UNDERSTANDING ASSERTION TO UNDERSTAND SILENCING: FINDING AN ACCOUNT OF ASSERTION THAT EXPLAINS SILENCING ARISING FROM TESTIMONIAL INJUSTICE

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 423-440
Author(s):  
David C. Spewak

ABSTRACTRae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby provide accounts of how pornography silences women by appealing to J.L. Austin's account of speech-acts. Since their accounts focus only on instances of silencing where the hearer does not grasp the type of speech-act the speaker intends to perform, their accounts of silencing do not generalize to explain silencing that arises from what Miranda Fricker calls “testimonial injustice.” I argue that silencing arising from testimonial injustice can only be explained by what we shall call the dialectical account of assertion, according to which assertion is the undertaking of a commitment in reasoned discourse. In doing so, I show that accounts of assertion based on speakers' intentions, proposals to common ground, and constitutive norms do not provide the necessary framework to explain silencing within the context of testimonial injustice. Having shown the strength of the dialectical account in explaining silencing, I conclude that the dialectical account also provides a way to remedy some instances of silencing arising from testimonial injustice providing further evidence that the dialectical account is the correct account of assertion.

Author(s):  
Guiming Yang ◽  
Sanford C. Goldberg

In the past two to three decades, most of the philosophical attention that has been paid to the speech act of assertion aims to characterize the nature of the act. A first question that is pursued concerns where the speech act of assertion fits within the domain of assertives (the category speech acts in which a proposition is presented-as-true). Simply put, assertions are those assertive speech acts in which the speaker advances a claim. But what is it to perform this sort of speech act? What is the nature of the act? Philosophers have proposed six main answers. These include the attitude view (which characterizes the nature of the act in terms of its role in expressing belief), the grammatical view (on which assertion is picked out by the vehicles used to make acts of this kind, namely, declarative sentences), the common ground view (where assertion is understood in terms of its essential effect on a conversation’s common ground), the commitment view (where assertion is characterized in terms of the kind of commitment that is engendered or reconfirmed by the performance of acts of this type), the constitutive rule view (according to which assertions are individuated by the distinctive rule that governs acts of this type) and the no-assertion view (which holds that there is no unique, interesting speech act type picked out by ‘assertion’). Of these six views, the one that has received the most attention (both critical and supportive) is the constitutive rule view. Such a view has been developed (and criticized) at great length. A leading version of the constitutive rule view is the view that the rule in question requires that one assert only what one knows. The main considerations offered in defense of this version of the view include its role in explaining various features of our assertoric practice, including the paradoxicality of assertions of sentences of the form ‘p, but I do not know that p’, its role in explaining why propositions expressed with, for example, ‘My lottery ticket lost’ are not properly assertable on merely probabilistic grounds (even when the odds of one’s winning are arbitrarily small) and its role in explaining why ‘How do you know?’ is a proper response to an assertion (even when the assertion’s explicit content has nothing to do with the speaker’s knowledge). However, many authors have responded to these arguments for the knowledge rule, finding them unconvincing. Interestingly, a great amount of attention has also been devoted to forging connections between the speech act of assertion and a variety of other topics of philosophical interest. These include topics in philosophy of language (pragmatics, semantics), epistemology (the epistemology of testimony, the epistemology of disagreement, the nature of epistemic authority, the division of epistemic labor), metaphysics (the nature of future contingents, modality), ethics (the ethics of assertion; what we owe to each other as information-sharing creatures) and social and political philosophy (various forms of epistemic injustice, silencing).


2019 ◽  
Vol 45 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bart Geurts

Abstract The main tenet of this paper is that human communication is first and foremost a matter of negotiating commitments, rather than one of conveying intentions, beliefs, and other mental states. Every speech act causes the speaker to become committed to the hearer to act on a propositional content. Hence, commitments are relations between speakers, hearers, and propositions. Their purpose is to enable speakers and hearers to coordinate their actions: communication is coordinated action for action coordination. To illustrate the potential of the approach, commitment-based analyses are offered for a representative sample of speech act types, conversational implicatures, as well as for common ground.


2020 ◽  
pp. 131-170
Author(s):  
Jody Azzouni

Assertion is a phenomenological category—that is, assertions are experienced as such by speaker-hearers. Speech-act phenomenology is distinguished from semantic perception. We not only experience speech acts, we experience the words and sentences we utter as distinct objects with properties different from those of the speech acts. Using this distinction, evidence against agential-state assertion norms, such as a sincere-belief norm, a knowledge norm, or a warrant norm, etc., is given. Anonymous assertions or shapes resembling inscriptions produced by accident are experienced as assertions and as possessing meaning even when they are recognized to be products of sheer accidents and in reality without utterers. Spokespersons for companies, actors in advertisements for products, cartoon characters (that don’t exist), and flakes who can’t be trusted are all experienced nevertheless as asserting, and what they assert as assertions. The common-ground expectation view is supported. Compatibly with this, Moorean remarks are often naturally utterable.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-82
Author(s):  
Johannes M. Heim ◽  
Martina E. Wiltschko

Direct and indirect characterizations of the relation between clause type (syntactic form) and speech act (pragmatic function) are problematic because they map oversimplified forms onto decomposable functions. We propose an alternative account of questions by abandoning any (in)direct link to their clause type and by decomposing speech acts into two variables encoding propositional attitudes. One variable captures the speaker’s commitment to an utterance, another their expectation toward the addressee’s engagement. We couch this proposal in a syntactic framework that relies on two projections dedicated to managing common ground (GroundP) and managing turn-taking (ResponseP), respectively. Empirical evidence comes from the conversational properties of sentence-final intonation in English and sentence-peripheral particles that serve to manage the common ground.


2017 ◽  
Vol 48 (4) ◽  
pp. 651-678 ◽  
Author(s):  
Uli Sauerland ◽  
Kazuko Yatsushiro

In this article, we investigate questions like What is your name again?, which presuppose that the answer was already made common-ground knowledge in the past ( Sauerland 2006 ). We call this a remind-me presupposition. While repetitive particles can trigger a remind-me presupposition in German and English, Japanese uses a specialized particle kke to bring about such a presupposition. We argue for an account of remind-me presuppositions based on syntactic decomposition of the question speech-act into an imperative part and a make-it-known part. On this account, the repetitive particles take scope between the two parts of the decomposed question speech-act. The proposal correctly predicts how both particles interact syntactically with the periphery of the clause in slightly different ways. The interaction with polar questions corroborates our proposal that the decomposed question speech-act parts are syntactically projected parts of the question structure. Our data therefore corroborate a syntactic representation of aspects of speech-acts.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 77-81
Author(s):  
Sayyora Azimova ◽  

This article is devoted to the pragmatic interpretation of the illocutionary action of the speech act “expression of refusals”. The article discusses different ways of reflecting cases of denial. This article was written not only for English language professionals, but also for use in aggressive conflicts and their pragmatic resolution, which naturally occur in the process of communication in all other languages


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 227-231
Author(s):  
Sayyora Azimova ◽  

This article is devoted to the pragmatic interpretation of the illocutionary action of the speech act“expression of refusals”. The article discusses different ways of reflecting cases of denial. This article was written not only for English language professionals, but also for use in aggressive conflicts and their pragmatic resolution, which naturally occur in the process of communication in all other languages


2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Evi Jovita Putri

<p>The research entitled Directive Speech Act Seen on Family 2.0 Drama Script Written by Walter Wykes purposes to describe and uncover the types of form and intended meaning of directive speech act on that drama script. This descriptive research uses pragmatic approach and theory. The collecting and analysing data are focused on the using of declarative, imperative, and interrogative sentences in the text of drama. The forms of those sentences will be analysed to find out the types of form of directive speech act, while the context of those sentences will be used to analyze the intended meaning of directive speech act uttered by speakers. The results of the research are found that, first, there are two types of the form of directive speech acts, direct directive speech acts and indirect directive speech acts. Direct directive speech acts are represented by imperative sentence without subject; imperative sentence with let; and negative imperative sentence. Meanwhile the indirect directive speech acts are represented by declarative sentence statement; declarative sentence if clause; negative declarative sentences; and interrogative sentences. Second, the intended meanings seen on drama script of Family 2.0 are command, prohibition, request, treat, and persuasion. It can be concluded that, the most frequent intended meaning appeared in directive speech acts on this script is command by the use of imperative forms. Then, the declarative and interrogative forms are used to request something by adults charaters; in contrast the kids characters use them to command and prohibit the hearer.<strong></strong></p><strong>Keywords: </strong> family 2.0, pragmatic, speech act, directive, form and intended meaning


SUHUF ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 321-342
Author(s):  
Fathur Rosyid

Abstrak Kata Kunci: Pragamtik, Tindak Tutur, Implikatur, Kisah Sayyidah Maryam   Kisah Sayyidah Maryam dalam al-Qur’a>n merupakan salah-satu kisah yang menarik dikaji dengan pendekatan pragmatik. Hal ini disebabkan, secara tekstual, beliau adalah publik figur yang fenomenal, bahkan mengalahkan status sosial perempuan lainnya, sehingga namanya terdokumentasikan dalam satu surat khusus yang populer dengan sebutan ”Surat Maryam”. Kecuali itu, kisah tersebut juga termasuk kisah yang kaya dengan nuansa konteks. Sementara posisi ilmu prgamatik sendiri  merupakan disiplin keilmuan yang mengkaji satuan bahasa dari sudut pandang relasi antara konteks linguistik yang bersifat diadik dan konteks non-linguistik yang bersifat triadik. Penelitian ini hendak mengungkap dua hal; Pertama, apa yang dimaksud pragmatika al-Qur’a>n?. Kedua, bagaimana bentuk aplikasi pragmatik tindak tutur dan implikatur terhadap fragmentasi kisah kelahiran Sayyidah Maryam dalam al-Qur’an?. Tujuan kedua pertanyaan tersebut untuk memahami konsep prgamtika al-Qur’an, juga untuk mengungkap bentuk tindak tutur dan implikatur fragmentasi kisah kelahiran Sayyidah Maryam. Penelitian ini menghasilkan kesimpulan; Pertama, pragmatika al-Qur’an adalah suatu disiplin ilmu yang mengkaji al-Qur’a>n dari sudut pandang relasi antara konteks kebahasaan dengan konteks non-kebahasaan. Kedua, tindak tutur fragmentasi kisah kelahiran Sayyidah Maryam yang terdapat dalam Qs. A<li ‘Imra>n (03): 36, lokusinya berupa kalimat informatif, sementara illokusinya merupakan bentuk kalimat asertif yang bermakna mengeluh. Adapun implikaturnya sebagai pelajaran, bahwa jika segala sesuatu telah dipasrahkan sama Allah swt. maka tidak pantas mencari kesalahan atas peraturan yang telah ditetapkan-Nya.               Abstract Keywords: Pragamtik, Speech Acts, implicatures, Story of Sayyidah Maryam   The story of Sayyidah Maryam in the al-Qur'a>n is one-on-one interesting stories studied with a pragmatic approach. This is due, textually, he is a public figure who is phenomenal, even beating out other women's social status, so the name is documented in a special letter that is popularly known as "Surah Maryam". Except that, the story also included a story rich with nuances of context. While the position pragamatic science itself is a scientific discipline that examines unit of language from the perspective of the relationship between linguistic context that is both dyadic and non-linguistic context that is triadic. This research seeks to reveal two things; First, what is meant pragmatic al-Qur'a>n?. Second, how the application form pragmatics of speech acts and implicatures to fragmentation birth story of Sayyidah Maryam in the al-Qur'a>n?. The second purpose of these questions to understand the concept pragamtic al-Qur'a>n, as well as to reveal the shape of speech acts and implicatures fragmentation of the birth story of Sayyidah Maryam. This research resulted in the conclusion; First, the pragmatics of the al-Qur’a>n is a discipline that examines al-Qur'a>n from the viewpoint of the relationship between linguistic context with non-linguistic context. Second, the speech act fragmentation birth story of Sayyidah Maryam contained in Qs. A<li 'Imra>n (03): 36, locutionary acts be informative sentence, while illocutionary acts an assertive form meaningful sentences complaining. The implicature as a lesson, that if everything was handled the same God, it is inappropriate to find fault with the regulations set his.


Author(s):  
Craige Roberts

This essay sketches an approach to speech acts in which mood does not semantically determine illocutionary force. The conventional content of mood determines the semantic type of the clause in which it occurs, and, given the nature of discourse, that type most naturally lends itself to a particular type of speech act, i.e. one of the three basic types of language game moves—making an assertion (declarative), posing a question (interrogative), or proposing to one’s addressee(s) the adoption of a goal (imperative). There is relative consensus about the semantics of two of these, the declarative and interrogative; and this consensus view is entirely compatible with the present proposal about the relationship between the semantics and pragmatics of grammatical mood. Hence, the proposal is illustrated with the more controversial imperative.


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