Methods for Initial Allocation of Points in Flight Prioritization

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Golaszewski ◽  
Kapil Sheth ◽  
Gregson Helledy ◽  
Sebastian Gutierrez-Nolasco
Keyword(s):  
Initial Allocation

scholarly journals Market Power in Output and Emissions Trading

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Francisco J. André ◽  
Luis Miguel de Castro
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Emissions Trading ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Cournot Model ◽  
Ceteris Paribus ◽  
Dominant Firm ◽  
Initial Allocation ◽  
Permit Price ◽  
Permit Allocation ◽  
Output Market

This article focuses on the strategic behavior of firms in the output and the emissions markets in the presence of market power. We consider the existence of a dominant firm in the permit market and different structures in the output market, including Cournot and two versions of the Stackelberg model, depending on whether the permit dominant firm is a leader or a follower in the output market. In all three models, the firm that dominates the permit market is more sensitive to its initial allocation than its competitor in terms of abatement and less sensitive in terms of output. In all three models, output is decreasing and the permit price is increasing in the permit dominant firm’s initial allocation. In the Cournot model, permit dominance is fruitless in terms of output and profit if the initial allocation is symmetric. Output leadership is more relevant than permit dominance since an output leader always tends to, ceteris paribus, produce more and make more profit whether it also dominates the permit market or not. This leadership can only be overcompensated for by distributing a larger share of permits to the output follower, and only if the total number of permits is large enough. In terms of welfare, Stackelberg is always superior to Cournot. If the initial permit allocation is symmetric, welfare is higher when the same firm dominates the output and the permit market at the same time.

Research on Water Resource Initial Allocation of Yellow River Basin Based on the AHP Model

2012 ◽  
Vol 518-523 ◽  
pp. 4216-4221
Author(s):  
Xin Li ◽  
Jun Wan ◽  
Jie Lin Jia ◽  
Qiang Wang
Keyword(s):  
Water Resources ◽  
River Basin ◽  
Yellow River ◽  
Yellow River Basin ◽  
Resources Allocation ◽  
Water Resources Allocation ◽  
Ahp Method ◽  
Ahp Model ◽  
Initial Allocation ◽  
Basin Water

Based on the principles of fairness, efficiency and sustainability, the assessment indicator system of the initial allocation of the river basin water resources is constructed in Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) method. By using the AHP model built, Standardization Law and Matlab software, an empirical study of the initial allocation of water resources in Yellow River Basin is got and the allocation scheme is put forward. Research shows that the AHP method is more scientific and rational in the river basin water resources allocation. The fairness and efficiency of fetching water can be reflected by readjustment on original Water resources allocation in nine provinces of Yellow River Basin. It is reasonable of the initial allocation of the Yellow River Basin Water Resources.

scholarly journals Initial allocation of carbon emission permits in power systems

2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-247 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tan WANG ◽  
Xu WANG ◽  
Yu GONG ◽  
Chuanwen JIANG ◽  
Fengjia XIONG ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Power Systems ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Emission Permits ◽  
Initial Allocation

Research on the initial allocation of carbon emission quotas: evidence from China

2016 ◽  
Vol 85 (2) ◽  
pp. 1189-1208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yu-Jie Hu ◽  
Rong Han ◽  
Bao-Jun Tang
Keyword(s):  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Initial Allocation ◽  
Emission Quotas

A Nutrient Quota Trading Scheme to Reduce the Eutrophication of the Baltic Sea

2007 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 296-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael A. Mehling ◽  
Karl Upston-Hooper
Keyword(s):  
Baltic Sea ◽  
Policy Instrument ◽  
Management Tool ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Baltic Sea ◽  
Limit Values ◽  
Initial Allocation ◽  
Nutrient Trading ◽  
Trading Scheme ◽  
The Baltic

AbstractEnvironmental policy is currently experiencing a general transition towards greater inclusion of flexible, market-based instruments. While one of the most salient manifestations of this trend, the creation of markets for tradable emissions quota, has been widely applied in the areas of air pollution and greenhouse gas regulation, it has yet to be introduced as a policy instrument for the management of watercourses. A great diversity of abatement costs for pollution of the Baltic Sea through nutrients that result in eutrophication suggests the introduction of a system of tradable quota as an attractive management tool. The following article provides a brief introduction to the challenge of nutrient accumulation in the Baltic Sea, and shows that the legislative framework currently governing its pollution does not categorically preclude the introduction of a nutrient trading scheme. A number of design issues would require clarification prior to the introduction of such a scheme, including the definition of the tradable commodity, the scope of participation, the initial allocation of quota, and monitoring and enforcement provisions. While the article concludes by affirming the fundamental viability of a nutrient trading scheme in the Baltic Sea Area, it identifies challenges in accommodating the trading scheme alongside existing emission limit values, state aid concerns, and the inclusion of states that are not Members of the European Union.

A Model of Designing Smart Water Market of Chinese Inter-Basin Diversion Project

2013 ◽  
Vol 295-298 ◽  
pp. 1923-1926
Author(s):  
Jun Dai
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Institutional Environment ◽  
Welfare Economics ◽  
Water Diversion ◽  
Water Market ◽  
Initial Allocation ◽  
Smart Water ◽  
Experimental Environment

This paper put forwards an improved technical path to design SWM for Chinese inter-basin diversion project, taking the institutes of government as an experimental environment, which is thought also need to be designed and tested. Then, a method for designing institutional environment of water market is further explored, by applying the Welfare economics theory，game theory, combined with a prototype, focused on the problem of the initial allocation and transaction of water diversion permission right in China.

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