ESA Digital Twin Earth Precursor: Food Systems

<p>Part of ESA’s Digital Twin Earth Precursor projects, our project focuses on supporting ESA in the definition of the concept of a Digital Twin Earth, and establishing a solid scientific and technical basis to realise this. The project, run by CGI and in close collaboration with Oxford University Innovation, Trillium & IIASA, has a focus on developing a Food Systems Digital Twin, taking on board interdisciplinary systems through the biosphere, atmosphere, and hydrosphere systems. These in turn would allow for new interdisciplinary insights for policies dealing with climate, food production and sustainability. The project is looking at a use case with the prominent use of AI processing, challenges of model integration, ingestion of socio-economic as well as physical measurements, end-to-end chain providing decision support outputs, all with innovation at each stage, and working closely with a series of stakeholders.</p><p>The purpose of our use case is to demonstrate the value of the Digital Twin Earth concept to the scientific community, by integrating the outputs of novel algorithms. We will be using selected machine learning extreme precipitation models feeding Global Gridded Crop Models, and after a regional downscaling exercise, the integration into cropland land use and pricing. By taking these steps, the benefits include improvement in routine monitoring with regular seasonal progress, short term policy development including responses to crop shortages due to extremes, and aiding in long term policy development to apply appropriate incentives. The purpose of the architecture and integration within the preparation of the demonstration is to support the use case and draw conclusions for the roadmap. These developments will be based on stakeholder consultations and the drawing together of differing model elements.</p><p>This Digital Twin Earth is an exciting project bringing together EO experts, Earth System Scientists, industry, AI experts, modellers, ICT experts and user community. It aims to establish the initial building blocks of an ambitious initiative, and, based on the prototyping activities, to develop a scientific and technology roadmap for the future, addressing current limitations. It ties in closely to both the European Space Agency’s and European Commission’s plan to create a series of interdisciplinary Digital Twin Earths with associated boundary conditions, in order to offer services to public sector users for developing, monitoring and assessing the impact of proposed policy and legislative measures concerning the environment and climate.</p>

Folk intuitions about reference change and the causal theory of reference

In this paper, we present and discuss the findings of two experiments about reference change. Cases of reference change have sometimes been invoked to challenge traditional versions of semantic externalism, but the relevant cases have never been tested empirically. The experiments we have conducted use variants of the famous Twin Earth scenario to test folk intuitions about whether natural kind terms such as ‘water’ or ‘salt’ switch reference after being constantly (mis)applied to different kinds. Our results indicate that this is indeed so. We argue that this finding is evidence against Saul Kripke’s causal-historical view of reference, and at least provisional evidence in favor of the causal source view of reference as suggested by Gareth Evans and Michael Devitt.

Disagreement, Semantics, and Meta-Semantics

Moral Twin Earth thought experiments appear to show that practical language is highly stable, and that many possible users of practical language are capable of having genuine disagreements with each other. This chapter clarifies a tempting generalization of this idea, which is that the members of every pair of possible users of moral language are capable of having a genuine disagreement. This is the Universal Disagreement thesis. It then shows how this thesis can be adapted to a contextualist semantics for ‘ought’ and other practical terms. It concludes by arguing that, for the realist, the central explanatory target is a claim about the stability of practical language.

Failures of Stability

This chapter argues against the Universal Disagreement thesis. Some possible communities use moral language, but do not have substantive disagreements with others who use their moral language differently. These are cases where the parties both use their terms with a moral role, but instead of differing over which substantive theory they follow when applying their moral terms (as in the original Moral Twin Earth cases), they differ in which additional roles they use these terms with. This is consistent with intuitions about Moral Twin Earth cases, but shows that they can lead to overgeneralizations about the semantic effects of a moral role. Instead, what needs to be explained by a meta-semantics for moral language is a more limited claim. Realists will have to show that moral terms are highly stable, but that it is possible to use a term such as ‘right’ with a moral role without referring to moral rightness.

The Price of Twin Earth

Liberals about perceptual contents claim that perceptual experiences can represent kinds and specific, familiar individuals as such; they also claim that the representation of an individual or kind as such by a perceptual experience will be reflected in the phenomenal character of that experience. Conservatives always deny the latter and sometimes also the former claim. I argue that neither liberals nor conservatives have adequately appreciated how the content internalism/externalism debate bears on their views. I show that perceptual content internalism entails conservativism when conjoined with one other, extremely plausible premise. Hence, liberals are committed to perceptual contents externalism, yet they have failed to fully address the consequences that this has for their view. Moreover, the argument is easily adapted to perceptual experiences of Twin Earthable properties, like colour and shape. I use this last result to show why existing conservative arguments that appeal to Twin Earth plausibly overgeneralize.

A Common Subject for Ethics

The purpose of this paper is to conceptualize and explore what I shall call the Common Subject Problem for ethics. The problem is that there seems to be no good answer to what property everyone who makes moral claims could be talking and thinking about. The Common Subject Problem is not a new problem; on the contrary, I will argue that it is one of the central animating concerns in the history of both metaethics and normative theory. But despite its importance, the Common Subject Problem is essentially invisible on many contemporary ways of carving up the problems of metaethics and normative ethical theory. My aim, therefore, is to make progress – in part by naming the problem, but also by beginning to sketch out the contours of what gives the problem its force, by distinguishing between different paths of response to the problem and assessing some of their chief merits, and finally, by distinguishing the Common Subject Problem from another problem with which it has come to be conflated. This nearby problem is the Moral Twin Earth Problem. Whereas the Common Subject Problem is a problem about what property ‘wrong’ could refer to, the Moral Twin Earth Problem is a problem about how ‘wrong’ could refer to it. The upshot of the paper, therefore, is to rescue one of the historically significant problems in normative ethics and metaethics – a problem that is essentially about normative semantics – from the illusion that has persisted over the last twenty years that it is really, somehow, a problem about metasemantics. Once we have reclaimed this problem, we can see that it could still be a problem even if there are no distinctively metasemantic problems in metaethics at all, that it is a problem faced by a wider variety of views, and that the space of possible solutions is much wider and more interesting for normative theory, moral psychology, and moral epistemology.