scholarly journals Idealization and the Wrong Kind of Reasons

Ethics ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 126 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-161
Author(s):  
John Brunero
Keyword(s):  
Wrong Kind Of Reasons

scholarly journals The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ulrike Heuer
Keyword(s):  
Attitude Theory ◽  
The Right ◽  
Wrong Kind Of Reasons

There is a wide-ranging discussion of two kinds of reasons for attitudes, which are sometimes called the right and wrong kinds of reasons. The distinction, some think, applies to a whole range of different attitudes such as beliefs and intentions, as well as pro-attitudes, e.g. admiration or desire, in similar ways. Explaining it may therefore contribute significantly to understanding the nature of reasons and normativity in general. This chapter argues for two claims: (1) we should sharply distinguish the wrong kind of reasons problem as it arises for fitting attitude theories from other problems that come under the same name; (2) the wrong kind of reasons problem outside of fitting attitude theory doesn’t have a very clear shape. In particular, there is no similarity between reasons to believe and reasons to intend in this regard, and therefore no hope for a unified explanation of the alleged phenomenon.

How Not to Solve the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem

2013 ◽  
Vol 47 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 101-110
Author(s):  
Christos Kyriacou
Keyword(s):  
Wrong Kind Of Reasons

Reasons Fundamentalism and Value

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Stratton-Lake
Keyword(s):  
Basic Notion ◽  
Buck Passing ◽  
Wrong Kind Of Reasons

Here I address the issue of whether the concept of a reason is a basic normative notion. I do this by considering whether the attempts to analyze this notion in terms of “ought” succeed, as I think these are the most promising accounts. I consider the attempts of Broome, and of Kearns and Star, to attempt to analyze reasons in terms of oughts, and argue that these attempts fail. I defend the view that goodness can be defined in terms of reasons—the buck-passing account of goodness—and defend this view from the most serious objections, the “wrong kind of reasons” objection and the “isolated good” objection. I finish by expressing some doubts about whether “ought” can be defined in terms of reasons. I conclude, therefore, that the notion of a reason is a basic notion, but not the basic normative notion.

scholarly journals Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Errol Lord ◽  
Kurt Sylvan
Keyword(s):  
Normative Reasons ◽  
Proper Solution ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
The Right ◽  
Two Stages ◽  
Wrong Kind Of Reasons

Reasons fundamentalists maintain that we can analyze all derivative normative properties in terms of normative reasons. These theorists famously encounter the Wrong Kind of Reasons (WKR) problem, since not all reasons for reactions seem relevant for reasons-based analyses. Some have argued that this problem is a general one for many theorists, and claim that this lightens the burden for reasons fundamentalists. We argue in this paper that the reverse is true: the generality of the problem makes life harder for reasons fundamentalists. We do this in two stages. First, we show that reflection on the generality of the distinction between wrong-kind reasons and right-kind reasons shows that not all right-kind reasons are normative reasons. So, not only do reasons-based analyses require a distinction between right-kind reasons and wrong-kind reasons, they also need a distinction between normative right-kind reasons from nonnormative right-kind reasons. We call this the Right Kind of Reasons Problem. In the second stage of the paper, we argue that reasons fundamentalism places tight constraints on its proper solution: in particular, it forbids one from appealing to anything normative to distinguish normative RKRs from nonnormative RKRs. It hence seems that reasons fundamentalists can only appeal to natural facts to solve the problem, but it is unclear which ones can do the job. So, reflection on the generality of the distinction only multiplies the fundamentalist’s problems. We end by exploring several solutions to these problems, and recommend a form of constitutivism as the best.

scholarly journals An Augmented Buck-Passing Account of Reasons and Value: Scanlon and Crisp on What Stops the Buck

Utilitas ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 490-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
PHILIP COOK
Keyword(s):  
Dual Role ◽  
Formal Property ◽  
Formal Properties ◽  
Buck Passing ◽  
In Virtue Of ◽  
Wrong Kind Of Reasons

Roger Crisp has inspired two important criticisms of Scanlon's buck-passing account of value. I defend buck-passing from the wrong kind of reasons criticism, and the reasons and the good objection. I support Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen's dual role of reasons in refuting the wrong kind of reasons criticism, even where its authors claim it fails. Crisp's reasons and the good objection contends that the property of goodness is buck-passing in virtue of its formality. I argue that Crisp conflates general and formal properties, and that Scanlon is ambiguous about whether the formal property of a reason can stop the buck. Drawing from Wallace, I respond to Crisp's reasons and the good objection by developing an augmented buck-passing account of reasons and value, where the buck is passed consistently from the formal properties of both to the substantive properties of considerations and evaluative attitudes. I end by describing two unresolved problems for buck-passers.

Wrong Kind of Reasons and Consequences

Utilitas ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 405-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
RICHARD ROWLAND
Keyword(s):  
Recent Issue ◽  
Buck Passing ◽  
Wrong Kind Of Reasons ◽  
Reason Problem

In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provided an appealing new solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason problem for the buck-passing account of value. In subsequent issues Jonas Olson and John Brunero have provided objections to Lang's solution. I argue that Brunero's objection is not a problem for Lang's solution, and that a revised version of Lang's solution avoids Olson's objections. I conclude that we can solve the Wrong Kind of Reason problem, and that the wrong kind of reasons for pro-attitudes are reasons that would not still be reasons for pro-attitudes if it were not for the additional consequences of having those pro-attitudes.

Fitting Attitudes, Wrong Kinds of Reasons, and Mind-Independent Goodness

2009 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-364
Author(s):  
Heath White
Keyword(s):  
Fitting Attitudes ◽  
Independent Property ◽  
Wrong Kind Of Reasons

AbstractThe 'fitting-attitudes analysis' aims to analyze evaluative concepts in terms of attitudes, but suffers from the 'wrong kind of reasons' problem. This article critiques some suggested solutions to the WKR problem and offers one of its own, which appeals to the aims of attitudes. However, goodness is not a concept that can be successfully analyzed according to the method suggested here. Reasons are given why goodness should be thought of, instead, as a mind-independent property.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document