Monetary Policy Committees and Voting Behavior

In this chapter we suggest to use Bayesian ideal point estimation to analyze voting in monetary policy committees. Using data from the Riksbank we demonstrate what this entails and we compare ideal point estimates with the results from traditional approaches. We end by suggesting possible extensions.

Through a Crystal Ball Darkly: The Future of Monetary Policy Communication

I make six predictions about the future of central bank communication about monetary policy. Some are made with great confidence, like: transparency will increase over time. Others are far riskier, like: attempts to communicate with the general public, though laudable, will fail. I also suggest ways in which the so-called cacophony problem on monetary policy committees (speaking with too many voices) can be mitigated.

Theoretical Aspects of Collective Decision Making - Survey of the Economic Literature

The article aims at surveying the economic literature related to collective decision making. In order to do so it proposes a coherent framework allowing for a structured analysis of the factors influencing the works of a committee. These factors are divided into external ( shaped outside of the committee e.g. by law) and internal ones (related to the composition of the committee and interactions between its members). The survey of the general economic literature related to collective decision making presented within the proposed framework yields interesting suggestions for further research, including the consequences for the shape of monetary policy committees.