Dignity Beyond Price: Kant and His Revolutionary British Contemporary

Despite their contemporaneity and obvious similarities, Richard Price and Immanuel Kant are rarely discussed together. This essay examines the common background of their work, similarities in their methodology and principles, and their common concern with connecting rationalist philosophical systems with knowledge at the level of ordinary life and politics – all this despite their lack of reference to each other. Their normative principles are assessed in connection with major documents and political events in their revolutionary era. A concluding section evaluates their work in relation to contemporary discussions that concern the relationship between pre-reflective and reflective levels of moral knowledge. The essay draws on the work of contemporary scholars such as Danielle Allen, David Brink, Robert Audi, Sarah McGrath, and Thomas Kelly.

O argumento religioso como promoção da razão pública liberal, abrangente e inclusiva

O tema da razão pública é um dos pontos de partida inegociáveis da teoria política liberal contemporânea. Nesse contexto, o maior teórico dessa tradição, John Rawls, desenvolve a ideia de razão pública, passível de ser analisada em três fases: excludente, includente e ampla. Essa distinção mostra o caráter potencialmente excludente do liberalismo político que só albergaria doutrinas compreensivas liberais, excluindo quaisquer outras. Já Robert Audi propõe uma teoria da separação entre Igreja e Estado com três princípios centrais (libertário, igualitário e de neutralidade), sendo que o princípio da neutralidade deixa dúvidas sobre a possibilidade da sua aplicação, pois tende a uma postura oficial antirreligiosa. A partir da reflexão sobre essas teorias, este artigo tem como objetivo mostrar que o argumento religioso apresenta as considerações racionais de parte relevante da sociedade, não sendo, portanto, incompatível com a democracia. Chega-se ao resultado de que a religião é um bem humano fundamental na sociedade política, e que o argumento religioso apresenta uma alternativa às concepções morais subjetivas. Ainda, que as ideias excludentes não apontam para a proteção laica da liberdade de consciência e de crença dos cidadãos, mas para a admissão exclusiva de uma postura pública antirreligiosa.

An ethical intuitionist account of transparency of algorithms and its gradations

To make evaluations about the morally relevant impacts of algorithms, transparency is needed. This paper lays out discussion of algorithms and transparency in an explicitly moral analysis with a special focus on the domain of justice and security. The paper provides an account of the moral import of transparency, defined itself as an instrumental value denoting a state of affairs conducive to acquisition of knowledge about some X. A normative account of transparency is outlined relying on an intuitionist framework rooted in the works of Ross and Robert Audi. It will be argued that transparency can be derived as a subsidiary (prima facie) principle from other duties including beneficence and justice and that it is groundable in the value of knowledge. Building on this foundation, the paper examines transparency and duty conflict with a special focus on algorithms in justice and security, recognising that complete transparency can be impossible where duties conflict. It is argued that as a subsidiary (prima facie) principle, transparency is overridable but ineradicable, which is to say that sufficiently justifiable reasons for secrecy or opacity can licence limiting transparency, that is, there may be occasion where full transparency is not our final duty.

Religion, Morality, and Public Policy

This chapter explores how religious convictions have functioned in the debate about whether human reproductive cloning should be banned, regulated, or permitted—a debate that erupted in 1997 following the belated announcement of “Dolly’s” birth. This historical case study examines and assesses the arguments that arose at the time, particularly in the context of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) report Cloning Human Beings. The NBAC hearings included testimony on religious views on human reproductive cloning, and its report examined and assessed those views. The chapter also considers NBAC’s deliberations about federal funding of human embryonic stem cell research that further illuminates the place of religious convictions in public bioethics. It concludes that in public bioethics the process of reaching a decision—or, in NBAC’s case, a recommendation—should attend to the widest possible range of positions and rationales, but that the outcome in substance and in public justification needs to involve, as Robert Audi argues, a sufficient or adequate secular reason.

Secularismo político en Chile a partir de los enfoques de Robert Audi y de Cecile Laborde

Este artículo explora si Chile puede considerarse secular bajo dos enfoques alternativos: el enfoque de «separación institucional» de Robert Audi y el reciente «enfoque de desagregación» de Cecile Laborde. Respecto del marco de Audi, se sostiene que el Estado chileno respeta el principio libertario, cumple solo parcialmente los requisitos del principio igualitario y está en deuda respecto al principio de neutralidad. Para el poder político chileno, la religiosidad y la ausencia de religiosidad no son valoradas de la misma manera. Con respecto al marco propuesto por Laborde, el Estado chileno cumple, en general, los requisitos de su secularismo mínimo. Subsisten, sin embargo, áreas problemáticas, especialmente cuando los funcionarios estatales emplean razones religiosas no accesibles en el foro legislativo, violando lo que Laborde llama el Estado justificable, y cuando el Gobierno utiliza formas de establecimiento simbólico que pueden afectar un estatus cívico igualitario, violando lo que Laborde llama el Estado inclusivo.

What Prima Facie Duties Are There?

This chapter interprets and defend Ross’s rejection of consequentialism and his endorsement of a moderate deontological position. It focuses particularly on what he says about promises, the special obligations he discusses most fully. It is argued that Ross treats promises as agent-relative intensifiers of reasons to promote goods; that there are other important kinds of agent-relative intensifiers recognized by Sidgwick but not by Ross; and that, unlike deontological constraints, agent-relative intensifiers are not puzzling or problematic. It is then argued, contra Robert Audi, that Ross should be interpreted as a classical deontologist rather than as a value-based intuitionist. And it is argued finally that Ross’s limited pluralism should be preferred to Jonathan Dancy’s particularism.

Intuicje moralne. O poznaniu dobra i zła

Praca jest poświęcona zagadnieniu intuicji moralnych oraz ich zdolności do uzasadniania naszych moralnych przekonań. Składa się z siedmiu rozdziałów. Rozdział pierwszy prezentuje krótki rys historyczny intuicjonizmu moralnego, z głównym akcentem położonym na intuicjonizm brytyjski XVII, XVIII, XIX i pierwszej połowy XX wieku. Zwieńczenie rozdziału stanowi prezentacja argumentów, które doprowadziły do osłabienia tego nurtu. Są to kolejno zarzut dziwaczności faktów moralnych, dziwaczności intuicji moralnej (jako władzy poznawczej), zarzut subiektywności intuicji, zarzut dogmatyzmu, arbitralności, zarzut z niezgody moralnej. Rozdziały II - V stanowią kolejno krytyczną prezentację współczesnych prób obrony intuicjonizmu (tzw. nowego intuicjonizmu) podejmowanych przez takich autorów jak Robert Audi, Michael Huemer, Timothy Chappell, Sabine Roeser, James Sias. Przedstawione w tych rozdziałach stanowiska w dużej mierze unikają wymienionych powyżej zarzutów, niemniej można wysuwać przeciwko nim nowe zarzuty (analizowane przy okazji prezentacji każdej z propozycji nowego intuicjonizmu). Rozdział VI stanowi próbę zintegrowania tych stanowisk w taki sposób, aby łączyć ich silne strony jednocześnie unikając i słabości. W świetle tego rozdziału obroniona została główna teza pracy, mianowicie, że moralne intuicje mają zdolność uzasadniania naszych moralnych przekonań i jako takie mogą stanowić wiarygodne źródło poznania moralnego. W duchu nowego intuicjonizmu autor przyjmuje omylność intuicji moralnych, stąd rozdział VII stanowi propozycję doskonalenia intuicyjnego poznania moralnego poprzez stosowanie metody refleksyjnej równowagi oraz doskonalenia cnót poznawczych.

The Cognitive Aspect of Christian Faith and Non-doxastic Propositional Attitudes

Summary In the recent discussion, several authors have argued for the claim that propositional faith need not be doxastic, but also can be “non-doxastic”. Notable proponents of this view are William Alston, Robert Audi, Daniel Howard-Snyder, and J. L. Schellenberg. In this paper, I focus on Christian faith and consider whether its cognitive aspect can be understood solely in terms of Alston’s and others’ non-doxastic accounts. I argue for a negative answer. In my view, the cognitive aspect of Christian faith calls for, as a minimum, “a sub-doxastic attitude”. As there is no shared terminology on this topic, a proportion of this paper deals with conceptual clarifications.