The marriage age U-shape

In this paper, I address the U-shaped dynamics (a decrease followed by an increase) in the age at first marriage during the twentieth century. First, I show that the U-shaped dynamics have been steeper in Western that in other countries. Second, I find that these dynamics in the West are strongly related to the post-World War II (WWII) economic growth. By contrast, in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries age of marriage was much less correlated across Western countries. I propose a simple model where age of marriage is a function of search frictions and married women's labor force participation. Both factors put together generate U-shaped dynamics as a result of an industrial boom that mimics the post-WWII Western economic development.

Jacks of All Trades and Masters of One: Declining Search Frictions and Unequal Growth

Declining search frictions generate productivity growth by allowing workers to find jobs for which they are better suited. For “jacks of all trades”—workers whose productivity is similar across different jobs in their labor market—declining search frictions lead to minimal growth. For “masters of one trade”—workers whose productivity varies a great deal across different jobs in their labor market—declining search frictions lead to fast growth. A rudimentary calibration suggests that differential returns to declining search frictions may account for a non-negligible fraction of the wage growth differential between routine and nonroutine workers. (JEL J24, J31, J63, J64, O33)

Estimation of Preference Heterogeneity in Markets with Costly Search

The paper shows preference heterogeneity is overestimated when not accounting for search frictions and studies the impact of search frictions on optimal price setting.

The Selection of Talent: Experimental and Structural Evidence from Ethiopia

We study how search frictions in the labor market affect firms’ ability to recruit talented workers. In a field experiment in Ethiopia, we show that an employer can attract more talented applicants by offering a small monetary incentive for making a job application. Estimates from a structural model suggest that the intervention is effective because the cost of making a job application is large, and positively correlated with jobseeker ability. We provide evidence that this positive correlation is driven by dynamic selection. In a second experiment, we show that local recruiters underestimate the positive impacts of application incentives. (JEL J23, J24, J31, J64, O15)