholarly materials are organized in the library and research databases, and examine the way their own biases affect their evaluations of information. This article examines some of the ways racism is build into the structure of the library and describes ways of teaching students to recognize inequities in the sources they rely on for college level research.

UNDERSTANDING ASSERTION TO UNDERSTAND SILENCING: FINDING AN ACCOUNT OF ASSERTION THAT EXPLAINS SILENCING ARISING FROM TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 423-440
Author(s):  
David C. Spewak
Keyword(s):  
Speech Acts ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Constitutive Norms ◽  
Correct Account ◽  
Testimonial Injustice ◽  
Miranda Fricker

ABSTRACTRae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby provide accounts of how pornography silences women by appealing to J.L. Austin's account of speech-acts. Since their accounts focus only on instances of silencing where the hearer does not grasp the type of speech-act the speaker intends to perform, their accounts of silencing do not generalize to explain silencing that arises from what Miranda Fricker calls “testimonial injustice.” I argue that silencing arising from testimonial injustice can only be explained by what we shall call the dialectical account of assertion, according to which assertion is the undertaking of a commitment in reasoned discourse. In doing so, I show that accounts of assertion based on speakers' intentions, proposals to common ground, and constitutive norms do not provide the necessary framework to explain silencing within the context of testimonial injustice. Having shown the strength of the dialectical account in explaining silencing, I conclude that the dialectical account also provides a way to remedy some instances of silencing arising from testimonial injustice providing further evidence that the dialectical account is the correct account of assertion.

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