Offensive, Defensive, and Generic Advertising Strategies in a Dynamic Oligopolistic Market

In today’s highly competitive business environment, advertisement plays an influential role in attracting customers and increasing market share. Companies adopt different advertising strategies in a competitive market, such as offensive, defensive, and generic, to keep and increase their market share. Researchers have generally modeled this problem using a dynamic differential game. All previous research studies have focused on finding these strategies in a duopoly market. Also, to simultaneously determine the optimal equilibrium strategy for these three strategies, the model is designed as a symmetric game due to the ease of solving. In contrast with the previous researches, the purpose of this paper is to present and solve an asymmetric game model to determine the optimal offensive, defensive, and generic advertising strategies in an oligopoly market. The proposed model’s objective is to obtain the maximum equilibrium profit for each company at any moment regarding the market share of each company and those of competitors. A numerical solution method based on the Pontryagin’s maximum principle is developed to solve the model. Then, the proposed model is solved for a triopoly market. Also, the sensitivity of the results to changes in model parameters has been investigated. The obtained results denote that in markets with more than two players under the asymmetric game, the proposed model can prescribe the optimal type of offensive, defensive, and generic advertising strategies.

Advertising with Supply Control: Some Implications of Norwegian Whitefish Export Promotion

An issue for generic advertising in agricultural markets with unregulated supplies is that the promotion-induced demand shift could lead to a supply response that substantially attenuates the price effects of the promotion. For the generic promotion of fish exports, however, the concern is generally just the opposite—the possibility that extensive government supply controls could render promotion efforts to expand export sales ineffectual due to little or no supply response. This study considers the effects of government whitefish (cod, haddock, and others) supply controls on the effectiveness of the Norwegian Seafood Council (NSC) whitefish export promotion program. We use an econometric simulation model to measure the effectiveness and returns to NSC whitefish export promotion under a range of possible export supply control conditions. Results indicate that effective supply control maximizes the return to promotion and that ineffectual supply control imposes a potentially large opportunity cost on the promoting industry.

EXTENDING THE ROTTERDAM DEMAND MODEL TO ANALYZE MARKET PARTICIPATION

The dependent variable in the Rotterdam model is shown to consist of two additive components: the proportionate change in the average product weight consumed by existing buyers and the proportionate change in the share of total consumers who actually purchase the product. Applying the extended model to household data on salmon consumption in France, results suggest prices have a larger effect on attracting new buyers to the product in question than on getting existing buyers to consume more. However, generic advertising was found to affect consumption intensity but have no effect on market participation in the short run.

The Ramifications of Nearly Going Dark: A Natural Experiment in the Case of U.S. Generic Orange Juice Advertising

Evaluations of generic advertising programs by commodity check-off programs involve analyses of counterfactual scenarios in which advertising and promotion expenditures are set to zero over the program's history. In actual practice, the counterfactual is rarely realized. We present a case in which such a natural experiment occurred when generic advertising and promotion expenditures for U.S. orange juice were cut nearly to zero. Using structural econometric and autoregression models, we estimate losses in consumption and sales revenue and examine the time required for the market for orange juice to recover from the check-off's strategy of going nearly dark.