scholarly journals Generalism and the Metaphysics of Ontic Structural Realism

2020 ◽  
Vol 71 (2) ◽  
pp. 751-772
Author(s):  
David Glick
Keyword(s):  
Structural Realism ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism

The Necessity of Sufficiency

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce L. Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Quantum Physics ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Divine Action ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Principle Of Sufficient Reason ◽  
Adequate Understanding ◽  
Quantum Phenomena

There is an argument for the existence of God from the incompleteness of nature that is vaguely present in Plantinga’s recent work. This argument, which rests on the metaphysical implications of quantum physics and the philosophical deficiency of necessitarian conceptions of physical law, deserves to be given a clear formulation. The goal is to demonstrate, via a suitably articulated principle of sufficient reason, that divine action in an occasionalist mode is needed (and hence God’s existence is required) to bring causal closure to nature and render it ontologically functional. The best explanation for quantum phenomena and the most adequate understanding of general providence turns out to rest on an ontic structural realism in physics that is grounded in the immaterialist metaphysics of theistic idealism.

scholarly journals On individuality in quantum theory

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-38
Author(s):  
Jasmina Jeknic-Dugic
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Theory ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Mechanical Analysis ◽  
Quantum Systems ◽  
Quantum Mechanical ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism

A quantum mechanical analysis of the decomposability of quantum systems into subsystems provides support for the so-called "attenuated Eliminative Ontic Structural Realism" within Categorical Structuralism studies in physics. Quantum subsystems are recognized as non-individual, relationally defined objects that deflate or relax some standard objections against Eliminative Ontic Structural Realism. Our considerations assume the universally valid quantum theory without tackling interpretational issues.

‘Scale Relative Ontology’ and Scientism

2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (46) ◽  
pp. 99-118
Author(s):  
Noel Boulting ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Structural Realism ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism ◽  
The Way

Ladyman and Ross’s Every Thing Must Go is a challenging text. In order to ascertain its significance, attention will be focused on their idea of Scale Relative Ontology. To do this their conception of Ontic Structural Realism will require elucidation. Its implications for Scale Relative Ontology will be explored before considering the way Scale Relative Ontology can be cast through three possible dimensions: the cosmological, the ordinary middle-sized, and scientific perspectives. In exploring the latter perspective, and applying insights derived from Peirce’s philosophy, their defence of Scientism will then be considered. In this way three different senses can be distinguished through which this doctrine can be presented, before examining what kind of Scientism they advocate and thereby its adequacy.

scholarly journals Ontic Structural Realism

2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. e12399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerry McKenzie
Keyword(s):  
Structural Realism ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism

scholarly journals Subatomic Particles, Epistemic Stances, and Kantian Antinomies

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Henschen
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Structural Realism ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Ontic Structural Realism ◽  
Subatomic Particles ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Town ◽  
Epistemic Stances ◽  
Empirical Realism ◽  
Scientific Ontology

AbstractIn Scientific Ontology, Chakravartty diagnoses a “dramatic conflict” between empiricism and metaphysics and aims to overcome that conflict by opting for a modern-day variant of Pyrrhonism, i.e. by appreciating the equal strength (isostheneia) of the arguments for and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, and by achieving tranquility (ataraxia) by suspending judgment or remaining speechless in the face of that isostheneia. In this paper, I want to argue that instead of remaining speechless in the face of the isostheneia of the arguments for and against the empiricist and metaphysical positions, we should adopt a position that remains underrated in Chakravartty’s analysis: a position that amounts to a modern-day variant of the Kantian combination of transcendental idealism and empirical realism, and that like the original Kantian combination, is capable of solving many instances of the dramatic conflict between empiricism and metaphysics and, in particular, a conflict that is the talk of the town in philosophy of science these days—the conflict between ontic-structural realism and Lewisian metaphysics.

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