scholarly journals A Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism with Cost Sharing of Corporate Social Responsibility

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 1227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong Liu ◽  
Bing-ting Quan ◽  
Jiao Li ◽  
Jeffrey Forrest
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 2045 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liping Song ◽  
Yingluo Yan ◽  
Fengmin Yao

In addition to pursuing profits, more and more international enterprises are beginning to pay attention to environmental sustainability and corporate social responsibility (CSR). How to effectively encourage enterprises to undertake more CSR and maintain the sustainable development of society has become an urgent task for managers and researchers. Under this background, this paper considers the recycling of used products for environmental sustainability and takes into account profit donation as a CSR investment. Aiming at the decision-making of single-cycle closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with a dominant retailer when considering government subsidies and CSR investment, and based on the Stackelberg Game analysis technology, we formulate three distinct donation (CSR investment) models; the centralized system’s donation model, the manufacturer’s donation model, and the retailer’s donation model, and by doing system comparisons and numerical examples to analyze the impact of government subsidy and CSR investment on new product pricing and waste product recovery from the perspectives of government, environment and CLSC system. The results show that government subsidy is not only conducive to expanding market demand and increasing waste recycling rates, but also to improving CSR investment levels. Under the two decentralized decision-making models, regardless of whether the dominant retailer makes CSR investment, she can always get more channel profits than the manufacturer. From the view of environmental, economic, and social perspectives, the manufacturer makes CSR investment a better choice, and at this time the government has the best effect of implementing subsidy. Finally, based on the principle of cost sharing, a CSR cost sharing contract which can realize the coordination of CLSC is designed to solve the channel conflict and optimize the decision-making. Counterintuitively, the dominant retailer can gain more profits when it bears more cost in the CSR cost sharing contract.


2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (5) ◽  
pp. 1515-1535 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maryam Johari ◽  
Seyyed-Mahdi Hosseini-Motlagh

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and pricing decisions are proposed for a competitive two-level pharmaceutical supply chain (PSC) comprising two pharma-manufacturers and one pharma-retailer. In the investigated PSC, the pharma-manufacturers competitively invest in the CSR effort to produce a new medicine and sell two substitutable products to the market through the pharma-retailer, deciding on selling prices of manufacturers’ products. The PSC under consideration is modeled in three decision-making structures, i.e., decentralized, centralized, and coordinated models. In the decentralized model, the pricing and CSR decisions are individually obtained using a pharma-manufacturers–Stackelberg game structure. In the centralized model as a benchmark, the best performance of the entire PSC system is achieved. Finally, to encourage all PSC members to agree on the coordination plan, a CSR cost-sharing contract is proposed. Our results reveal that under competitive environment, the proposed CSR cost-sharing contract is able to increase market demand by significantly decreasing selling prices and increasing level of the CSR efforts.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 4050 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Kang ◽  
Xinfeng Luan ◽  
Wenjing Shen ◽  
Yanfang Ma ◽  
Xuguang Wei

Alleviating poverty is a critical problem in many developing countries such as China. In this paper, we consider a poverty-alleviation supply chain composed of one supplier in a poor area and one producer helping the supplier reduce poverty by fulfilling Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Our work aims at examining the impacts of government subsidies and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) on the poverty-alleviation operations. Four game-theoretic models are constructed and analyzed to investigate the impacts of coefficients of government subsidies and CSR cost sharing on the supplier’s and producer’s profits, social welfare growth, CSR level, wholesale price, output of the supplier, and retail price. Our findings suggest that the most effective poverty-alleviation mechanism in most cases is the combination of government subsidies and market efforts. Contrary to common beliefs that companies have to sacrifice profit for social responsibility, we show that poverty alleviation is reconcilable with profit maximization and social welfare improvement, and companies can achieve a win-win situation of both poverty alleviation and profitability. Our work provides new insights for sustainable poverty alleviation and socially sustainable operations.


2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1845937
Author(s):  
A. K. M. Mohsin ◽  
Hongzhen Lei ◽  
Syed Far Abid Hossain ◽  
Hasanuzzaman Tushar ◽  
Mozaffar Alam Chowdhury ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong Liu ◽  
Wenwen Ren ◽  
Qian Xu ◽  
Zhiyang Liu

Purpose This paper aims to deal with the coordination problem of the supply chain through cost sharing of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and government subsidy. Design/methodology/approach With respect to the coordination problem of the supply chain with CSR, this paper constructs a three-stage game model consisting of a dominant retailer, n suppliers and government. From the perspective of cost sharing and government subsidies, this paper discussed the decentralized and centralized decision-making, respectively. On this basis, this paper designed a coordination mechanism considering both cost sharing and government subsidies and explore the impact of cost sharing rate and government subsidy rate on CSR efforts, members’ profits and social welfare. Findings CSR can improve the profits of supply chain members and the overall performance of the supply chain. Then the profits of supply chain nodal enterprises will be affected by the fulfillment level of CSR of their partners. Furthermore, excessive CSR will erode the supply chain profits and cause resource waste. High CSR costs often make retailers low CSR effort level, while a high CSR cost sharing rate can reduce the profits of suppliers and the supply chain. In addition, excessive government subsidies will lead to the decline of social welfare. Excessive government subsidies will cause the dependence of enterprises and affect their operating efficiency. Practical implications The proposed coordination mechanism can effectively do with the coordination problem of the supply chain. Originality/value The proposed coordination mechanism considering cost sharing and government subsidies simultaneously can effectively deal with conflict problems and guarantee the supply chain members and the supply chain to maximize their profits and social welfare.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 1088
Author(s):  
Ten-Suz Chen ◽  
Yung-Fu Huang ◽  
Ming-Wei Weng ◽  
Manh-Hoang Do

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has witnessed remarkable attention in academic studies as well as being widely conducted in different industries globally. This specific case was chosen as one of the biggest dairy companies that may be represented for Vietnam dairy supply chain management. This research aims to integrate CSR initiatives into food supply chain management to clarify the optimal replenishment policy, paying close attention to the relationship between midstream manufacturers and final customers. The classical economic production quantity model has been employed, relying on the two-stage assembly production system. The three parameters that contribute to the total profit formulation that have been considered consist of the social charity amount for per unit selling, the unit wholesale price of the manufacturer, and the return rate of used goods from the customer. The study has stressed that there is a significant impact from implementing CSR initiatives on the enterprise’s inventory policy that leads to enhance the firm’s financial performance.


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