Monetary Policy Committees, Voting Behavior and Ideal Points

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger ◽  
Louis Raes
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Ideal Points ◽  
Monetary Policy Committees

Monetary Policy Committees and Voting Behavior

2019 ◽  
pp. 38-58
Author(s):  
Sylvester Eijffinger ◽  
Ronald Mahieu ◽  
Louis Raes
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Ideal Point ◽  
Point Estimation ◽  
Point Estimates ◽  
Monetary Policy Committees ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Traditional Approaches ◽  
Ideal Point Estimation

In this chapter we suggest to use Bayesian ideal point estimation to analyze voting in monetary policy committees. Using data from the Riksbank we demonstrate what this entails and we compare ideal point estimates with the results from traditional approaches. We end by suggesting possible extensions.

scholarly journals Information Use and the Condorcet Jury Theorem

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (10) ◽  
pp. 1098
Author(s):  
Keiichi Morimoto
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Information Use ◽  
Information Aggregation ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Strategic Complementarity ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Jury Theorem

Using a simple model of a coordination game, this paper explores how the information use of individuals affects an optimal committee size. Although enlarging the committee promotes information aggregation, it also stimulates the members’ coordination motive and distorts their voting behavior through higher-order beliefs. On the determination of a finite optimal committee size, the direction and degree of strategic interactions matter. When the strategic complementarity among members is strong, a finite optimal committee size exists. In contrast, it does not exist under strategic substitution. This mechanism is applied to the design of monetary policy committees in a New Keynesian model in which a committee conducts monetary policy under imperfect information.

scholarly journals MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEES: MEETINGS AND OUTCOMES

2010 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 569-588 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAN MARC BERK ◽  
BEATA K. BIERUT
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Monetary Policy Committees

Selecting Your Inflation Targeters: Background and Performance of Monetary Policy Committee Members

2011 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-238 ◽  
Author(s):  
Etienne Farvaque ◽  
Piotr Stanek ◽  
Hakim Hammadou
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Size Effects ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Economic Cooperation ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Monetary Policy Committee ◽  
Monetary Policy Committees ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Policy Committee

Abstract This paper starts by describing the composition of monetary policy committees (MPCs) in inflation-targeting and non-targeting countries. The experience of MPC members on their inflation performance is then compared, opposing inflation targeters with non-targeters. Our sample covers the major Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, in the period 1999-2008. Our results first show that MPCs are different in inflation-targeting (versus non-targeting) countries. They also reveal that policy-makers’ backgrounds influence inflation, and that the influence of MPCs’ experience is much greater in inflation-targeting countries, while size effects are more important for committees that do not target inflation.

Nonparametric Ideal-Point Estimation and Inference

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Tahk
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Ideal Point ◽  
Point Estimation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Hypothesis Tests ◽  
Consistent Estimation ◽  
Nonparametric Approach ◽  
Ideal Points ◽  
Ideal Point Estimation

Existing approaches to estimating ideal points offer no method for consistent estimation or inference without relying on strong parametric assumptions. In this paper, I introduce a nonparametric approach to ideal-point estimation and inference that goes beyond these limitations. I show that some inferences about the relative positions of two pairs of legislators can be made with minimal assumptions. This information can be combined across different possible choices of the pairs to provide estimates and perform hypothesis tests for all legislators without additional assumptions. I demonstrate the usefulness of these methods in two applications to Supreme Court data, one testing for ideological movement by a single justice and the other testing for multidimensional voting behavior in different decades.

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