Granice decentralizacji

The concept of decentralization has fixed content and the scope of meaning. At present, defining decentralization only through the lack of hierarchical dependence would be incorrect. One can speak of the external and internal limits of decentralization. The internal limits of decentralization are political or legal determinants of decentralization. The external limits of decentralization are those which closely interact with centralization – as an opposite category, but complementary to decentralization. Outside of decentralization and centralization, there is a place for autonomy. Autonomy is in contradiction with the state’s unitarian character.

Decentralization vs Centralization: Scenarios of Regional Development of Ukraine in the Context of Internal Stability Establishment

The work aims to analyze scenarios for the development of regional policy in Ukraine in conditions of decentralization and centralization trends confrontation in the country. The main problem is the establishment of structural completeness of the decentralization reform in Ukraine, which should involve the implementation of administrative-territorial, budgetary and political decentralization. An important task is also to determine the effectiveness of devolution, delegation, deconcentration, deregulation, and divestment, which are manifestations of the decentralization process and collectively determine the quality of reform. Based on the methodology of system analysis and the concept of “balance of relations,” as well as using a historical and comparative method in investigating the improvement of approaches to leading public policy, and a structural-functional method for analysis of territorial-political system as a decentralized and multi-level, the paper proposes an analysis of the balance of inter-level relations in the country, the effectiveness of reforms, decentralization and trends for further development. The work indicates that since 2014, administrative and territorial optimization and enlargement of communities have become the main result of the decentralization reform. The discussion of political decentralization remains extremely disturbing and is blocked as “separatism,” as well as attempts to resolve the conflict in the Donbas by political means through the adoption of the Steinmeier Formula are demurred as “capitulation.” The economic crisis, which coincided with the pandemic, can aggravate the negative perception of reform, the development of which remains possible within the framework of three development scenarios: “Euro-optimistic,” “inertial” and “blocking.”

The costs and benefits of decentralization and centralization of ant colonies

A challenge faced by individuals and groups of many species is determining how resources and activities should be spatially distributed: centralized or decentralized. This distribution problem is hard to understand due to the many costs and benefits of each strategy in different settings. Ant colonies are faced by this problem and demonstrate two solutions: 1) centralizing resources in a single nest (monodomy) and 2) decentralizing by spreading resources across many nests (polydomy). Despite the possibilities for using this system to study the centralization/decentralization problem, the trade-offs associated with using either polydomy or monodomy are poorly understood due to a lack of empirical data and cohesive theory. Here, we present a dynamic network model of a population of ant nests which is based on observations of a facultatively polydomous ant species (Formica lugubris). We use the model to test several key hypotheses for costs and benefits of polydomy and monodomy and show that decentralization is advantageous when resource acquisition costs are high, nest size is limited, resources are clustered, and there is a risk of nest destruction, but centralization prevails when resource availability fluctuates and nest size is limited. Our model explains the phylogenetic and ecological diversity of polydomous ants, demonstrates several trade-offs of decentralization and centralization, and provides testable predictions for empirical work on ants and in other systems.

Disruption and Strategic Outsourcing to the Competitor in the Common Market

There are circumstances that one firm will outsource (purchase) products to its competitor in the common market when experiencing an unexpected supply disruption. Such strategies to hedge against the unexpected supply disruption commonly suffers from the higher wholesale price charged by its competitor although it helps maintain its presence on the market. Its competitor also is concerned about encroachment to sell the products to the firm as a rival in the common market. Mathematical models are formulated to maximize each party's profit in both cases of outsourcing and not outsourcing under decentralization and centralization. The results show that both parties benefit from the strategy of outsourcing at the time of disruption. More interestingly, the results also show that the competitor's centralized decision-making is preferred.

EUROPEAN LESSONS OF DECENTRALIZATION

The role of the state in the processes of European integration and decentralization is analyzed, the factors of threats for it are determined. The following common features of decentralization processes in the EU member states are highlighted as strengthening the role of the regional level, the need to choose between different models of separation of powers between different levels of government (exclusive or joint authority) and the search for ways to adequately finance transferred powers. Decentralization also actualizes the problem of territorial inequality and patronage for European countries. It is proved that the national state is a central actor in the process of decentralization, despite the fact that this process creates certain threats to the state itself. On the one hand, the EU as a supranational organization has already limited some aspects of the sovereignty of its member states, in particular, in the area of monetary policy. With the deepening of European integration, the powers of national states and in other areas are increasingly limited. On the other hand, the gradual increase in the share of powers conveyed by the state to decentralized and regional authorities further weakens its role. Moreover, the increasing influence of liberalism on state policy and the introduction of competition among the main providers of public services also limits the possibility of the state’s influence on its internal policies. Such a dynamics gives grounds for questioning the ability of states to effectively manage their territories. At the same time, it was noted that in most EU member states, the bodies of state power have long been the guarantor of national unity in both social and territorial terms. Such a “unity of opposites” (decentralization and centralization) is unlikely to change in the medium term.

EUROPEAN LESSONS OF DECENTRALIZATION

The role of the state in the processes of European integration and decentralization is analyzed, the factors of threats for it are determined. The fol- lowing common features of decentralization processes in the EU member states are highlighted as strengthening the role of the regional level, the need to choose between different models of separation of powers between different levels of go- vernment (exclusive or joint authority) and the search for ways to adequately fi- nance transferred powers. Decentralization also actualizes the problem of territo- rial inequality and patronage for European countries. It is proved that the national state is a central actor in the process of decentralization, despite the fact that this process creates certain threats to the state itself. On the one hand, the EU as a supranational organization has already limited some aspects of the sovereignty of its member states, in particular, in the area of monetary policy. With the deepening of European integration, the powers of national states and in other areas are in- creasingly limited. On the other hand, the gradual increase in the share of powers conveyed by the state to decentralized and regional authorities further weakens its role. Moreover, the increasing influence of liberalism on state policy and the introduction of competition among the main providers of public services also li- mits the possibility of the state’s influence on its internal policies. Such a dynamics gives grounds for questioning the ability of states to effectively manage their ter- ritories. At the same time, it was noted that in most EU member states, the bodies of state power have long been the guarantor of national unity in both social and territorial terms. Such a “unity of opposites” (decentralization and centralization) is unlikely to change in the medium term.

Information transmission within federal fiscal architectures: theory and evidence

This paper explores the role of information transmission and misaligned interests across levels of governments in explaining variation in the degree of decentralization across countries. We analyse two alternative policy-decision schemes—‘decentralization’ and ‘centralization’— within a two-sided incomplete information principal–agent framework. The quality of communication depends on the conflict of interests between the government levels and on which government level controls the degree of decentralization. We show that the extent of misaligned interests and the relative importance of local and central government knowledge affect the optimal choice of policy-decision schemes. Our empirical analysis confirms that countries’ choices depend on the relative importance of private information. In line with our theory the results differ significantly between unitary and federal countries.