National and International Regulation and Practices Pertaining to PMSC of Malaysia

The cases of sea robberies and crimes in Asia and particularly in Malaysia waters from 2013 to 2018 is quite alarming. The cases from 2013 to 2018 is consecutively 150, 187, 203, 85, 101, and 83. There was a steady increase in cases from 2013 to 2015, which reached a peak of 203 cases in 2015. The current area of serious concern is the Sulu-Celebes Sea and waters off Eastern Sabah. The Malaysia maritime security forces that consist of the Royal Malaysian Navy, MMEA, and Marine Police have all out to stop thse sea crimes. The increased number of assets and frequency of patrol is not practical and costly and it is difficult to ensure the security of each vessel. One solution by the shipowner is to engage the service of the private maritime security company (PMSC) as a last security net. Ministry of Home Affair (MOHA) had established regulation for the operation of PMSC in Malaysia based on local law. However, the regulation is not compatible with international requirements and especially when shipping is the most international industry in the world. The reason for the incompatibility is may due to MOHA was using regulations and standards of on-land private security companies in Malaysia to develop the standard for the private maritime security firm. Another reason is Marine Department Malaysia, which represents Malaysia in the International Maritime Organization was not referred.

Armor All: The Self-Conception of Private Security Contractors

Whereas the values, attitudes and motivations of soldiers serving in their countries’ armed forces have been widely studied, to date we know very little about the motivations and self-conception of individuals working for the private security industry. Using data obtained through an online survey, this article explores the values, attitudes and identity of more than 200 private security contractors with law enforcement backgrounds and operational experience with a security firm in Iraq. Contrary to media dominating images of ruthless, money-grabbing mercenaries, respondents in this sample adhered to attitudes and values very similar to those of professional soldiers serving in Western militaries.

Gender Differences In Job Attribute Preferences And Job Choice Of University Students In China

<p class="MsoBlockText" style="margin: 0in 0.5in 0pt;"><span style="font-style: normal; mso-bidi-font-style: italic;"><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">This study investigates the gender differences in job attribute preferences and job choice among a group of university students in China.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Due to the shortage of well-trained professionals and managers in China, both foreign and Chinese organizations compete for highly trained candidates.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Correlation and regression analysis on data from 1,231 university students in China were used to test three hypotheses. Similarities between how men and women view the importance of advancement, compensation, and learning and overseas opportunities, in employment by foreign and national enterprises, were observed.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>But, on issues of job security, firm size, and nationality of supervisor, gender differences were present.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;">&nbsp; </span>Implications on employee recruitment for Chinese and foreign enterprises are discussed and suggestions for future research are provided. </span></span></span></p>

Understanding Online Traders' Behavior: An Example from Common Stock Investment in Taiwan

The effect of online trading on investors' trading behavior is analyzed based on investors' trading data provided by a major security firm in Taiwan. Findings are as follows: (1) Male and younger traders preferred online trading. Investors who had a higher gross return tended to switch to using online trading. (2) Even though investors traded more actively after going online, their trading performance was not negatively affected. (3) Online trading did not significantly increase speculative trading even though more information can be assessed online. (4) The order execution efficiency of online trading was better than that of phone-based trading.

Global Laws

Alexey Vladimirovich Ivanov, a twenty-something computer geek from Chelyabinsk, Russia, in the Ural Mountains, earned his living hacking the computer networks of American companies. After breaking into a firm’s servers, he would contact it on behalf of “The Expert Group of Protection Against Hackers” and demand thousands of dollars in exchange for tips on how to plug its security holes. One Connecticut company that initially refused to pay received this e-mail from Ivanov:… now imagine please Somebody hack you network (and not notify you about this), he download Atomic software with more then 300 merchants, transfer money, and after this did ‘rm -rf/’ [a Unix command that deletes directories] and after this you company be ruined. I don’t want this, and because this i notify you about possible hack in you network, if you want you can hire me and im allways be check security in you network. What you think about this?... If a firm did not comply with his unsubtle threats, Ivanov would delete its computer files or post its customers’ credit card information on the Web. Not surprisingly, most firms gave in to the extortion. When FBI officials became aware of Ivanov’s scams, they sought help from the Russian police. But as Brendan Koerner explained, “The Russian interior ministry’s ‘Department R,’ which fights cybercrime, can barely keep up with the kontoras in St. Petersburg and Moscow, much less police a distant outpost like Chelyabinsk.” So the FBI took matters into its own hands. Under the guise of a fictional American Internet security firm called “Invita,” the FBI invited Ivanov to the United States to audition for a job identifying flaws in the networks of potential Invita clients. When Ivanov arrived, undercover agents asked him to prove his ability to break into computer networks. Unbeknownst to Ivanov, the FBI was using a “sniffer” keystroke recording program to learn the usernames and passwords for his computers in Russia. After the audition, the FBI arrested Ivanov and, using his usernames and passwords, downloaded incriminating information from his computer in Russia—information later used to convict him.