Strategies of Sino-American Rivalry in Africa: From 2000 to COVID-19

In this article it is argued that Sino-American rivalry in Africa is based on competing strategies utilized by each power to enhance their interests and bilateral ties on the continent, as well to try and outdo each other in image projection and overall influence expansion. These strategies of rivalry and power enhancement revolve around promoting close military ties and transactions on the continent; the framing of the continent in the language of securitization and strategic importance; and the perennial utilization of discourse or narrative that frames the other as detrimental to the interests of African states. These strategies of containing the others power preponderance or influence have expanded to include what is now referred to as vaccine diplomacy on the part of China, and during the Trump Administration the raising of loud alarm bells of China trying to dispossess Africa through what could be referred to as the debt trap. The consequences of these competing strategies enhance the following: authoritarianism in some key African states; increased jihadism in some regions of Africa as a reaction to the presence of the two major powers on the continent; weapons implicated in state violence and war crimes; and less money available for development as a result of resources being diverted to militarization. The ongoing pandemic will add another dimension to the US - China rivalry as both powers try to project an image of being the most concerned about Africa on as it relates to combating the virus.

How Democracies Keep the Peace: Contextual Factors That Influence Conflict Management Strategies

Some studies find that democratic states are more amenable to third party forms of conflict management, while other studies indicate that democracies are able to resolve contentious issues on their own through bilateral negotiations. Using data from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) Project, the authors investigate peaceful and militarized conflict management strategies that democratic states employ to resolve contentious issues. Theoretically, the authors focus on how militarized conflict history, relative capabilities, and issue salience influence the tools of conflict management that democratic states employ. Empirical analyses suggest that democratic dyads employ bilateral negotiations more often to resolve contentious issues when the issue has been militarized previously, when the issue is more salient, and when they are facing an equal adversary. Democratic dyads seek out non-binding third party settlement more frequently in situations of power preponderance than non-democratic dyads, although binding forms of third party settlement occur most often in relatively equal democratic dyads. Pairs of democracies are more likely to employ militarized conflict management strategies when they have resorted to force over the issue previously, when the issue is highly salient, and when they are evenly matched.

The flawed logic of a MAD man: Craig's contribution to Power Preponderance theory

In a recent issue of this journal Campbell Craig put forward an amended version of Power Preponderance theory seeking to explain why US unipolar predominance has turned out to be not simply a ‘moment’ and as such represents ‘a serious anomaly for neorealist theory’.In using Waltz's own work on how nuclear weapons affect state behaviour, Craig appears to further bolster the case for Power Preponderance theory. Craig exploits what at first sight seems to be a contradiction in Waltz's work. However, Craig's error is that he treats securityquaterritorial security rather than considering a more encompassing view of state security. In the arena of ‘secondary’ security issues the usual logic of counter-balancing with conventional military forces still holds sway. This reply argues that a balance of power will return to the international system, it is just that at this moment no country or coalition of countries is quite up to the task.

American power preponderance and the nuclear revolution

The theory of Power Preponderance put forward by Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth is poised to replace structural balance-of-power theory as the leading American Realist interpretation of international politics. Power Preponderance argues that would-be rivals to the US are not balancing against it because they are dissuaded from doing so by geopolitical and structural factors, rather than because they love the US or are cowed by it. This article shows why the central analytical claim of Power Preponderance would be substantially enhanced by incorporating the logic of the nuclear revolution, but that its main policy recommendation – indefinite and magnanimous American preponderance – is undermined by the spectre of nuclear war. In the nuclear age, normative solutions to the problem of anarchy invariably gravitate toward the logic of a world state.