Constitutive Reasons and the Suspension of Judgement

This paper identifies a puzzle that emerges when recent work on the suspension of judgement is integrated with evidentialist solutions to the wrong kind of reasons problem: it looks like there is no such thing as a reason to suspend judgement. Two possible responses to this puzzle are considered: one recharacterizes the suspension of judgement as a mental action, and the other recharacterizes it as a second-order attitude. It is argued that these responses sidestep the puzzle only with unacceptable compromise to the view of suspension of judgement.

Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental

Reasons fundamentalists maintain that we can analyze all derivative normative properties in terms of normative reasons. These theorists famously encounter the Wrong Kind of Reasons (WKR) problem, since not all reasons for reactions seem relevant for reasons-based analyses. Some have argued that this problem is a general one for many theorists, and claim that this lightens the burden for reasons fundamentalists. We argue in this paper that the reverse is true: the generality of the problem makes life harder for reasons fundamentalists. We do this in two stages. First, we show that reflection on the generality of the distinction between wrong-kind reasons and right-kind reasons shows that not all right-kind reasons are normative reasons. So, not only do reasons-based analyses require a distinction between right-kind reasons and wrong-kind reasons, they also need a distinction between normative right-kind reasons from nonnormative right-kind reasons. We call this the Right Kind of Reasons Problem. In the second stage of the paper, we argue that reasons fundamentalism places tight constraints on its proper solution: in particular, it forbids one from appealing to anything normative to distinguish normative RKRs from nonnormative RKRs. It hence seems that reasons fundamentalists can only appeal to natural facts to solve the problem, but it is unclear which ones can do the job. So, reflection on the generality of the distinction only multiplies the fundamentalist’s problems. We end by exploring several solutions to these problems, and recommend a form of constitutivism as the best.

Reasons Fundamentalism and Value

Here I address the issue of whether the concept of a reason is a basic normative notion. I do this by considering whether the attempts to analyze this notion in terms of “ought” succeed, as I think these are the most promising accounts. I consider the attempts of Broome, and of Kearns and Star, to attempt to analyze reasons in terms of oughts, and argue that these attempts fail. I defend the view that goodness can be defined in terms of reasons—the buck-passing account of goodness—and defend this view from the most serious objections, the “wrong kind of reasons” objection and the “isolated good” objection. I finish by expressing some doubts about whether “ought” can be defined in terms of reasons. I conclude, therefore, that the notion of a reason is a basic notion, but not the basic normative notion.

The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons

There is a wide-ranging discussion of two kinds of reasons for attitudes, which are sometimes called the right and wrong kinds of reasons. The distinction, some think, applies to a whole range of different attitudes such as beliefs and intentions, as well as pro-attitudes, e.g. admiration or desire, in similar ways. Explaining it may therefore contribute significantly to understanding the nature of reasons and normativity in general. This chapter argues for two claims: (1) we should sharply distinguish the wrong kind of reasons problem as it arises for fitting attitude theories from other problems that come under the same name; (2) the wrong kind of reasons problem outside of fitting attitude theory doesn’t have a very clear shape. In particular, there is no similarity between reasons to believe and reasons to intend in this regard, and therefore no hope for a unified explanation of the alleged phenomenon.

The Beginnings of an Answer

This chapter answers the first two of the four objections from the end of Chapter 1. (1) When thinking rationally has disastrous consequences, in one sense (reflecting the ‘wrong kind of reasons’) you ‘ought not’ to think rationally, but in another sense (reflecting the ‘right kind of reasons’) you ‘ought’ to think rationally. This corresponds to the difference, not between ‘state-given’ and ‘object-given’ reasons, but between the norms that are, and those that are not, constitutive of the mental states to which they apply. (2) If it is really possible to have rational false beliefs about what one ‘ought’ to do, the sense of ‘ought’ featuring in the content of this belief must be different from the sense in which one ‘ought’ never to act contrary to one’s beliefs about what one ought to do. The former is an ‘objective “ought”’ while the latter is a more ‘subjective “ought”’.

Morality, Accountability and the Wrong Kind of Reasons

In The Second Person Standpoint, Stephen Darwall makes a new argument against consequentialism, appealing to: (a) the conceptual tie between obligation and accountability, and (b) the ‘right kind of reasons’ for holding others accountable. I argue that Darwall's argument, as it stands, fails against indirect consequentialism, because it relies on a confusion between our being right to establish practices, and our having a right to do so. I also explore two ways of augmenting Darwall's argument. However, while the second of these ways is more promising than the first, neither provides a convincing argument against indirect consequentialism.