Antitrust Law and Digital Markets: A Guide to the European Competition Law Experience in the Digital Economy

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Viktoria H.S.E. Robertson
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Digital Economy ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
European Competition Law

scholarly journals Productos de lujo y distribución a través de plataformas de internet desde el Derecho Europeo de la Competencia (TJUE C-230/16, Asunto Coty) = Luxury products and distribution through internet platforms from the European Competition Law (ECJ C-230/16, Coty Case)

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 663
Author(s):  
Alicia Arroyo Aparicio
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
European Law ◽  
Cosmetic Products ◽  
Selective Distribution ◽  
On Line ◽  
Luxury Products ◽  
European Competition Law

Resumen: Este estudio analiza la jurisprudencia del TJUE referida a los acuerdos de distribución se­lectiva de productos cosméticos de lujo y la compatibilidad de la restricción de las ventas de esos produc­tos a través de plataformas de internet (on line) con el Derecho protector de la libre competencia de la UE. Se tiene en cuenta en particular la Sentencia de 6 de diciembre de 2017, Asunto Coty Germany GbmH c. Parfümerie Akzente GmbH, si bien se observa la jurisprudencia en general así como desde la recaída en el Asunto Metro hasta dicha sentencia. Tres cuestiones son destacadas: distribución selectiva y Derecho de la Competencia; la compatibilidad de la prohibición de comercializar en plataformas de internet –“amazon.de” es la plataforma concreta del Asunto Coty– y la interconexión con el Derecho de marcas.Palabras clave: distribución selectiva, plataformas de venta en internet, productos de lujo, Dere­cho de la Competencia, Asunto Coty.Abstract: This study analyzes EJC Case Law referring to the selective distribution agreements of luxury cosmetic products and the compatibility of the restriction of sales of these products through onli­ne platforms, under the perspective of Antitrust European Law. In particular, the Judgment of December 6, 2017, Coty Germany GbmH c. Parfümerie Akzente GmbH is considered, but also it is important to take into account the evolution from Metro Case to Coty. Three issues are highlighted: selective distri­bution and Competition Law, compatibility of the prohibition to market on internet platforms - “amazon.de” was the specific platform in Coty- Case and the interconnection with the Trademarks Law.Keywords: selective distribution, on line sales and platform bans, Antitrust Law, Coty Case.

scholarly journals Price Algorithms as a Threat to Competition Under the Conditions of Digital Economy: Approaches to Antimonopoly Legislation of BRICS Countries

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 94-117
Author(s):  
A. Spiridonova ◽  
E. Juchnevicius
Keyword(s):  
Economic Activity ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Digital Economy ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Interstate Cooperation ◽  
Brics Countries ◽  
Legal Problems ◽  
Antitrust Laws ◽  
Antitrust Regulation ◽  
Price Algorithm

The authors examine certain legal problems of antitrust regulation in the digital economy facing the international community, including BRICS member countries. This article focuses on the problems associated with the use of price algorithms by enterprises as a threat factor to competition. The concept of “price algorithm” and the goals of its use by enterprises are analyzed; it is concluded that the use of price algorithms is just one of the tools for conducting economic activity. At the same time, enterprises can pose a threat to competition by using price algorithms as an element of concluding anti-competitive agreements (concerted actions) between enterprises and illegal coordination of their activities. Restriction of competition through the use of price algorithms can harm consumers of goods, works, and services and should be controlled by antitrust authorities. Based on the analysis of the antitrust laws of the BRICS member countries, it is concluded that currently the concept of a “pricing algorithm” is not enshrined in the laws of any of the BRICS member states, however, there are prohibitions on anticompetitive agreements of enterprises and illegal coordination of economic activity. We refute the need to legally enshrine the concept of “price algorithm” in antitrust law. At the same time, it proves that enterprises should be held accountable for the use of the price algorithm as atool to limit competition. The paper proves that within the framework of interstate cooperation of the BRICS countries in the field of competition law, it is necessary to develop common approaches to antitrust regulation in the digital economy, including to ensure auniform approach to regulating and controlling the use of price algorithms by enterprises in the framework of economic activity.

scholarly journals The Global Dominance of European Competition Law Over American Antitrust Law

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 731-766
Author(s):  
Anu Bradford ◽  
Adam Chilton ◽  
Katerina Linos ◽  
Alexander Weaver
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
European Competition Law

scholarly journals Aplicabilidad de un acuerdo de elección de foro a una reclamación de indemnización de daños por vulneración del Artículo 102 TFUE: el caso Apple Sales International (C-595/17) = Applicability of a jurisdiction agreement to a claim of damages by infringement of Article 102 TFEU: the Apple Sales International case (C-595/17)

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 439
Author(s):  
Alfonso-Luis Calvo Caravaca ◽  
Julia Suderow
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Damage Claims ◽  
The Will ◽  
European Competition Law ◽  
Abuse Of Dominance ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

Resumen: La aplicación privada del derecho de la Competencia no se limita tan sólo a acciones de daños por infracciones del art. 101 TFUE, sino que también abarca las acciones follow on y stand alone contra los abusos de posición de dominio sancionados por el art. 102 TFUE. Se trata de acciones que tienen su origen en conductas unilaterales en las que las cláusulas de atribución de competencia juegan un papel esencial. El TJUE resuelve con la sentencia Ap-ple Sales ciertas dudas sobre el alcance de estas cláusulas si bien su respuesta genera nuevas cuestiones que podrán plantearse en futuros litigios. La voluntad de las partes y la proporcio-nalidad tendrán que seguir siendo los elementos sobre los que pivote la exclusividad del foro de sumisión expresa.Palabras clave: acciones para la indemnización de daños anticompetitivos, acciones autónomas, acciones de seguimiento, acuerdos de elección de foro, arbitraje, competencia judicial internacional, Daños, Derecho antitrust, Derecho europeo de la competencia, Unión Europea.Abstract: Private enforcement of Competition Law is not limited to cartel damage claims based on infringements of art. 101 TFUE. Follow on and Stand alone actions against the abuse of dominance sanctioned by art. 102 TFUE are also included. They are actions derived from unilateral conducts where jurisdiction agreements play an important role. In the ruling Apple Sales, the ECJ solves certain doubts about the scope of this type of clauses but its answer generates new questions that will be dealt in future disputes. The will of the parties as well as the proportionality will still be the basis of the exclusivity of the forum.Keywords: antitrust damages actions, stand-alone actions, follow-on actions, jurisdiction agreements, arbitration, jurisdiction, damages (Torts), Antitrust Law, European Competition Law, European Union.

scholarly journals The Global Dominance of European Competition Law Over American Antitrust Law

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anu Bradford ◽  
Adam S. Chilton ◽  
Katerina Linos ◽  
Alex Weaver
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
European Competition Law

scholarly journals Digital economy and antitrust law: The unity and conflict of opposites

Pravovedenie ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 63 (4) ◽  
pp. 486-521
Author(s):  
Alexey Yu. Ivanov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Industrial Revolution ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Digital Economy ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Positive Role ◽  
Capitalist System ◽  
Brics Countries ◽  
The World

The digital economy has become a new milestone in human development, but along with the benefits of digitalization and globalization of the world economy it has brought an unprecedented increase in the concentration of market power in the hands of a small group of digital monopolies and a rapid increase in global inequality, which creates systemic imbalances in the development of society. According to a number of experts, a likely consequence of such imbalances in development may be long-term instability that already entails fundamental risks for the existence of the capitalist system. Antitrust law has already played a positive role in overcoming such challenges in the development of the capitalist system during the technological transformations of the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. It has allowed the USA and a number of other Western countries to go through the last great industrial revolution in a less painful way than those countries, including Russia, which experienced a dismantling of the capitalist system and were unable to withstand the pressures of accelerated development. This article analyzes the reasons that prevented antitrust law from playing a similar balancing role during the ongoing industrial revolution and proposes possible measures to improve mechanisms of antitrust regulation of the digital economy. Among the most promising avenues for creating effective checks and balances on the growing market power of global digital platforms are the emerging formats for antitrust cooperation within the framework of regional associations of developing countries, primarily on the BRICS platform. Cooperation between the BRICS countries in the sphere of competition law and policy may also become a serious factor for the formation of a global antitrust regime, which does not currently exist. Moreover, given the positioning of the BRICS countries in the world system, such cooperation allows for the creation of a global competition law that would promote a wider dissemination of knowledge and advanced technologies and help remove barriers to global innovation flows that are now set by global technological monopolies. Cooperation in this sphere would have a positive impact on reducing global inequalities.

“Collective Redress” in European Competition Law

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 388-414
Author(s):  
Alexandra P. Mikroulea
Keyword(s):  
Hybrid System ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Mixed System ◽  
Basic Question ◽  
Effective Implementation ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Collective Redress ◽  
Opt Out ◽  
Private Autonomy ◽  
European Competition Law

AbstractOpt-in or opt-out? That is the basic question to be answered. The decision to promote actions of “opt-in” type as opposed to those of the “opt-out” type, for the sake of private autonomy, does not ensure the effective application of european competition law. On the contrary, it may decrease the application’s intensity and effectiveness. Recent reforms among European state members such as in the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway are powerful indications that the opt-out principle may result in the effective implementation of competition law. There is no doubt that a mixed system (hybrid system), providing the court with the power to decide in favour of either the opt-in or the opt-out system, will result in better implementation of competition law. At the present time there are two pending cases in England (Dorothy Gibson and Mastercard) for which the decision on opt-out or opt-in are highly anticipated. Should the court decide, in one or both of the cases, on an opt-out approach, this will bring a momentous reevaluation of the entire collective redress concept.

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