Model-Theoretic Knowledge Accumulation: The Case of Agency Theory and Incentive Alignment

2013 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 442-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jared D. Harris ◽  
Scott G. Johnson ◽  
David Souder
Author(s):  
G. Tyge Payne ◽  
Oleg V. Petrenko

Agency theory is one the most prominent theoretical perspectives utilized in business and management research. Agency theory argues—using fundamental assumptions that agents are: (a) self-interested, (b) boundedly rational, and (c) different from principals in their goals and risk-taking preferences—that a problem occurs when one party (a principal) employs another (an agent) to make decisions and act in their stead. Essentially, the value of a principal-agent relationship is not optimized because the two contracted parties may have different interests and information is asymmetric (not equal). Agency costs are the result of principal and agent conflicts of interest and disagreements regarding actions that are taken. As such, monitoring and incentive-alignment systems are used to curb costs associated with opportunist behavior. Agency theory is commonly utilized to understand and explain corporate governance phenomena, including executive incentive alignment, board monitoring, and control of top managers; this strand of the literature is founded in economics and represents the bulk of the research in business and management. However, other important principal-agent relationships are commonly seen in business and society, such as with politicians/voters, brokers/investors, and lawyers/clients, and have benefited from the vast stream of research that has explored the principal-agent relationship in various forms and contexts. Also, alternative theoretical perspectives have emerged to accommodate variations of the principal-agent relationship. Namely, principal-principal agency, behavioral agency, and stewardship theories are prominent alternative theories that challenge, expand, or relax the basic assumptions of the classic theory to extend our understanding of important relationships and mechanisms in business and management.


2007 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric A. Fong ◽  
Henry L. Tosi

The authors examine the moderating effects of conscientiousness on the relationships between agency controls and effort and agency controls and task performance. Results show that less conscientious individuals appear to increase effort through incentive alignment and monitoring, whereas conscientious individuals do not shirk with or without agency controls. Furthermore, results show that less conscientious individuals increase task performance through incentive alignment, but not through monitoring. The study confirms that motivation to act opportunistically differs between individuals unlike what is assumed by agency theory. Also, incentive alignment may be more effective than monitoring when attempting to align principal and agent interests.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (5) ◽  
pp. 439-446
Author(s):  
Hamid Ait lemqeddem ◽  
◽  
Mounya Tomas ◽  

There is renewed interest in the need to focus on corporate governance in an environment where it is a performance imperative for all small and large organizations, private and public, beginner or established.The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the place of corporate governance practices in organizations to ensure that the board, officers, and directors take action to protect shareholder interests and all stakeholders. It is important to focus on the effect of these practices on improving performance and competitiveness. To do so, we opted for the hypothetico-deductive method with a quantitative approach. Our theoretical foundation is theory is agency theory.


2013 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohamed Syazwan Ab Talib ◽  
Lim Rubin ◽  
Vincent Khor Zhengyi

This is a preliminary study developed to explore the determinants of capital structure of Shariah-compliant firms listed in Bursa Malaysia. This study is primarily motivated by the issue of the determinants still being inconclusive in the area of capital structure. The study is performed using the static models namely Pool Ordinary Least Square, Fixed Effect and Random Effect Model. Empirical analysis on the determinants reveals that country specific factor which is GDP and sector specific factor which is industry concentration are also significant in influencing the corporate financing decisions in this country along with firm specific factors such as efficiency, bankruptcy risk, profitability, tangibility, liquidity and size of the firm. The findings revealed that results are sensitive to models employed in the study. Nevertheless, the applicability of capital structure theories such as the trade-off theory, agency theory and pecking order theory diverge across sectors in Malaysia. The pecking order theory and agency theory are found to be the dominant theories governing the corporate financing decision in the country as well. It indicates strong evidence of hierarchy practised in firms’ financing decision. The finding on agency theory being dominant justifies the function of short-term debt as a controlling mechanism to mitigate the agency problem arises within firms across sectors. 


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen P. Garvey

66 Buffalo Law Review 123 (2018)This Article offers an unorthodox theory of insanity. According to the traditional theory, insanity is a cognitive or volitional incapacity arising from a mental disease or defect. As an alternative to the traditional theory, some commentators have proposed that insanity is an especially debilitating form of irrationality. Each of these theories faces fair-minded objections. In contrast to these theories, this Article proposes that a person is insane if and because he lacks a sense of agency. The theory of insanity it defends might therefore be called the lost-agency theory.According to the lost-agency theory, a person lacks a sense of agency when he experiences his mind and body moving but doesn’t experience himself as the author or agent of those movements. The title character in the movie Dr. Strangelove suffered from what’s known as alien hand syndrome. People suffering from this syndrome experience the moving hand as their hand but don’t experience themselves as the author or agent of its movements. The lost-agency theory portrays insanity as alien hand syndrome writ large. The insane actor is like someone possessed by an alien self. He’s not in charge of his mind or body when he commits the crime.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muhammad Farhan Basheer ◽  
Saqib Muneer ◽  
Muhammad Atif ◽  
Zubair Ahmad

The primary purpose of the study is to explore the antecedents of corporate social and environmental responsibilities discourse practices in Pakistan. The industry sensitivity, government shareholding, block holder ownership, print media coverage, environmental monitoring programs, and strategic posture are examined as antecedents of corporate social and environmental responsibility practices. A multidimensional theoretical perspective namely stakeholder theory (ST), institutional theory (IT), agency theory (PAT), and legitimacy theory (LT) is used to conceptualize the phenomena. All the four of perspective theories (positive accounting theory, legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory, and institutional theory) claim that there are ‘pressures’ that impact the organization. How much ‘pressures’ are recognized, managed or satisfied differs from one perspective of theory to the other. To estimate the data, this study uses three sets of panel data models, i.e., the pooled ordinary least squares model (POLS) or constant coefficients model, fixed effects (FEM or least squares dummy variable/LSDV model) and random-effects models. The final sample is comprising of 173 firms over eight years from 2011 to 2017. The firms listed in PSX are included in the sample. Overall the findings of the study have shown agreement with the proposed results. However, the study has provided more support to the institutional theory and stakeholder theory. Keywords: Corporate Social Responsibility, Stakeholders Theory, Agency Theory, Pakistan


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles M. Elson ◽  
Craig K. Ferrere
Keyword(s):  

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