The impact of employer-delayed deposits on plan participant wealth

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of employer-delayed deposits to defined contribution plans on plan participant wealth. The history of regulatory oversight on the obligations of employers to remit deposits to defined contribution plans on behalf of employees is discussed. In light of these regulations, the paper discusses and examines situations in which employers may legally delay the deposit of employee contributions to a defined contribution plan and how the existence of various calendar anomalies may impact the returns of plan participants. Design/methodology/approach Simulated equity portfolios over the period 1985-2014 are created to determine the economic significance of possible delays in plan deposits on the accumulated wealth of plan participants. Findings The findings suggest that in situations where employees are paid monthly at the end of the month, it is always to their benefit to have their funds deposited as soon as possible. However, for employees paid weekly at the end of the week, a slight delay (one to three days) in the deposit of funds by the employer may actually be beneficial for the employee, particularly if the employee invests heavily in small and mid-cap stocks. Originality/value This is the first paper to explicitly study the impact of an employer’s timing of deposits to a defined contribution plan on the accumulated wealth of plan participants, and is thus the primary contribution of the paper.

Lessons for public pensions from Utah's move to pension choice

We explore what happened when the state of Utah moved away from its traditional defined benefit pension. In its place, it offered new hires a choice between a conventional defined contribution plan and a hybrid plan option, where the latter has both a guaranteed benefit component and a defined contribution plan where employees bear investment risk. We show that around 60% of new hires failed to make any active choice and, as a result, were automatically defaulted into the hybrid plan. Slightly more than half of those who made an active choice elected the hybrid plan. Post-reform, employees who failed to actively elect a primary retirement plan were also far less likely to enroll in a supplemental retirement account, compared with new hires who actively selected a plan. We also find that employees hired following the reform were more likely to leave public employment, resulting in higher separation rates. This could reflect a reduction in the desirability of public employment under the new pension design and an improving economic climate in the state. Our results imply that public pension reformers must consider employee responses in addition to potential cost savings, when developing and enacting major pension plan changes.