Audit report lag and client industry homogeneity

Purpose This study aims to examine the association between audit report lag (ARL), the length of time between the fiscal year end and the date the auditors’ report is signed, and client industry homogeneity, a measure of the similarity of operations of members of an industry. Design/methodology/approach Regression models are used to test the significance of industry homogeneity on the ARL, of specialists in homogenous industries on the ARL, and the completion of the audits of homogenous industry clients in the year of tightening Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filing deadlines. Findings The evidence suggests that auditors complete audits of clients more quickly in more homogenous industries. The association between ARL and homogeneity is negative, which indicates that auditors are more efficient in audits in homogenous industries. The association between ARL and specialist audits in homogenous industries is also negative. Finally, homogenous industry audits are better able to be completed by the compressed filing dates imposed by the SEC on accelerated and large accelerated filers in 2003 and 2006. Originality/value This study extends recent research on industry homogeneity’s influence on the audit market. By reporting an association between the homogeneity of a company’s industry and the ARL, investors and regulators have additional information to better evaluate the timing and monitor trends in the timing of the audit report dates.

Client industry characteristics and auditor changes

Purpose This study aims to examine whether the industry characteristics of homogeneity, product competition, high auditor competition and accounting standards complexity are associated with auditor changes. Design/methodology/approach Logistic regressions test for significance of the industry characteristics on resignations, dismissals and directional changes to and from Big 4 and nonBig 4 auditors after controlling for client, auditor and engagement factors. Findings The authors report a lower likelihood of auditor resignations with greater accounting standards complexity. The authors also report a greater likelihood of auditor dismissals with greater industry homogeneity, greater product competition and greater auditor competition. Results also show that accounting standards complexity is associated with a lower likelihood of changes from Big to nonBig auditors, and industry homogeneity is associated with a greater likelihood of changes from Big to nonBig. Also, greater auditor competition is associated with a lower likelihood of changes from nonBig to Big auditors. Research limitations/implications Prior research has established the importance of industry characteristics to the market for audit services (Cairney and Stewart, 2015; Wang and Chui, 2015; Cahan et al., 2011; Bills et al., 2015). The authors report that industry characteristics also impact auditor changes. Second, previous research has used various methods that indicate general industry effects on changes. The paper contributes to this research by specifying industry characteristics. Limitations include the reliance on the self-reporting in 8-Ks to identify auditors resigning and firms dismissing auditors. Also, the paper relies on proxies for industry characteristics that were developed in prior research. Practical implications Regulators have expressed concern over the relatively low rates of auditor changes and the problem of lack of auditor choice. By demonstrating a significant effect of industry characteristics on changes, the authors indicate some levers that may be available to influence rates of auditor changes, especially realignments to nonBig. Originality/value This is one of the first studies to examine how specific industry characteristics impact auditor changes. The study may be of interest to academics who are interested in how industry factors influence auditor changes. It may also interest policymakers who could lever the characteristics of industries to address concerns about the low rates of auditor changes.

Audit Fees and Client Industry Homogeneity

SUMMARY This study examines the relationship between a client industry's homogeneity and audit fees. We assume that audit efficiencies occur in audits in industries whose members have similar operations and, therefore, are where auditors benefit from the use of similar audit procedures and experience lower average audit costs. To identify industries with similar operations, we use operational expense homogeneity, which is based on the correlations between the changes in operating expenses among industry members. Adapting a standard fee model (Hay, Knechel, and Wong 2006), we find that homogeneity is negatively associated with audit fees. Further, we find that specialist auditors charge lower fees in homogenous industries. Finally, we observe a lower standard deviation of fees in more homogenous industries. Together, these results suggest that auditors sustain lower costs in audits of homogenous clients and that the similarly lower costs incurred across auditors are passed on to clients in the form of lower fees. Data Availability: Data used in this paper are available from the sources listed in the paper.

What determines the variation in relative performance evaluation usage across US industries?

Purpose – Relative performance evaluation (RPE) involves board comparisons of firm performance to that of a peer group when evaluating CEO performance. To date, research on RPE in the USA has typically relied on models where RPE is implicitly assumed. In contrast, Bannister and Newman provide some direct evidence on the explicit RPE usage by US firms showing that it is limited and there is significant inter-industry variation in its use. The authors aim to focus on why boards in some industries employ RPE to a greater extent than those in other industries do using measures of industry discretion, industry homogeneity, industry competition. Design/methodology/approach – The authors utilize the sample use in the Bannister and Newman study of RPE usage in industries (160 firms from the 1992 Fortune 250 with proxy statements for 1992 and 1993). The authors compile measures of industry membership (using SIC codes), industry discretion, industry homogeneity, and industry competition from Compustat a well. Multiple regression is used to test the hypotheses. Findings – The authors find that the use of RPE at the industry level is significantly related to industry discretion (i.e. the degree of latitude that managers have over strategic and operational choices in the particular industry environment) and industry homogeneity, but not to industry competition. Research limitations/implications – The study is limited in terms of a dated sample (necessary to be consistent with the Bannister and Newman paper). It would bear updating. In addition, multi-year panel data could be used to generate more robust results. It would also be useful to replicate the study in other national (and hence governance) contexts. Practical implications – The findings should help boards when deciding how to reward or punish CEOs and top managers for their firm performance by filtering out relative performance in a more rational manner (e.g. by taking relevant industry context into account). Originality/value – In terms of originality, this is the first study, to the authors' knowledge, that investigates RPE at the industry level. It is valuable because industry discretion is an important contextual variable that a board of directors will find useful in evaluating managers since this type of discretion is beyond managerial control.

Homogenous Industries and Auditor Specialization: An Indication of Production Economies

In this study, we examine the association between industry homogeneity and auditor specialization. We find a significant association between our proxies for industry homogeneity (change in industry-member operating expenses) and auditor specialization (auditor concentration and auditor focus) after controlling for extent of industry regulation, litigiousness, growth, client-industry concentration, and the number of industry members. The positive relation between our specialist proxies and industry homogeneity indicates that auditors seek additional firms to audit in industries in which members have similar operations. This suggests that auditor specialization provides a cost-based competitive advantage because the cost of developing expertise is spread over more clients. Thus, in contrast to recent criticisms of auditor concentration, specialization results in more efficient audits.