Power-Sharing in Monetary Policy Committees: Evidence from the United Kingdom and Sweden

2014 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 665-692 ◽  
Author(s):  
HENRY W. CHAPPELL ◽  
ROB ROY MCGREGOR ◽  
TODD A. VERMILYEA
2020 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 412-440
Author(s):  
Jo Eric Khushal Murkens

Abstract The complexities of the United Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the European Union while simultaneously honoring its prior commitments to its decentralized, autonomous, and constituent regions have put constitutional questions back on the map. The dominant approach analyzes these questions premised on the “preservative” view of the constitution. This view prioritizes the stability and continuity of the institutions in Westminster (Parliament) and Whitehall (central executive). However, the preservative view of the constitution is theoretically and practically deficient as it cannot give an account of the multipolar and decentralized developments of the past twenty years. Another interpretation regards the legal and political changes to the constitution as “transformative.” This view accentuates the fragility of the U.K. constitution due to a plurality of constitutional rules and the ongoing processes of devolution of powers within multilevel systems of government. This Article discusses that evolution of the U.K. constitution through the prism of comparative constitutional law and its appropriate methodology. The preservative model of the constitution favors a universalist method, whereas the transformative model requires a contextualist method. I argue that the experience of supranational (European Union) and infranational (devolution) power sharing has fundamentally altered the United Kingdom’s central constitutional concepts. To stabilize its fragmentary forces, the United Kingdom needs to adopt concepts that reflect the state as divided, the constitution as transitional, sovereignty as an attribute of the state rather than Parliament, and democracy as conflicted. Nothing less than the future of the United Kingdom as a state is at stake.


2015 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 249-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Poguntke ◽  
Paul Webb

IntroduzioneIn this article, we seek to re-consider the ‘presidentialization of politics’ argument in the light of recent developments in Germany and the United Kingdom. The experiences of coalition government suggest prima facie grounds for the erosion of the presidentialization process in each country. Germany has operated with a Grand Coalition in which domination of the executive by the Chancellor would seem less likely, whereas the long history of single-party governments in the United Kingdom gave way to a rare experiment in coalitional power sharing between 2010 and 2015, circumstances which should limit prime ministerial power. However, it is our contention that the presidentialization thesis retains its purchase in these two countries. German Chancellors and British prime ministers have been increasingly able to mobilize power resources, which allow them to govern more independently of their own parties and their coalition partners, and this seems to hold across a variety of political circumstances.


2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rangan Gupta ◽  
Mark Wohar

Theory suggests a strong link between monetary policy rate uncertainty and equity return volatility, since asset pricing models assume the risk-free rate to be a key factor for equity prices. Given this, our paper uses historical monthly data for the United Kingdom over 1833:01 to 2018:07, to show that monetary policy uncertainty increases stock market volatility within sample. In addition, we show that the information on monetary policy uncertainty also adds value to forecasting out-of-sample equity market volatility. 


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