scholarly journals Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models Considering Government Subsidy and Corporate Social Responsibility Investment

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (5) ◽  
pp. 2045 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liping Song ◽  
Yingluo Yan ◽  
Fengmin Yao

In addition to pursuing profits, more and more international enterprises are beginning to pay attention to environmental sustainability and corporate social responsibility (CSR). How to effectively encourage enterprises to undertake more CSR and maintain the sustainable development of society has become an urgent task for managers and researchers. Under this background, this paper considers the recycling of used products for environmental sustainability and takes into account profit donation as a CSR investment. Aiming at the decision-making of single-cycle closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with a dominant retailer when considering government subsidies and CSR investment, and based on the Stackelberg Game analysis technology, we formulate three distinct donation (CSR investment) models; the centralized system’s donation model, the manufacturer’s donation model, and the retailer’s donation model, and by doing system comparisons and numerical examples to analyze the impact of government subsidy and CSR investment on new product pricing and waste product recovery from the perspectives of government, environment and CLSC system. The results show that government subsidy is not only conducive to expanding market demand and increasing waste recycling rates, but also to improving CSR investment levels. Under the two decentralized decision-making models, regardless of whether the dominant retailer makes CSR investment, she can always get more channel profits than the manufacturer. From the view of environmental, economic, and social perspectives, the manufacturer makes CSR investment a better choice, and at this time the government has the best effect of implementing subsidy. Finally, based on the principle of cost sharing, a CSR cost sharing contract which can realize the coordination of CLSC is designed to solve the channel conflict and optimize the decision-making. Counterintuitively, the dominant retailer can gain more profits when it bears more cost in the CSR cost sharing contract.

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Rainero ◽  
Giuseppe Modarelli

PurposeIn the disruptive technologies era, the lack of convincing business cases on blockchain (BC) adoption about food supply chain, the existence of uncertainties and barriers to adoption due to knowledge scarcity on characteristics as well as the potentialities and risks involved in it, have triggered the need to investigate the first multinational BC adoption for food supply chain in Europe, to consider how it can guarantee knowledge for the consumption/purchase decision-making and the creation-mechanism of consciousness for sustainable behavioral choice.Design/methodology/approachThe authors provide a field exploratory analysis based on customers' perceptions and real knowledge about BC (as a knowledge-constructive tool) in the food and beverage sector. This connected with the need for an informed context, favoring sustainable conscious decision-making related to both the food chain and innovation acceptance. This analysis included the use of innovation acceptance as a corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategic orientation through a survey- and interview-based field analysis (80 respondents).FindingsThe findings of this study can be considered as antecedents of innovation acceptance in the sector. The analysis assesses consumers' scarce knowledge and perceptions on the BC system, the scarce usage level and the higher acquiring propensity for traceable foodstuffs generating bi-directional/dimensional value, considering that consumption habits could change through security and certainty antecedents and induced knowledge provided by external technological intervention.Originality/valueBy trying to match innovation and the knowledge-construction need as a vehicle for acceptance, the theoretical contribution would empower the literature on food traceability from the perspective of strategic BC application through a from-knowledge-to-knowledge strategy.


2021 ◽  
Vol 257 ◽  
pp. 02086
Author(s):  
Yi Liu ◽  
Yanting Huang

This paper considers a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer based on different corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviors. In addition, the advertising investment and government’s reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) are also taken in account. To explore the impact of CSR behaviors on supply chain, we developed three models: (1) Only the manufacturer undertakes CSR (model M); (2) only the retailer undertakes CSR (model R); (3) the manufacturer and the retailer share CSR (model MR). By analyzing the results, we found that: (1) The advertising investment level and waste products return rate both increase with the increase of the extent to members undertake CSR when there is only retailer undertakes CSR and when the manufacturer and retailer share CSR, and remain unchanged when there is only the manufacturer undertakes CSR; (2) the overall social welfare increases with the increase of the extent to members undertake CSR no matter which member undertakes CSR, and reaches the highest when there is only the retailer undertakes CSR; (3) it is the most conductive for the performance of the closedloop supply chain when there is only the retailer undertakes CSR.


2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (5) ◽  
pp. 1515-1535 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maryam Johari ◽  
Seyyed-Mahdi Hosseini-Motlagh

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) and pricing decisions are proposed for a competitive two-level pharmaceutical supply chain (PSC) comprising two pharma-manufacturers and one pharma-retailer. In the investigated PSC, the pharma-manufacturers competitively invest in the CSR effort to produce a new medicine and sell two substitutable products to the market through the pharma-retailer, deciding on selling prices of manufacturers’ products. The PSC under consideration is modeled in three decision-making structures, i.e., decentralized, centralized, and coordinated models. In the decentralized model, the pricing and CSR decisions are individually obtained using a pharma-manufacturers–Stackelberg game structure. In the centralized model as a benchmark, the best performance of the entire PSC system is achieved. Finally, to encourage all PSC members to agree on the coordination plan, a CSR cost-sharing contract is proposed. Our results reveal that under competitive environment, the proposed CSR cost-sharing contract is able to increase market demand by significantly decreasing selling prices and increasing level of the CSR efforts.


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