LEARNING TO LISTEN: EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE AND THE CHILD

Episteme ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-377 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Burroughs ◽  
Deborah Tollefsen

AbstractInEpistemic InjusticeMiranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice in which someone is wronged specifically in his or her capacity as a knower. Fricker's examples of identity-prejudicial credibility deficit primarily involve gender, race, and class, in which individuals are given less credibility due to prejudicial stereotypes. We argue that children, as a class, are also subject to testimonial injustice and receive less epistemic credibility than they deserve. To illustrate the prevalence of testimonial injustice against children we document examples of negative prejudicial treatment in forensic contexts where children frequently act as testifiers. These examples, along with research on the child's competence and reliability as a testifier, reveal widespread epistemic prejudice against children. Given that subjection to prejudice can have a detrimental impact on children we discuss ways to ameliorate this form of testimonial injustice. We argue that, both in formal and natural contexts, the child's testimony should be evaluated alongside the relationships that support (or fail to support) her development as a testifier. The adult can play a central role in creating successful testimonial interactions with children by acting as a “responsible hearer.”

2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey S Yap

This paper will connect literature on epistemic injustice with literature on victims and perpetrators, to argue that in addition to considering the credibility deficit suffered by many victims, we should also consider the credibility excess accorded to many perpetrators. Epistemic injustice, as discussed by Miranda Fricker, considers ways in which someone might be wronged in their capacity as a knower. Testimonial injustice occurs when there is a credibility deficit as a result of identity-prejudicial stereotypes. However, criticisms of Fricker have pointed out that credibility is part of a more complex system that includes both deficits and excesses. I will use these points to argue that we should look closer at sources of credibility excess in cases of sexual assault. This means that in addition to considering sources of victim blaming by looking at ways in which “ideal” victims are constructed, we also need to consider ways in which “ideal” perpetrators are constructed.


Affilia ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 088610992098526
Author(s):  
Marjorie Johnstone ◽  
Eunjung Lee

Using the theoretical framework of epistemic injustice articulated by philosopher Miranda Fricker as an analytic tool, we analyze recent victories of Indigenous feminist activism in gathering the stories of Indigenous women, challenging dominant meta-narratives and rewriting the herstory of Canada. We use the epistemic concept of the hermeneutic gap to consider the implications of this resistance in conjunction with the increased visibility of the intersectional positionality of Indigenous women. To illustrate our analysis, we focus on two case studies. Firstly, an individual perspective through the life journey of a feminist Anishinaabe Activist, Bridgett Perrier. Secondly, we conduct a systemic analysis of the recent Report on the National Inquiry into the Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (MMIWG). We close with a discussion on how critical it is for social workers—especially non-Indigenous social workers—to relearn and document the meaning of the MMIWG issues. This includes recognizing Indigenous resistance, activism, and the newly formulated hermeneutic understandings that are emerging. Then, the final task is to apply these concepts to their practice and heed the calls to action which the report calls for.


2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole Dular

“Mansplaining” is by now part of the common cultural vernacular. Yet, academic analyses of it—specifically, philosophical ones—are missing. This paper sets out to address just that problem. Analyzed through a lens of epistemic injustice, the focus of the analysis concerns both what it is, and what its harms are. I argue it is a form of epistemic injustice distinct from testimonial injustice wherein there is a dysfunctional subversion of the epistemic roles of hearer and speaker in a testimonial exchange. As these are roles of power and are crucial to our existence and functioning within epistemic communities, the wrong and harms suffered from this injustice are serious and, I argue, distinct from other types already discussed in the literature. I close by considering an alternative model of mansplaining as a form of silencing, as well as briefly diagnosing its general underlying cause and possible solutions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Beth E. Elness-Hanson

Having one's voice heard and being known by one's name are foundational aspects of respect and human dignity. Likewise, being able to contribute to shared understanding is at the core of epistemic justice. This intercultural and post-colonial inquiry of Gen 16 considers the Egyptian Hagar-known by her foreign Semitic name meaning "Fleeing One"-as an example of epistemic injustice. Integrating Miranda Fricker 's work on epistemic injustice, this study espouses the justice of hearing and seeing the marginalised and oppressed, as exemplified by Yhwh. As the Egyptian woman's voice- once ignored-gives testimony within the text to a fuller understanding of God, so also listening to/seeing other contemporary African scholars' voices/writings opens one's ears/eyes to fuller understandings of God today. These voices include the seminal work of David Tuesday Adamo, a vanguard in African biblical hermeneutics, in whose honour this examination is written.


2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 662-700
Author(s):  
Jean Chrysostome K. Kiyala

Abstract This empirical study examines the impact of epistemic injustice on child soldiers while exploring the potential of the Baraza structure – a local jurisprudence in the Democratic Republic of Congo – to pursue the “the best interests of the child” principle, particularly in the process of holding young soldiers accountable. Epistemic injustice, conceptually developed by Miranda Fricker, consists of “testimonial injustice”, when the hearer gives a deflated level of credibility to a speaker’s word due to prejudice; “hermeneutical injustice”, which takes place when a structural breach in collective interpretive imagination resources unfairly disadvantages a person or social group when trying to render intelligible their social experiences; and “distributive epistemic injustice”, which happens when “epistemic goods” (education and information) are inequitably distributed. The research outcomes suggest that Baraza jurisprudence has the potential to avert epistemic injustice, and to promote a non-discriminatory treatment of accused former child and adolescent soldiers.


Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Congdon

AbstractIn this paper, I make explicit some implicit commitments to realism and conceptualism in recent work in social epistemology exemplified by Miranda Fricker and Charles Mills. I offer a survey of recent writings at the intersection of social epistemology, feminism, and critical race theory, showing that commitments to realism and conceptualism are at once implied yet undertheorized in the existing literature. I go on to offer an explicit defense of these commitments by drawing from the epistemological framework of John McDowell, demonstrating the relevance of the metaphor of the “space of reasons” for theorizing and criticizing instances of epistemic injustice. I then point out how McDowell’s own view requires expansion and revision in light of Mills' concept of “epistemologies of ignorance.” I conclude that, when their strengths are used to make up for each others' weaknesses, Mills and McDowell’s positions mutually reinforce one another, producing a powerful model for theorizing instances of systematic ignorance and false belief.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophie Bourgault

Recent care ethics scholarship has reflected on how to render socio-political institutions more inclusive/democratic. This project resonates with that of Miranda Fricker, who proposes means to diminish exclusions and epistemic injustices in institutions. This article considers two of these remedies, which sit in tension: one entails the unveiling of particulars, whereas the other involves the veiling of particulars (for example, the concealing of names and bodily features). The article insists on the significance of time and contact in care delivery, and on the need to consider epistemic wrongs within an economy of attention and credibility.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  

Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, by Miranda Fricker. New York: Oxford University Press. August 2007. ISBN: 9780198237907. 192 pages.


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