Subatomic Particles, Epistemic Stances, and Kantian Antinomies

In Scientific Ontology, Chakravartty diagnoses a “dramatic conflict” between empiricism and metaphysics and aims to overcome that conflict by opting for a modern-day variant of Pyrrhonism, i.e. by appreciating the equal strength (isostheneia) of the arguments for and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, and by achieving tranquility (ataraxia) by suspending judgment or remaining speechless in the face of that isostheneia. In this paper, I want to argue that instead of remaining speechless in the face of the isostheneia of the arguments for and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, we should adopt a position that remains underrated in Chakravartty’s analysis: a position that amounts to a modern-day variant of the Kantian combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism, and that like the original Kantian combination, is capable of solving many instances of the dramatic conflict between empiricism and metaphysics and, in particular, a conflict that is the talk of the town in philosophy of science these days—the conflict between ontic-structural realism and Lewisian metaphysics.

How Ontic Structural Realism would Formalize Scientific Progress

This essay tries to make a tangential cut between the debate that seeks the most adequate definition of scientific progress (involving authors such as K. Popper, T Kuhn, A Bird or J Saatsi) and the debate on the viability of structural realism to be considered the best epistemological approach to the understanding of nature (B van Fraassen, J Ladyman, J Worrall, S Psillos...). Thus, we will first connect both debates by showing that they shared a common problem before their progressive distancing. Finally, we will outline a formulation of scientific progress inferred from the structural realism approach; in particular, our definition will be based on J. Ladyman’s proposal in Every Thing Must Go as we will emphasize that it also provides an answer to the aforementioned original problem. Our conclusion is that this formulation of scientific progress differs from the three main ones, namely, truthlikeness, problem-solving, and accumulation of knowledge. This fourth form is necessarily linked to a speculative approximation of reality. Moreover, we want to suggest that this fourth conception is articulated under the shadow of the ideas of CS Peirce. Keywords: structural realism, scientific progress, J Ladyman, speculative realism

DISPOSITIONAL ONTOLOGY AS A BASIS FOR STRUCTURAL REALISM

M. Esfeld has proposed to use the ontology of external causal properties, or dispositions, of objects as a basis for ontic structural realism. It is this approach that makes possible realism towards objects as they are understood by S. French and J. Ladyman –objects are mere nodes in the structure. In our paper dispositional ontology is con-trasted withD. Lewis’ metaphysics of categorical properties, and through this juxtaposition the last is rendered inappropriate and the first appears promising as a foundation for structural realism and scientific metaphysics.

Ontic Structuralism and Fundamentality

Ontic structural realism (OSR) is the view that (i) in spite of the discontinuities that characterise the historical development of science, we can be realist about something, i.e., the concrete counterpart of certain theoretical structures that remain preserved across theory-change; and (ii) such structure is all there is in the actual world, at least at the fundamental level. It is thus a thesis about the fundamental—one whereby relations, not objects, are the basic building blocks of reality. However, there are in fact several dimensions to the structuralism-fundamentality link, and many alternative ways of cashing out the idea that reality is fundamentally structural. Arguably, these require a more systematic and detailed assessment than acknowledged in the literature so far. The chapter provides such an assessment based on considerations coming from both physics and analytic metaphysics, and concludes by pointing to a hitherto quite neglected theoretical option.

Thomist vs. Scotist Perspectives on Ontic Structural Realism

Structural realism has re-emerged as part of the debate between scientific realism and antirealism. Since then it has branched into several different versions, notably epistemic structural realism and ontic structural realism. The latter theory (which itself has now divided into competing formulations) is still an important perspective in the realism/antirealism dialectic; however, its significance has expanded well beyond that debate. Today ontic structural realism is also an important player in the metaphysics of science literature, engaging with a variety of ontological questions. One of these pertains to the basic categories of ontology, with the proponents of ontic structural realism typically advocating a radical rethinking of how to view substance and relation while calling into question the (allegedly) traditional privileging of the former over and against the latter. In this paper I assess ontic structural realism from the perspective of two major systems: Thomism and Scotism. I argue that the basic commitments of Thomism allow for some surprising convergences with ontic structural realism, while Scotism does not.

The Benacerraf Problem as a Challenge for Ontic Structural Realism†

ABSTRACT Benacerraf has presented two problems for the philosophy of mathematics. These are the problem of identification and the problem of representation. This paper aims to reconstruct the latter problem and to unpack its undermining bearing on the version of Ontic Structural Realism that frames scientific representations in terms of abstract structures. I argue that the dichotomy between mathematical structures and physical ones cannot be used to address the Benacerraf problem but strengthens it. I conclude by arguing that versions of OSR that do not rely on mathematical frameworks for representational purposes need not be vulnerable to Benacerraf’s second problem.

A Metaphysics for Mathematical and Structural Realism

The goal of this paper is to preserve realism in both ontology and truth for the philosophy of mathematics and science. It begins by arguing that scientific realism can only be attained given mathematical realism due to the indispensable nature of the latter to the prior. Ultimately, the paper argues for a position combining both Ontic Structural Realism and Ante Rem Structuralism, or what the author refers to as Strong Ontic Structural Realism, which has the potential to reconcile realism for both science and mathematics. The paper goes on to claims that this theory does not succumb to the same traditional epistemological problems, which have damaged the credibility of its predecessors.