Thomist vs. Scotist Perspectives on Ontic Structural Realism

2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-337
Author(s):  
Travis Dumsday ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Science Literature ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism ◽  
Metaphysics Of Science ◽  
Important Player ◽  
Epistemic Structural Realism

Structural realism has re-emerged as part of the debate between scientific realism and antirealism. Since then it has branched into several different versions, notably epistemic structural realism and ontic structural realism. The latter theory (which itself has now divided into competing formulations) is still an important perspective in the realism/antirealism dialectic; however, its significance has expanded well beyond that debate. Today ontic structural realism is also an important player in the metaphysics of science literature, engaging with a variety of ontological questions. One of these pertains to the basic categories of ontology, with the proponents of ontic structural realism typically advocating a radical rethinking of how to view substance and relation while calling into question the (allegedly) traditional privileging of the former over and against the latter. In this paper I assess ontic structural realism from the perspective of two major systems: Thomism and Scotism. I argue that the basic commitments of Thomism allow for some surprising convergences with ontic structural realism, while Scotism does not.

scholarly journals Epistemic structural realism, modality and laws of nature

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 447
Author(s):  
Bruno Borge
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Scientific Theories ◽  
Epistemic Structural Realism ◽  
The One

According to epistemic structural realism (EER) scientific theories provide us only with knowledge about the structure of the unobservable world, but not about its nature. The most significant objection that this posi- tion has faced is the so-called Newman’s problem. In this paper I offer an alternative objection to EER. I argue that its formulation leads to undesirable skeptical positions in two fields close to scientific realism: the debates on modality and laws of nature. I also show that there is an interesting sense in which my objection is stronger than the one offered by Newman.

scholarly journals FROM SCIENTIFIC STRUCTURALISM TO TRANSCENDENTAL STRUCTURALISM

2016 ◽  
Vol 57 (135) ◽  
pp. 759-780
Author(s):  
Patricia Kauark-Leite ◽  
◽  
Ronaldo Penna Neves ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
The Other ◽  
Current Debate ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Realist Position ◽  
Epistemic Structural Realism

ABSTRACT In the current debate between scientific realism and empiricism, both sides seem to embrace some sort of structuralism as an important component of their descriptions of science. The structural realism is generally presented in two versions: one ontic and the other epistemic. It has been argued that that epistemic structural realism (ESR) is close, if not identical, to a Kantian approach. We aim to show that this is not the case, since ESR, being fundamentally a realist position, cannot be fully consistent with a transcendental approach. Such a position is better called transcendental structuralism (TS), an alternative that we believe is worth being investigated on its own. In this paper, we will take Henry Allison's interpretation of transcendental idealism as a starting point to establish the distinctions between ESR and TS.

scholarly journals A Metaphysics for Mathematical and Structural Realism

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-89
Author(s):  
Adam InTae Gerard
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Philosophy Of Mathematics ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism ◽  
Mathematical Realism ◽  
Ante Rem Structuralism ◽  
And Mathematics ◽  
Mathematics And Science

The goal of this paper is to preserve realism in both ontology and truth for the philosophy of mathematics and science. It begins by arguing that scientific realism can only be attained given mathematical realism due to the indispensable nature of the latter to the prior. Ultimately, the paper argues for a position combining both Ontic Structural Realism and Ante Rem Structuralism, or what the author refers to as Strong Ontic Structural Realism, which has the potential to reconcile realism for both science and mathematics. The paper goes on to claims that this theory does not succumb to the same traditional epistemological problems, which have damaged the credibility of its predecessors.

scholarly journals Scientific Realism Again

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 99 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Ladyman
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Common Sense ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Van Fraassen ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism ◽  
Fundamental Physics ◽  
The Real ◽  
Special Sciences ◽  
Do So

The present paper concerns how scientific realism is formulated and defended. It is argued that van Fraassen is fundamentally right that scientific realism requires metaphysics in general, and modality in particular. This is because of several relationships that raise problems for the ontology of scientific realism, namely those between: scientific realism and common sense realism; past and current theories; the sciences of different scales; and the ontologies of the special sciences and fundamental physics. These problems are related. It is argued that ontic structural realism, in the form of the real-patterns account of ontology, offers a unified solution to them all (or at least that it is required to do so, if it is to make good on the promise of naturalised metaphysics).

The Necessity of Sufficiency

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce L. Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Quantum Physics ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Divine Action ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Adequate Understanding ◽  
Quantum Phenomena

There is an argument for the existence of God from the incompleteness of nature that is vaguely present in Plantinga’s recent work. This argument, which rests on the metaphysical implications of quantum physics and the philosophical deficiency of necessitarian conceptions of physical law, deserves to be given a clear formulation. The goal is to demonstrate, via a suitably articulated principle of sufficient reason, that divine action in an occasionalist mode is needed (and hence God’s existence is required) to bring causal closure to nature and render it ontologically functional. The best explanation for quantum phenomena and the most adequate understanding of general providence turns out to rest on an ontic structural realism in physics that is grounded in the immaterialist metaphysics of theistic idealism.

scholarly journals On individuality in quantum theory

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-38
Author(s):  
Jasmina Jeknic-Dugic
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Theory ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Mechanical Analysis ◽  
Quantum Systems ◽  
Quantum Mechanical ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism

A quantum mechanical analysis of the decomposability of quantum systems into subsystems provides support for the so-called "attenuated Eliminative Ontic Structural Realism" within Categorical Structuralism studies in physics. Quantum subsystems are recognized as non-individual, relationally defined objects that deflate or relax some standard objections against Eliminative Ontic Structural Realism. Our considerations assume the universally valid quantum theory without tackling interpretational issues.

scholarly journals D. Dennett’s Real Patterns as a Modal Ontology: Essentialist Interpretation of Truth-Making

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 59-74
Author(s):  
Nikita V. Golovko
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Realism ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Realistic Interpretation ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Modal Ontology

The paper aims to make a satisfactory realistic interpretation of the solution of the truth-making problem within the framework of D. Dennett’s real patterns conception in order to show that D. Dennett’s ontology can be interpreted in a realistic sense not only within the framework of J. Ladyman’s structural realism. As a starting point, the solution of the truth-making problem within the concept of “serious essentialism” by E. J. Lowe is considered. Our thesis is that the expansion of the D. Dennett’s conception with E. J. Lowe’s “serious essentialism” leads us to the conclusion that D. Dennett’s ontology not only receives a satisfactory realistic interpretation of the solution of the truth-making problem, but also provides an opportunity to answer properly to the definition of scientific realism given by M. Devitt.

‘Scale Relative Ontology’ and Scientism

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (46) ◽  
pp. 99-118
Author(s):  
Noel Boulting ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Structural Realism ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism ◽  
The Way

Ladyman and Ross’s Every Thing Must Go is a challenging text. In order to ascertain its significance, attention will be focused on their idea of Scale Relative Ontology. To do this their conception of Ontic Structural Realism will require elucidation. Its implications for Scale Relative Ontology will be explored before considering the way Scale Relative Ontology can be cast through three possible dimensions: the cosmological, the ordinary middle-sized, and scientific perspectives. In exploring the latter perspective, and applying insights derived from Peirce’s philosophy, their defence of Scientism will then be considered. In this way three different senses can be distinguished through which this doctrine can be presented, before examining what kind of Scientism they advocate and thereby its adequacy.

The Fundamentalist Vision

2020 ◽  
pp. 211-214
Author(s):  
Theodore Sider
Keyword(s):  
Laws Of Nature ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Ultimate Reality ◽  
Fundamental Nature ◽  
Metaphysics Of Science

A brief synoptic conclusion. When our aim is a distinctive account of ultimate reality the proper postmodal tool is that of fundamentality. With that tool we can articulate a "fundamentalist vision": an account of the fundamental nature of the facts and laws in the domain in question. This conception of the metaphysics of science fits a certain realist outlook, and undermines some forms of structuralism: nomic essentialism and structural realism (though not comparativism). But the vision faces serious challenges having to do with arbitrariness: arbitrariness in the constituents of the fundamental facts, and arbitrariness in the laws of nature.

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