1 Twin Earth and Its Horizons: On Hermeneutics, Reference, and Scientific Theory Choice

2020 ◽  
pp. 24-53
2021 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
Howard Sankey

Abstract The paper presents a realist account of the epistemic objectivity of science. Epistemic objectivity is distinguished from ontological objectivity and the objectivity of truth. As background, T.S. Kuhn’s idea that scientific theory-choice is based on shared scientific values with a role for both objective and subjective factors is discussed. Kuhn’s values are epistemologically ungrounded, hence provide a minimal sense of objectivity. A robust account of epistemic objectivity on which methodological norms are reliable means of arriving at the truth is presented. The problem remains that deliberative judgement is required to determine the relevance and relative significance of a range of methodological norms. A role is sketched for cognitive virtues which may be exercised in the course of the deliberative judgement.


1994 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul M. Dombrowski

Paul Feyerabend elucidated the role of prior adherence to scientific theory in shaping subsequent perceptions of data. Thus one's theory choice shapes data, rather than data shaping theory, as is traditionally held. Feyerabend's philosophy also downplays the role of raw data, emphasizing instead debate among competing theories. This iconoclastic philosophy yields important new insights into the Challenger disaster, insights consonant with yet distinct from those of social constructionism. We learn from it the salience of meaning rather than raw data; the powerful role of prior conceptualizations in shaping the data of experience; and the surprising need for debate and pluralism for the wholesome pursuit of science and technology.


Hypatia ◽  
1987 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 107-120 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda Alcoff

In this paper I set out the problem of feminist social science as the need to explain and justify its method of theory choice in relation to both its own theories and those of androcentric social science. In doing this, it needs to avoid both a positivism which denies the impact of values on scientific theory-choice and a radical relativism which undercuts the emancipatory potential of feminist research. From the relevant literature I offer two possible solutions: the Holistic and the Constructivist models of theory-choice. I then rate these models according to what extent they solve the problem of feminist social science. I argue that the principal distinction between these models is in their contrasting conceptions of truth. Solving the problem of feminist social science will require understanding that what is at stake in the debate is our conception of truth. This understanding will serve to clarify, though not resolve, the various approaches to and disagreements over methodologies and explanations in feminist social science.


2017 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 350-359
Author(s):  
Aoife Lynch

This essay views science as a creative mask for the poetry and philosophy of W.B. Yeats. It explores the changing worldview which occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century with the discovery of wave-particle duality by Max Planck in 1900. It considers the new concepts of reality which arose at this time in relation to modernism and Yeats's response to the paradigmatic change of era he was a part of. Accordingly, the poet's understanding of universal history in A Vision (1925, 1937) is used alongside close readings of his poetry to evince an argument which unites that poetry with philosophy, scientific theory, and modernism as aspects of one universe of knowledge which refracts different aspects of itself through the prism of time.


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