scholarly journals Reports from Twin Earth: Both deep structure and appearance determine the reference of natural kind terms

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jussi Haukioja ◽  
Mons Nyquist ◽  
Jussi Jylkkä
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Deep Structure ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
Twin Earth

scholarly journals Reports from Twin Earth: Both deep structure and appearance determine the reference of natural kind terms

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jussi Haukioja ◽  
mons nyquist ◽  
Jussi Jylkkä
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Deep Structure ◽  
Thought Experiments ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Semantic Externalism ◽  
Standard Samples ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
Twin Earth ◽  
Degree Of Similarity

Following the influential thought experiments by Hilary Putnam and others, philosophers of language have for the most part adopted semantic externalism concerning natural kind terms. In this paper, we present results from three experiments on the reference of natural kind terms. Our results confirm some standard externalist assumptions, but are in conflict with others: ordinary speakers take both appearance and underlying nature to be central in their categorization judgments. Moreover, our results indicate that speakers’ categorization judgments are gradual, and proportional to the degree of similarity between new samples and familiar, “standard” samples. These findings pose problems for traditional theories, both externalist and internalist.

scholarly journals Folk intuitions about reference change and the causal theory of reference

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Wiegmann ◽  
Steffen Koch
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Causal Theory ◽  
Semantic Externalism ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
Historical View ◽  
Gareth Evans ◽  
Twin Earth ◽  
Folk Intuitions

In this paper, we present and discuss the findings of two experiments about reference change. Cases of reference change have sometimes been invoked to challenge traditional versions of semantic externalism, but the relevant cases have never been tested empirically. The experiments we have conducted use variants of the famous Twin Earth scenario to test folk intuitions about whether natural kind terms such as ‘water’ or ‘salt’ switch reference after being constantly (mis)applied to different kinds. Our results indicate that this is indeed so. We argue that this finding is evidence against Saul Kripke’s causal-historical view of reference, and at least provisional evidence in favor of the causal source view of reference as suggested by Gareth Evans and Michael Devitt.

Putnam on the Meaning of Natural Kind Terms

1977 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 819-828 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard Linsky
Keyword(s):  
Science Fiction ◽  
Natural Kind ◽  
Hilary Putnam ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
Rigid Designators ◽  
The Third ◽  
Traditional Notion ◽  
General Terms ◽  
Twin Earth

In “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, Hilary Putnam presents several arguments to show that natural kind terms do not have a meaning or “sense” of a Fregean sort. Instead, he says, they function much like indexicals such as “this” or “I”, whose reference is determined by the circumstances of their use, not by unique properties of the referent that might be “expressed” in a sense. Putnam further argues that this account covers most general terms in our language, not just kind terms like “water” and “tiger”. He thus presents a serious challenge for the traditional notion of meaning, for if he is right only a few score words would be left with a meaning.In this paper I wish to distinguish three arguments which appear intermingled in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”. Two of the arguments make explicit use of the same science-fiction example of a “Twin Earth” while the third uses a related example, and all three might be seen as showing that kind terms are like “rigid designators”. My purpose is to sort out these three arguments and show their importance for the theory of meaning.

The Logic of Natural Kind Terms

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 199-216
Author(s):  
Lifeng Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms

scholarly journals The Psychology of Natural Kind Terms

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Foster-Hanson ◽  
Marjorie Rhodes
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms

Draft of chapter to appear in: The Psychology of Natural Kinds Terms. In S.T. Biggs, & H. Geirsson (Eds.) The Routledge Handbook on Linguistic Reference. London: Routledge.

What Are Natural Kinds?

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Soames
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Actual World ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
General Term ◽  
Conventional Wisdom ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
World State ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
Ontological Question

This chapter approaches the ontological question, “What are natural kinds?” through another, partially linguistic, question. “What must natural kinds be like if the conventional wisdom about natural kind terms is correct?” Although answering this question will not tell us everything we want to know, it will, be useful in narrowing the range of feasible ontological alternatives. The chapter summarizes the contemporary linguistic wisdom and then tests different proposals about kinds against it. It takes simple natural kind terms—like “green,” “gold,” “water,” “tiger,” and “light”—to be Millian terms that rigidly designate properties typically determined by a reference-fixing stipulation to the effect that the general term is to designate whatever property provides the explanation of why, at actual world-state, all, or nearly all, the samples of items associated with the term by speakers who introduce it have the observational properties they do.

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