Outside directors' industry-specific experience and firms' liability of newness

2008 ◽  
Vol 29 (12) ◽  
pp. 1345-1355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasemin Y. Kor ◽  
Vilmos F. Misangyi
2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-17
Author(s):  
Abdelkader Derbali ◽  
Lamia Jamel ◽  
Ali Lamouchi ◽  
Ahmed K Elnagar ◽  
Monia Ben Ltaifa

The board of directors plays a crucial role as an internal structure of corporate governance. Certainly, its efficiency is needy on the existence of numerous issues; the greatest significance is correlated to its characteristics that relay principally to the individuality of its memberships, board dimension, combining the purposes of pronouncement and regulator as well the grade of the individuality of the audit board and the diverse gender of the committee. To assess the authenticity of our assumptions, which stipulate the presence of deterministic characteristics of the committee on the profitability of Tunisian banks, we evaluated by three different ratios i.e., ROA (return on asset), ROE (return on equity), and MP (market performance); and we estimate three models with linear regressions. The empirical findings were performed on a data sample composed of 11 Tunisian banks listed on the Stock Exchange of Tunisia (SET) during the period from 1999 to 2018. From the estimated regressions, we find a satisfactory outcome indicating the significance of the influence of the characteristics of the committee on the banking performance in Tunisia. Then, the percentage of outside directors negatively affects the level of the financial performance of banks. The number of institutional administrators performs an essential role in improving financial performance. Finally, the duality of the Presidency of the Council General-Directorate has a negative effect on the level of stock market performance of Tunisian banks.


2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 121-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Contessotto ◽  
W. Robert Knechel ◽  
Robyn A. Moroney

SUMMARY Audit quality is dependent on the experience and effort of the audit team to identify and respond to client risks (risk responsiveness). Central to each team are the core role holders who plan and execute the audit. While many studies treat the partner as the primary core role holder, the manager and auditor-in-charge (AIC) are also important. Using data for engagements from two midtier firms, we analyze the association between the experience and relative effort of the manager and AIC and risk responsiveness. We find a manager's client-specific experience is associated with risk responsiveness for non-listed clients but find no evidence that the general or industry experience of a manager, or the experience of the AIC, is associated with risk responsiveness. The client-specific experience and relative effort of the partner is associated with risk responsiveness. These results suggests that managers can provide an important, albeit limited, contribution to the audit. JEL Classifications: M2. Data Availability: The data were made available to the researchers on the understanding that they will remain confidential.


Author(s):  
Marc I. Steinberg

This chapter examines, from a traditional perspective, several areas where the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has impacted corporate governance in a meaningful way. By way of example, these subjects include insider trading, qualitative materiality, the role of gatekeepers (such as outside directors, attorneys, and accountants), the Commission’s use of disclosure to influence conduct, the implementation by subject companies of undertakings pursuant to SEC enforcement proceedings, and mergers and acquisitions (including tender offers and going-private transactions). This chapter’s focus is on the manner in which the SEC for well over 50 years has impacted corporate governance by means of exercising its rule-making and oversight authority.


2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 249-268
Author(s):  
Christine Contessotto ◽  
W. Robert Knechel ◽  
Robyn Moroney

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