scholarly journals The right and the wrong kind of reasons

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. e12412 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Gertken ◽  
Benjamin Kiesewetter
Keyword(s):  
The Right ◽  
Wrong Kind Of Reasons

scholarly journals The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrike Heuer
Keyword(s):  
Attitude Theory ◽  
The Right ◽  
Wrong Kind Of Reasons

There is a wide-ranging discussion of two kinds of reasons for attitudes, which are sometimes called the right and wrong kinds of reasons. The distinction, some think, applies to a whole range of different attitudes such as beliefs and intentions, as well as pro-attitudes, e.g. admiration or desire, in similar ways. Explaining it may therefore contribute significantly to understanding the nature of reasons and normativity in general. This chapter argues for two claims: (1) we should sharply distinguish the wrong kind of reasons problem as it arises for fitting attitude theories from other problems that come under the same name; (2) the wrong kind of reasons problem outside of fitting attitude theory doesn’t have a very clear shape. In particular, there is no similarity between reasons to believe and reasons to intend in this regard, and therefore no hope for a unified explanation of the alleged phenomenon.

scholarly journals Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Errol Lord ◽  
Kurt Sylvan
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Proper Solution ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
The Right ◽  
Two Stages ◽  
Wrong Kind Of Reasons

Reasons fundamentalists maintain that we can analyze all derivative normative properties in terms of normative reasons. These theorists famously encounter the Wrong Kind of Reasons (WKR) problem, since not all reasons for reactions seem relevant for reasons-based analyses. Some have argued that this problem is a general one for many theorists, and claim that this lightens the burden for reasons fundamentalists. We argue in this paper that the reverse is true: the generality of the problem makes life harder for reasons fundamentalists. We do this in two stages. First, we show that reflection on the generality of the distinction between wrong-kind reasons and right-kind reasons shows that not all right-kind reasons are normative reasons. So, not only do reasons-based analyses require a distinction between right-kind reasons and wrong-kind reasons, they also need a distinction between normative right-kind reasons from nonnormative right-kind reasons. We call this the Right Kind of Reasons Problem. In the second stage of the paper, we argue that reasons fundamentalism places tight constraints on its proper solution: in particular, it forbids one from appealing to anything normative to distinguish normative RKRs from nonnormative RKRs. It hence seems that reasons fundamentalists can only appeal to natural facts to solve the problem, but it is unclear which ones can do the job. So, reflection on the generality of the distinction only multiplies the fundamentalist’s problems. We end by exploring several solutions to these problems, and recommend a form of constitutivism as the best.

Consequentialism and the Wrong Kind of Reasons: A Reply to Lang

Utilitas ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-359 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN BRUNERO
Keyword(s):  
The Right ◽  
Buck Passing ◽  
Wrong Kind Of Reasons ◽  
Reason Problem

In his article ‘The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem’, Gerald Lang formulates the buck-passing account of value so as to resolve the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. I argue against his formulation of buck-passing. Specifically, I argue that his formulation of buck-passing is not compatible with consequentialism (whether direct or indirect), and so it should be rejected.

The Beginnings of an Answer

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Wedgwood
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Right ◽  
Wrong Kind Of Reasons

This chapter answers the first two of the four objections from the end of Chapter 1. (1) When thinking rationally has disastrous consequences, in one sense (reflecting the ‘wrong kind of reasons’) you ‘ought not’ to think rationally, but in another sense (reflecting the ‘right kind of reasons’) you ‘ought’ to think rationally. This corresponds to the difference, not between ‘state-given’ and ‘object-given’ reasons, but between the norms that are, and those that are not, constitutive of the mental states to which they apply. (2) If it is really possible to have rational false beliefs about what one ‘ought’ to do, the sense of ‘ought’ featuring in the content of this belief must be different from the sense in which one ‘ought’ never to act contrary to one’s beliefs about what one ought to do. The former is an ‘objective “ought”’ while the latter is a more ‘subjective “ought”’.

Morality, Accountability and the Wrong Kind of Reasons

Utilitas ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (1) ◽  
pp. 28-40
Author(s):  
MICAH LOTT
Keyword(s):  
Second Person ◽  
Convincing Argument ◽  
The Right ◽  
Wrong Kind Of Reasons ◽  
Stephen Darwall ◽  
Do So

In The Second Person Standpoint, Stephen Darwall makes a new argument against consequentialism, appealing to: (a) the conceptual tie between obligation and accountability, and (b) the ‘right kind of reasons’ for holding others accountable. I argue that Darwall's argument, as it stands, fails against indirect consequentialism, because it relies on a confusion between our being right to establish practices, and our having a right to do so. I also explore two ways of augmenting Darwall's argument. However, while the second of these ways is more promising than the first, neither provides a convincing argument against indirect consequentialism.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement under NAFTA Chapter 11: The Shape of Things to Come?

1998 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 263-290
Author(s):  
J. Anthony VanDuzer
Keyword(s):  
Free Trade Agreement ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Trade Agreement ◽  
Minimum Standards ◽  
The North ◽  
State Behaviour ◽  
Nafta Chapter 11 ◽  
To Come ◽  
The Right

SummaryRecently, there has been a proliferation of international agreements imposing minimum standards on states in respect of their treatment of foreign investors and allowing investors to initiate dispute settlement proceedings where a state violates these standards. Of greatest significance to Canada is Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement, which provides both standards for state behaviour and the right to initiate binding arbitration. Since 1996, four cases have been brought under Chapter 11. This note describes the Chapter 11 process and suggests some of the issues that may arise as it is increasingly resorted to by investors.

What face familiarity feelings say about the lateralization of specific entities within the core system

2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Gainotti
Keyword(s):  
Temporal Lobe ◽  
Memory System ◽  
Core System ◽  
The Core ◽  
Memory Traces ◽  
Specific Memory ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Temporal Structures ◽  
The Right

Abstract The target article carefully describes the memory system, centered on the temporal lobe that builds specific memory traces. It does not, however, mention the laterality effects that exist within this system. This commentary briefly surveys evidence showing that clear asymmetries exist within the temporal lobe structures subserving the core system and that the right temporal structures mainly underpin face familiarity feelings.

Study of charge transfer in FeTi

1983 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
pp. 296-297
Author(s):  
J. Taft∅
Keyword(s):  
Charge Transfer ◽  
Charge Distribution ◽  
Electron Scattering ◽  
Periodic System ◽  
Electron Distribution ◽  
Scattering Amplitude ◽  
Transition Elements ◽  
Hartree Fock ◽  
Cscl Structure ◽  
The Right

It is well known that for reflections corresponding to large interplanar spacings (i.e., sin θ/λ small), the electron scattering amplitude, f, is sensitive to the ionicity and to the charge distribution around the atoms. We have used this in order to obtain information about the charge distribution in FeTi, which is a candidate for storage of hydrogen. Our goal is to study the changes in electron distribution in the presence of hydrogen, and also the ionicity of hydrogen in metals, but so far our study has been limited to pure FeTi. FeTi has the CsCl structure and thus Fe and Ti scatter with a phase difference of π into the 100-ref lections. Because Fe (Z = 26) is higher in the periodic system than Ti (Z = 22), an immediate “guess” would be that Fe has a larger scattering amplitude than Ti. However, relativistic Hartree-Fock calculations show that the opposite is the case for the 100-reflection. An explanation for this may be sought in the stronger localization of the d-electrons of the first row transition elements when moving to the right in the periodic table. The tabulated difference between fTi (100) and ffe (100) is small, however, and based on the values of the scattering amplitude for isolated atoms, the kinematical intensity of the 100-reflection is only 5.10-4 of the intensity of the 200-reflection.

New Dimensions in Freeze-Etching

1969 ◽  
Vol 27 ◽  
pp. 202-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell L. Steere ◽  
Michael Moseley
Keyword(s):  
Fracture Surfaces ◽  
Aluminum Specimen ◽  
Specimen Holder ◽  
Freeze Etching ◽  
The Right

A redesigned specimen holder and cap have made possible the freeze-etching of both fracture surfaces of a frozen fractured specimen. In principal, the procedure involves freezing a specimen between two specimen holders (as shown in A, Fig. 1, and the left side of Fig. 2). The aluminum specimen holders and brass cap are constructed so that the upper specimen holder can be forced loose, turned over, and pressed down firmly against the specimen stage to a position represented by B, Fig. 1, and the right side of Fig. 2.

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