scholarly journals "Data Mining of Urban New Energy Vehicles in an Intelligent Government Subsidy Environment Using Closed-Loop Supply Chain Pricing Model"

2020 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 151-172 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jing-Hua Zhao ◽  
Da-Lin Zeng ◽  
Ting-Wei Zhou ◽  
Ze-Chao Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Data Mining ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Pricing Model ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
New Energy ◽  
New Energy Vehicles

scholarly journals Game-Theoretic Analysis to Examine How Government Subsidy Policies Affect a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Izabela Ewa Nielsen ◽  
Sani Majumder ◽  
Subrata Saha
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Government Organizations ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government

The pros and cons of government subsidy policies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) setting on optimal pricing, investment decisions in improving product quality, and used product collection under social welfare (SW) optimization goal have not been examined comprehensively. This study compares the outcomes of three government policies under manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) and retailer-Stackelberg (RS), namely (i) direct subsidy to the consumer, (ii) subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, and (iii) subsidy to the manufacturer to improve product quality. Results demonstrate that the greening level, used product collection, and SW are always higher under the RS game, but the rate of a subsidy granted by the government is always higher under the MS game. Profits for the CLSC members and SW are always higher if the government provides a subsidy directly to the consumer, but productivity of investment in the perspective of the manufacturer or government are less. In a second policy, the government organizations grant a subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, but it does not necessarily yield the desired outcome compared to others. In a third policy, the manufacturer receives a subsidy on a research and development (R&D) investment, but it yields a sub-optimal greening level. This study reveals that the outcomes of subsidy policies can bring benefit to consumers and add a degree of complication for CLSC members; government organizations need to inspect carefully among attributes, mainly product type, power of CLSC members, and investment efficiency for the manufacturer, before implementing any subsidy policies so that it can lead to an environmentally and economically viable outcome.

A fuzzy pricing model for a green competitive closed-loop supply chain network design in the presence of disruptions

2018 ◽  
Vol 188 ◽  
pp. 425-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morteza Ghomi-Avili ◽  
Seyed Gholamreza Jalali Naeini ◽  
Reza Tavakkoli-Moghaddam ◽  
Armin Jabbarzadeh
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Network Design ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Supply Chain Network Design ◽  
Supply Chain Network ◽  
Pricing Model ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain

Study on Discrimination Pricing Model of Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Product Remanufacturing

2012 ◽  
Vol 452-453 ◽  
pp. 663-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
New Product ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Optimal Pricing ◽  
Pricing Model ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Pricing Decisions

With awareness of environmental protection strengthens and constraints of regulations and laws to environmental protection increasing, more and more enterprises focus on the closed-loop supply chain management. Considering difference between new product and remanufactured product, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with manufacturers recycling used products directly from the consumers based on game theory. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profit of centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. At last, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the two-part tariff contract.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document