scholarly journals Integrated Operational Model of Green Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6041
Author(s):  
Chui-Yu Chiu ◽  
Chen-Yang Cheng ◽  
Ting-Ying Wu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
Reverse Direction ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Net Income ◽  
Reverse Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain

Due to increasing environmental awareness, companies have started embracing the green supply chain concept to reduce waste of resources. Based on this increased awareness, an integrated green closed-loop supply chain has been developed, which integrates the forward supply chain and reverse supply chain. The reverse supply chain follows the same path as the forward supply chain in the reverse direction to recycle used products. Due to the uncertain quality of used products, not all products can be selected for recycling and reproduction, as the reduced yield might decrease the overall net income in the supply chain. The study develops an evaluation model to consider government subsidy, used product recycling rate, and quality of the used products to explore their impacts on the entire system. The results show that when the reproducibility rate of used raw materials decreases, the net income would also decrease accordingly. Furthermore, when government subsidy increases, the net income of the supply chain also increases accordingly. Similarly, when the recycling rate of used products increases, the net income also increases. As government subsidy affects the net income more than the recycling rate of used products, this research concludes that government subsidy is a key factor in the green closed-loop supply chain.

A Possibilistic Reliable and Responsive Closed Loop Supply Chain Network Design Model under Uncertainty

2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (04) ◽  
pp. 317-338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alireza Hamidieh ◽  
Mohamadreza Fazli-Khalaf
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Network Design ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
Extended Model ◽  
Supply Chain Network ◽  
Reverse Supply Chain ◽  
Uncertainty Of Parameters

Reliability of supply chain networks is an important issue affecting customer satisfaction and profitability of organizations. However, occurrence of disruptions such as flood, earthquake and fire could ruin performance of supply chains. Uncertainty of parameters is another important factor that could lower quality of long-term plans of companies. Hence, uncertainty of parameters and disruption strike are important issues adversely influencing reliability of networks. Also, responsiveness of supply chains is a significant matter that should be considered carefully while designing distribution networks. Responsiveness could increase customer loyalty and satisfaction that could result in increasing market share of companies and their long-term planned benefit. Regarding alluded matters, the aim of this paper is designing a reliable forward-reverse supply chain network that minimizes total costs of network design along with maximization of total responsiveness of distribution network. Extended closed-loop network is capable of considering environmental issues by caring about end-of-life products. Designing reverse supply chain network aside with forward ones could decrease bad environmental impact of end-of-life products. Notably, to cope with adverse effects of disruptions, a scenario-based approach is suggested that enables considering partial and complete disruption of capacity of facilities. Additionally, an effective possibilistic programming method is applied to appropriately control uncertainty of parameters. As quality of raw materials is important to produce high-quality products, minimum acceptable quality level of raw materials is considered in extended model to maximize customer satisfaction. Finally, it should be noted that designed test problems show appropriate performance of suggested model and its applicability in real world case studies. Extended model is solved regarding different risk-aversion levels and sensitivity analysis is performed for different parameters of network design that shows effectual performance of proposed model.

scholarly journals Pricing-Decision and Coordination Contract considering Product Design and Quality of Recovery Product in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qingming Zou ◽  
Guangyu Ye
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Total Profit

In a closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, this paper studies the pricing strategies and coordination mechanism of supply chain when the remanufacturing cost is random caused by the proportion of reusability parts in design stage and quality condition of recycling product. The results show that the wholesale price and retail price are negative correlation, while the recycling rate and total profit of supply chain system are positive correlation with the proportion of reusability component designed in new product and quality of recycling product. Moreover, there are conclusions that the wholesale price and retail price are lower while the recycling rate and total profit of supply chain system are higher with centralized decision. Then, in order to coordinate the closed-loop supply chain, this paper develops a revenue-sharing contract, in which the revenue share parameter is determined based on absolute deviation approach. The theoretical results are illustrated by a numerical example.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

Study on Incentive Mechanism of MRCTM Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on the Uncertainty Quality

2010 ◽  
Vol 108-111 ◽  
pp. 341-346
Author(s):  
Huang Ling
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Conversion Factor ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Incentive Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Optimal Analysis ◽  
The Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Product Recycling

In this paper, the MRCTM model of closed-loop supply chain was investigated. An effective incentive mechanism that considered the uncertainty quality of product recycling was designed by the introduction of brand conversion factor. The author made an optimal analysis of the incentive mechanism. Moreover, the influence of different parameters, such as quality and brand to the fixed reward and the unit incentive payment was analyzed and some useful results were obtained.

scholarly journals Game-Theoretic Analysis to Examine How Government Subsidy Policies Affect a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Izabela Ewa Nielsen ◽  
Sani Majumder ◽  
Subrata Saha
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Government Organizations ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government

The pros and cons of government subsidy policies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) setting on optimal pricing, investment decisions in improving product quality, and used product collection under social welfare (SW) optimization goal have not been examined comprehensively. This study compares the outcomes of three government policies under manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) and retailer-Stackelberg (RS), namely (i) direct subsidy to the consumer, (ii) subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, and (iii) subsidy to the manufacturer to improve product quality. Results demonstrate that the greening level, used product collection, and SW are always higher under the RS game, but the rate of a subsidy granted by the government is always higher under the MS game. Profits for the CLSC members and SW are always higher if the government provides a subsidy directly to the consumer, but productivity of investment in the perspective of the manufacturer or government are less. In a second policy, the government organizations grant a subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, but it does not necessarily yield the desired outcome compared to others. In a third policy, the manufacturer receives a subsidy on a research and development (R&D) investment, but it yields a sub-optimal greening level. This study reveals that the outcomes of subsidy policies can bring benefit to consumers and add a degree of complication for CLSC members; government organizations need to inspect carefully among attributes, mainly product type, power of CLSC members, and investment efficiency for the manufacturer, before implementing any subsidy policies so that it can lead to an environmentally and economically viable outcome.

scholarly journals Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Model with Subsidy on Green Supply Chain Technology Investment

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (16) ◽  
pp. 4403 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haixiang Wu ◽  
Bing Xu ◽  
Ding Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Variational Inequality ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Raw Materials ◽  
Investment Decision ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chain Network ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Technology Investment

The green supply chain (GSC) can effectively reduce the waste of resources and avoid environmental pollution. For a closed-loop supply chain network consisting of multiple manufacturers, multiple retailers, and multiple consumer and recycling markets, we assume that retailers are responsible for the recycling of used products, manufacturers use raw materials to produce new products and recycled products for remanufacturing, and government departments subsidize all manufacturers and retailers for GSC technology investment. Then, the equilibrium conditions of manufacturers, retailers, demand markets, and recycling markets are obtained by using the variational inequality method, complementarity theorem, and Nash equilibrium theory, and the variational inequality model of the closed-loop supply chain network multiphase equilibrium is established. Based on numerical simulation, the optimal technology investment decision of green supply chain under different government subsidy rates, and the influence of market structure and enterprise cost asymmetry on the equilibrium solution of supply chain network are analyzed. The results show that government subsidies can effectively promote enterprises to upgrade their level of GSC technology investment. The intensification of enterprise competition and the asymmetry of enterprise costs will affect the composition of enterprise profits and the allocation of profits between enterprises, and the former will weaken the effect of government subsidies.

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