Private Benefit Found by IRS in Operation of “Staffing Agency”

2021 ◽  
Vol 38 (9) ◽  
pp. 5-5
Keyword(s):  
Private Benefit

Bank Mergers: Private Benefit at Public Cost

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniela Scida ◽  
Farindokht Vagheti
Keyword(s):  
Bank Mergers ◽  
Private Benefit

scholarly journals On the estimation of the value of voting rights: Evidence from Taiwan

2006 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 15-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
I-Hsiang Huang
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Abnormal Return ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Voting Rights ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Private Benefit ◽  
Expected Return ◽  
Equity Ownership ◽  
Publicly Traded Firms

This paper proposes that the value of voting rights can be measured as the abnormal return of the date after the ex-voting rights date. The merit of this method is that it is applicable to all publicly traded firms. Whatever the expected return model is adopted, the vote value hypothesis of Manne (1962) is hold by using a sample of firms listed on Taiwan Stock Market whose annual shareholder meetings have a board election. Moreover, the result shows that the value of voting rights is negatively related to prior year’s market value of equity, managerial equity ownership, and return on asset. It is consistent with the hypothesis that the source of vote value comes from private benefit of control and improved management

An Archeology of Corruption in Medicine

2018 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 525-535 ◽  
Author(s):  
MILES LITTLE ◽  
WENDY LIPWORTH ◽  
IAN KERRIDGE
Keyword(s):  
Personality Disorders ◽  
Fair Trading ◽  
Private Benefit ◽  
Reporting Requirements ◽  
Social Entity ◽  
Pharmaceutical Industries ◽  
Corrupt Behavior ◽  
Transparency And Accountability

Abstract:Corruption is a word used loosely to describe many kinds of action that people find distasteful. We prefer to reserve it for the intentional misuse of the good offices of an established social entity for private benefit, posing as fair trading. The currency of corruption is not always material or financial. Moral corruption is all too familiar within churches and other ostensibly beneficent institutions, and it happens within medicine and the pharmaceutical industries. Corrupt behavior reduces trust, costs money, causes injustice, and arouses anger. Yet it persists, despite all efforts since the beginnings of societies. People who act corruptly may lack conscience and empathy in the same way as those with some personality disorders. Finding ways to prevent corruption from contaminating beneficent organizations is therefore likely to be frustratingly difficult. Transparency and accountability may go some way, but the determined corruptor is unlikely to feel constrained by moral and reporting requirements of this kind. Punishment and redress are complicated issues, unlikely to satisfy victims and society at large. Both perhaps should deal in the same currency—material or social—in which the corrupt dealing took place.

Timing of Auctions of Real Options

2020 ◽  
Vol 66 (9) ◽  
pp. 3956-3976 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lin William Cong
Keyword(s):  
Real Options ◽  
Private Benefit ◽  
Strike Price ◽  
Partial Control ◽  
Auction Design ◽  
Bidding Strategies ◽  
Information Rent ◽  
Nature Of Time ◽  
Irreversible Nature

This paper endogenizes auction timing and initiation in auctions of real options. Because bidders have information rent, a seller faces a “virtual strike price” higher than the actual exercise cost. The seller inefficiently delays the auction to encourage bidder participation and uses the irreversible nature of time to gain partial control over option exercises. The seller’s private benefit at option exercise may restore efficient auction timing, but option exercises are always inefficiently late. When the seller lacks commitment to auction timing, bidders always initiate in equilibrium, resulting in earlier option exercise and higher welfare than auctions proscribing bidder initiation. Overall, auction timing modifies the distribution of the bidder valuations and has important implications for bidding strategies, auction design, and real outcomes. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.

Funding Frontiers: Public Policing, ‘User Pays’ Policing and Police Foundations

2019 ◽  
pp. 115-140
Author(s):  
Randy K. Lippert ◽  
Kevin Walby
Keyword(s):  
North America ◽  
Private Security ◽  
Police Departments ◽  
Private Benefit ◽  
The Public ◽  
Security Services ◽  
The Us ◽  
Police Foundations ◽  
Retail Establishments

This chapter explores the longstanding but surprisingly neglected ‘user pays’ policing, as well as newer and proliferating police foundations in Canada and the US. Many police departments in North America and beyond now offer ‘user pays’ public policing. The premise of ‘user pays’, as its name suggests, is that the public should not pay for private use of the public police. Those who use their security services for private benefit should pay, and the more they use them, the more they should pay. In practice, this involves selling security services to individuals and organisations for street festivals, funeral escorts, concerts, special parades, and retail establishments, and sometimes directly to private security firms themselves. These arrangements always entail uniformed officers providing security to these ‘users’ via temporary assignment.

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