CIVIL LAW STATUS OF BENEFICIARIES OF A PRIVATE BENEFIT FOUNDATION

This paper examines the civil law status of the beneficiaries of a foundation (Stiftung) subject to private benefit purposes. It concerns the reasons and impact of conservative and instrumental approaches to the permissible purposes of the foundation, the classification criterion of private benefit foundations (privatnützige Stiftungen) and public benefit foundations (gemeinnützige Stiftungen), the limits to which the Germanic countries tolerate with establishment of the private benefit foundations and then defines the civil law status of the beneficiaries from the perspective of their claims to the foundation and participation in the foundation management, control and protection. As a result of the research the ways to mitigate the risks, that private foundations can create for the participants in civil law relations, are proposed in the light of the legal nature of the foundation.

論傳統＂義＂德在抗擊重大疫情中的現實意義——基於博弈論的分析

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English. 在中國發生重大的公共衛生危機——新型冠狀肺炎病毒爆發的背景下，防疫工作不可避免地面臨一些個人與他人或社會的利益衝突。妥善解決這些衝突需要道德的支撐。當前重大疫情下普通人表現出的助人為樂、捨己為人的義舉，或繼承自傳統美德，或至少與傳統“義”德相符合。傳統的“義”德注重公利，在抗擊重大疫情過程中能夠發揮重要作用。這種現實作用能夠被博弈論中的純策略博弈和信任博弈分析所證明。抗擊重大疫情需要整個社會的團結協作，個人需講求“公義”、 “信義”，明白義利的統一性，必要地讓渡“私利”，將防疫的“公利”最大化，方能打贏抗疫戰，從而更廣泛地保護個人“私利”。 In the context of the outbreak of covid-19 pandemic and its impact on public health, the conflicts of interests between individuals and between an individual and society have become an ethical challenge. The traditional Chinese concept of “righteousness” (yi) calls for the need for public good, whereas “benefit” (li) is often associated with private interests, as shown in the Confucian-Mohist debate. In this paper, I show that there is another reading of the concept of “righteousness” that does not necessarily exclude the idea of individual interest and benefit. In addition, I use “game theory” to illustrate the unity of public righteousness and private benefit.

The cost of corruption and undue private benefit: two hidden faces of the same mirror

Purpose The purpose of this study is to formulate the cost of corruption and undue private benefit. Design/methodology/approach The design is based on cost formulas of the corruption already formulated, and the design of these formulas allows the calculation for Argentina in 2021 of the cost of the corruption. Findings The corruption cost models for bribes and cost overruns for public works are the theoretical basis for obtaining the undue private benefit. Based on the formulas developed to calculate the costs of corruption for Argentina 2021. Research limitations/implications There are no limitations in the model. Practical implications In addition to the calculation of the cost of corruption, the formula of private profit undue by corruption is developed. Social implications The social implications are certainty about the cost of corruption for Argentina in 2021. Originality/value The present work is original and its value is given by the formulation and practical demonstration of the cost of corruption for Argentina in 2021 and the undue private benefit.

Competition and Agency Problems Within Banks: Evidence from Insider Lending

This paper studies whether greater competition can mitigate agency problems within banks. We measure the intensity of the agency conflict within a bank by the volume of loans that the bank lends to its insiders (e.g., executives). We first check that these loans are a form of private benefit. By exploiting interstate branching deregulation, we then show that banks react to greater competition by reducing insider lending, especially when the entry of new competitors may more strongly affect bank profitability. Results are robust to using various identification approaches and alternative indicators of agency conflict. We conclude that competitive pressure reduces managerial self-dealing. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.

Ruthless Exploiters or Ethical Guardians of the Workforce? Powerful CEOs and their Impact on Workplace Safety and Health

The allocation of resources among different stakeholders is an ethical dilemma for chief executive officers (CEOs). In this study, we investigate the association between CEO power and workplace injuries and illnesses. We use an establishment-level dataset comprising 31,924 establishment-year observations between 2002 and 2011. Our main result shows that employees at firms with structurally powerful CEOs experience fewer workplace injuries and illnesses and days away from work. We reason that CEOs derive a private benefit from low injury and illness rates and that powerful CEOs are better at influencing employees to take workplace safety and health seriously. Additional analyses reveal fewer injuries and illnesses in firms led by CEOs with expertise power. However, increased injuries and illnesses were linked to firms controlled by CEOs with ownership power. Moreover, we find that structurally powerful CEOs mitigate injury and illness differences in relation to geographical proximity to corporate headquarters. We contribute with both research and practical implications on the topics of CEO power and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in general and workplace safety and health in particular.

Public good messaging motivates the wealthy to reduce water consumption

The wealthy have an outsized impact on many real-world public goods problems, consuming vastly more resources per capita than less wealthy individuals. This creates a challenge for motivating the wealthy to engage in more sustainable behaviors; because of their wealth, they are not very responsive to economic incentives (e.g. fees, fines and taxes) of the magnitudes typically employed. We propose that “social incentives” (which rely on social normativity and reputational concerns) may be more effective for motivating the wealthy. To test this claim, we conduct a field experiment aimed at reducing residential water use among 10,500 relatively high-income households in the state of Connecticut (estimated 137% wealthier than the average US household). We compare a control condition (receiving no messages) to a messaging campaign (5 messages sent over 9 months) that emphasizes either self-interested financial benefits of water reduction (“Private Benefit” treatment) or the benefits of water conservation for the community and the environment (“Public Good” treatment). We find that the Private Benefit treatment had no significant effect on water use compared to the control. The Public Good treatment, on the other hand, significantly reduced water use relative to the control and relative to the Private Benefit treatment, and this effect was especially pronounced among households with previously higher water use (a commonly used proxy for wealth). Our findings suggest that non-material “social incentives” may be more effective than traditional financial incentives for encouraging sustainability, particularly among the wealthy.

Timing of Auctions of Real Options

This paper endogenizes auction timing and initiation in auctions of real options. Because bidders have information rent, a seller faces a “virtual strike price” higher than the actual exercise cost. The seller inefficiently delays the auction to encourage bidder participation and uses the irreversible nature of time to gain partial control over option exercises. The seller’s private benefit at option exercise may restore efficient auction timing, but option exercises are always inefficiently late. When the seller lacks commitment to auction timing, bidders always initiate in equilibrium, resulting in earlier option exercise and higher welfare than auctions proscribing bidder initiation. Overall, auction timing modifies the distribution of the bidder valuations and has important implications for bidding strategies, auction design, and real outcomes. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.