How do audit team industry and client‐specific experience impact audit effort and audit fees?

2021 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 249-268
Author(s):  
Christine Contessotto ◽  
W. Robert Knechel ◽  
Robyn Moroney
Keyword(s):  
Audit Fees ◽  
Specific Experience ◽  
Audit Team

The Association between Audit Manager and Auditor-In-Charge Experience, Effort, and Risk Responsiveness

2018 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 121-147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine Contessotto ◽  
W. Robert Knechel ◽  
Robyn A. Moroney
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
The Core ◽  
Specific Experience ◽  
Primary Core ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Audit Team ◽  
Industry Experience ◽  
Jel Classifications ◽  
Core Role

SUMMARY Audit quality is dependent on the experience and effort of the audit team to identify and respond to client risks (risk responsiveness). Central to each team are the core role holders who plan and execute the audit. While many studies treat the partner as the primary core role holder, the manager and auditor-in-charge (AIC) are also important. Using data for engagements from two midtier firms, we analyze the association between the experience and relative effort of the manager and AIC and risk responsiveness. We find a manager's client-specific experience is associated with risk responsiveness for non-listed clients but find no evidence that the general or industry experience of a manager, or the experience of the AIC, is associated with risk responsiveness. The client-specific experience and relative effort of the partner is associated with risk responsiveness. These results suggests that managers can provide an important, albeit limited, contribution to the audit. JEL Classifications: M2. Data Availability: The data were made available to the researchers on the understanding that they will remain confidential.

On the Economics of Mandatory Audit Partner Rotation and Tenure: Evidence from PCAOB Data

2020 ◽  
pp. 0000-0000
Author(s):  
Brandon Gipper ◽  
Luzi Hail ◽  
Christian Leuz
Keyword(s):  
Cross Section ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Large Cross Section ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Audit Market ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Mandatory Rotation ◽  
Audit Team ◽  
Audit Partner Rotation

We analyze the effects of partner tenure and mandatory rotation on audit quality, pricing, and production for a large cross-section of U.S. public firms over the 2008 to 2014 period. On average, we find no evidence that audit quality declines over the tenure cycle and little support for "fresh-look" benefits provided by the new audit partner. Audit fees decline and audit hours increase after mandatory rotation, but then reverse over the tenure cycle. We also find evidence that audit firms use "shadowing" in preparation for a lead partner turnover. These effects differ by competitiveness of the local audit market, client size, and partner experience. When multiple members of the audit team commence at a new client, the transition appears to be more disruptive and more likely to exhibit audit quality effects. Our findings point to costly efforts by the audit firms to minimize disruptions and audit failures around mandatory rotations.

The Relationship between Audit Team Composition, Audit Fees, and Quality

2017 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 115-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarowar Hossain ◽  
Kenichi Yazawa ◽  
Gary S. Monroe
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Professional Staff ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Team Composition ◽  
Going Concern ◽  
Going Concern Opinion ◽  
Audit Team ◽  
First Time

SUMMARY Using Japanese data, we investigate whether there is a positive association between audit team composition based on the number of senior auditors, assistant auditors, and other professional staff on the audit team and audit fees and a variety of commonly used measures of audit quality (likelihood of issuing a going concern opinion and a first-time going concern opinion for a sample of financially distressed companies, the absolute value of discretionary and working capital accruals). We find that the number of senior auditors, assistant auditors, and other professional staff on the audit team are positively associated with audit fees. We find that the number of senior auditors on the audit team has a positive association with audit quality. However, the number of assistant auditors and other professional staff on the audit team are not significantly associated with any of our audit quality measures. JEL Classifications: M41; M42. Data Availability: All data are publicly available from the sources indicated in the paper.

The Conditional Effects of Abnormal Audit Fees on Audit Quality

2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 291-332
Author(s):  
Kyung Soon Kim ◽  
Seun Young Park ◽  
Jin Hwon Lee
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Conditional Effects
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