US pressure weakens Syria-based Khorasan Group

Subject Assessment of the 'Khorasan Group' Significance The US-led coalition's airstrikes in Syria since 2014 have focused on the Islamic State group (ISG). However, they have also struck the 'Khorasan Group' -- a collection of veteran al-Qaida operatives that allegedly plots terrorist attacks abroad, and that operates on the edges of Syria's al-Qaida affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN). Beginning in late 2014, Washington warned repeatedly that the Khorasan Group was plotting attacks in Europe and the United States, and that it was recruiting holders of Western passports who would be able to enter and transit Western countries more easily. Impacts Al-Qaida outside Syria will likely pursue terrorist attacks that punish the West for its policies in the Muslim world. ISG will also carry out terrorist attacks in an effort to assert its leadership over the global jihadist movement. Without an imminent threat from the Khorasan Group, the West will have difficulty making a case for targeting JaN. JaN will retain a base of Syrian opposition support so long as it does not invite international retaliation by supporting an attack abroad.

Subject Terrorism risks to Russia. Significance The Islamic State group (ISG) called for jihad against Russia and the United States on October 13. ISG regards Moscow and Washington as fighting a 'crusader war' against Muslims. Concern in Russia is growing that President Vladimir Putin's Syrian intervention will increase the terrorism threat inside the country. Impacts Exodus of radicals to fight with ISG has improved the security situation in the North Caucasus but many may seek to return to attack Russia. Chechen leader Kadyrov's power will grow if North Caucasus terrorism increases, as Moscow will need him to help restore order. Russia will push for closer security cooperation with Western agencies, the Kremlin using the threat as an argument for defending Damascus.


Significance Sectarian tensions in Iraq were exacerbated when the radical Sunni Islamic State group (ISG) seized Mosul in 2014 and Iraq's Shia militias were mobilised to fill the security vacuum left by the collapse of the Iraqi army. Impacts Sectarian tensions will prolong political paralysis and, therefore, undermine efforts to reform the politics and economy of the country. Iran will extend its influence over Baghdad, at the expense of the United States. Political paralysis and weaker US ties would deepen Iraq's fiscal crisis.


Subject Lone-actor terrorist motivations. Significance Recent lone-actor terrorist attacks in Orlando, Nice, Munich and elsewhere have made this threat salient for the public and policymakers alike. The number of lone-actor attacks has almost trebled since 1990 -- from a base rate of 5-6 per year, according to recent research. Yet the authorities find these types of attacks difficult to detect and disrupt ahead of time. Impacts Lone-actor attacks are likely to recur in the West while authorities struggle to respond. Islamic State group (ISG)-inspired lone-actor attacks may incentivise far-right lone actors to respond violently and vice-versa. The rise of encrypted messaging services and the dark net will fuel the debate around policing this problem without curbing free speech.


Significance Under pressure from the US and EU ambassadors, Bosnia's leaders have reached agreement to form a state government. The breakthrough has provided a badly needed respite from political paralysis; it required difficult concessions from all sides. Impacts By emphasising each side's concessions, politically affiliated media could jeopardise a shaky settlement. The United States and EU are too preoccupied with mainly internal problems to re-engage in Bosnia or the Balkans more concretely. Tensions between Russia and the West are being reflected in Bosnian politics.


Significance As the United States, Russia and other international powers attempt to broker a resolution to Syria's war, federalism or partition have been mooted repeatedly as a solution to the intractable conflict. Yet a critical mass of Syrian actors reject any sort of political decentralisation, and are instead committed to fighting for total victory over all of Syria. Impacts The de facto partition process under way is likely to see further sectarian and ethnic cleansing. Regime areas in the west will be the most viable economically, while Kurdish and Islamic State group areas in the east will be poorer. The new sub-state areas will be highly vulnerable to external influence and regional geopolitics. As a result, the risk of Syria sparking a wider regional crisis will remain high.


Significance Turkey carried out its first airstrikes inside Syria on July 24, almost a year after the start of the US-led campaign against ISG. However, critics claim that Turkey is simply joining the anti-ISG operations as a pretext to prevent Kurdish militants in Syria from seizing new territory along the border. Ankara has said it plans to establish a security belt controlled by Syrian Arab rebel units in territory on the Syrian side of the Turkish border currently held by ISG. Impacts Expansion of the anti-ISG campaign to al-Bab and Manbij would see new refugee influxes into Turkey. Setbacks in Aleppo would reinforce ISG's drive to expand into Homs province. ISG will be tempted to carry out retaliatory attacks against the Turkish authorities and economy. Damascus will avoid direct military confrontation with Turkey and the United States in northern Syria. Syrian rebels, particularly the more moderate factions, will benefit from the weakening of ISG.


2003 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin McInnes

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the US response have been widely described as heralding a new kind of war. For over a decade previous to 11 September, however, a body of literature had developed arguing that during the 1990s a new kind of warfare had begun to emerge for the West. This article examines whether 11 September and its immediate aftermath – the US campaign in Afghanistan – confirmed these trends, or whether it really did constitute a different kind of war. It does so through a four-part framework: that during the 1990s wars were localised; that the enemy was not a state but a regime or individual leader; that civilian deaths should be minimised; and that wars were fought on behalf of the West by professionals, but that the risks to these forces should also be minimised.


Significance The past year witnessed further jihadi gains amid the political turmoil in the Middle East that has followed the Arab uprisings -- most significantly the Islamic State Group (ISG)'s conquest of Sunni provinces Iraq in June and proclamation of a caliphate. However, the advance is not even across the board; the threat remains centred on regional targets, more than those in the West. More spillover from a metastasising jihadism in the Middle East is to be expected, including sporadic high-profile attacks in the West. Impacts The international reputation of Syria's Assad regime will gradually improve as the West remains focused on the threat of the ISG. Authoritarian regimes will exploit the jihadist threat to justify internal security crackdowns and delay democratic reforms. US-Iranian collaboration against ISG will reinforce the perception of an anti-Sunni conspiracy -- a key feature of jihadi propaganda. The US shale oil revolution will continue to offset disruption to oil supplies by the ISG. Tourism in affected countries, particularly Egypt, will continue to suffer.


Subject The outlook for terrorism. Significance Terrorist activity has been increasing in recent years. The rise of the Islamic State group (ISG) has reinvigorated jihadism and inspired attacks in the West. Jihadist attacks there make a disproportionately small proportion of terrorist attacks worldwide, yet these might be the ones with the greatest global effect. Impacts ISG's loss of territory and financial sources may only result in a slow decline of global terrorism. Much will depend on governance build-up in Iraq. Additional counterterrorism funding and new laws strengthening existing measures will continue apace. Knee-jerk and over-reactive measures focusing too heavily on the symptoms of terrorism are unlikely to produce sustainable progress.


Significance In September 2014, the United States and coalition partners began an air campaign against Islamic State group (ISG) in Syria following its seizure of large swathes of northern and western Iraq. While these developments have not changed overall US policy in Syria -- to encourage a negotiated political settlement between regime and opposition -- they have seen Washington's focus move away from the civil war and onto counter-terrorism and containing ISG in Iraq. Impacts Islamist rebels backed by Gulf states and Turkey will dominate the insurgency and influence any post-Assad government. Efforts to destroy ISG in Iraq are unlikely to succeed so long as it retains a safe haven in Syria. US air support will help Kurds establish contiguous zone of control in northern Syria, prompting Ankara to respond. Without access to game-changing US weapons, Syrian rebels will not have the firepower needed to defeat the regime. The regime will withdraw steadily from outlying areas and consolidate its control on Damascus, the Homs-Hama corridor and western Syria.


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