Competition Law in Europe

European competition law is the other central player in the competition law world, so an entire chapter is devoted to understanding how it works and how to deal with it. Virtually all firms operating beyond their own national boundaries need to pay attention to it, many regimes use it as a model and reference point, and its institutions have broad and often deep influence on many others. Some aspects of the substantive law are similar to US antitrust, but the similarities are sometimes misleading. For example, EU law uses economic analysis in ways that often differ from how it is used in the US. Procedural and institutional arrangements are often complicated. They represent multiple voices, as national and EU institutions function together to create, apply, and enforce competition law. The chapter reveals how this system functions and what factors guide decisions in it. It looks, in particular, at the institutional arrangements between the EU and its member states, including the role of the European Competition Network.

Competition Law and Antitrust

The more than 100 competition/antitrust laws around the world play major roles both at home and in other countries. They influence each other in ways that affect decisions everywhere. The book is a new kind of guide that makes this world accessible to anyone, anywhere. It provides a new set of tools to organize the vast amount of data about competition laws in ways that reveal what is happening and what is driving decisions. Using a global perspective, it defines competition law in a way that is applicable to all competition law systems and then examines competition law goals, methods, and institutions and the forces that drive them. It devotes an entire chapter each to US antitrust law and European competition law as well as sections for East Asian, Latin American, and developing country competition law patterns. It shows how competition law regimes relate to each other as parts of a global system with its own patterns and dynamics. Transnational public and private institutions, including law firms, management and economic consultancy firms, accounting firms, and others are part of this system. By combining clear analysis of the elements of individual regimes with the transborder forces that influence them, it gives lawyers, students, officials, and scholars the tools they need to understand and operate in this complex and often misunderstood world.

Die kartellrechtliche Beurteilung von Preisgleitklauseln als Ausprägung von Hub & Spoke Verhältnissen

This dissertation is devoted to assessing price adjustment clauses in European competition law. In practice, such clauses often require the disclosure of sensitive market information by competitors to a common contractual partner. This disclosure of information can be a form of hub-and-spoke collusion. The extent to which a price adjustment clause falls under the prohibition of cartels in Art. 101 of the TFEU, and thus whether an agreement without any contact between competitors is possible, depends in particular on the definition of a concerted practice. Whether accidental and unintentional participation in the exchange of information should also fall within the scope of Art. 101 (1) of the TFEU is subject to discussion. The author argues for a nuanced assessment of conscious and unconscious indirect information exchange.

Verpflichtungszusagen im europäischen Kartellrecht und der Grundsatz der Verhältnismäßigkeit

Commitment decisions are a popular means for the European Commission to close antitrust proceedings. This book examines the influence of the principle of proportionality on commitment decisions, a topic which has neither been fully scrutinised in research literature nor properly clarified by the courts thus far. Firstly, the book gives a general overview of commitment decisions and analyses their similarities and differences to other instruments in European competition law. It then explores the principle of proportionality and its role in competition law. Subsequently, the main part of the book examines the alleged precedence of commitment decisions over other instruments of competition law. The following chapter looks at the proper application of the principle of proportionality on commitment decisions by the European Commission. Finally, in a summary analysis, the book concludes that the principle of proportionality’s main strengths unfold especially with regard to commitment decisions.

Albert Sanchez-Graells, Prześwietlanie w poszukiwaniu zmów przetargowych w zamówieniach publicznych, „Journal of European Competition Law & Practice” 2019, vol. 10

Albert Sanchez-Graells, ‘Screening for Cartels’ in Public Procurement: Cheating at Solitaire to Sell Fool’s Gold? (Prześwietlanie w poszukiwaniu zmów przetargowych w zamówieniach publicznych), „Journal of European Competition Law & Practice” 2019, vol. 10, iss. 4, s. 199–211, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/jeclap/lpz024

Geo-blocking Regulation: Antitrust or Consumer Protection?

The author attempts to show that the seeming absorption of a large-scale, general geo-blocking prohibition in the field of competition law (antitrust) is unsystematic, and can negatively influence the further development of European competition law and policy and related goals. The positive implications of the GBR regime in the area of consumer protection law (and for trade regulation as such) are not negated. The author, however, attempts to underscore the fact that, in certain constellations, legislative instruments should be very clearly designated, their nature and scope concisely labelled. Formal oversights, such as omission of clear denominations or even plain wrong designations can – in certain circumstances – lead to functional consequences. For this reason the author stresses the view that the GBR is a legislative instrument of market regulation and consumer protection and has no real appreciable link to antitrust.