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2021 ◽  
Vol 80 (2) ◽  
pp. 379-407
Author(s):  
Thomas Eichner ◽  
Rüdiger Pethig

AbstractWe investigate the displacement effects of unilateral phase-out-of-coal policies in a stylized two-country model with coal- and gas-fired electricity generation in an international emissions trading scheme. In the basic policy scenario, electricity markets are national and one country bans coal while the emissions cap remains unchanged. The allocative displacement effects are strongly asymmetric: the coal-banning country suffers a welfare loss, the other country is better off, and aggregate welfare declines. Furthermore, the permit price decreases, while the electricity price rises in the unilaterally acting country and declines in the other country. If all countries would phase out coal, the effects would be symmetric and all countries would lose. We then extend the analysis to the cases (i) when the unilateral coal ban is combined with a moderate cut of the emissions cap (as recently suggested in an EU Directive) and (ii) when we allow for international trade in electricity. Compared to the basic unilateral policy, in these cases, the total welfare costs tend to be smaller and some tend to be shifted from the unilaterally acting country to the other one.


Author(s):  
John A. Sorrentino

Carbon has been part of the Earth since its beginning, and the carbon cycle is well understood. However, its abundance in the atmosphere has become a problem. Those who propose solutions in decentralized market economies often prefer economic incentives to direct government regulation. Carbon cap-and-trade programs and carbon tax programs are the prime candidates to reign in emissions by altering the economic conditions under which producers and consumers make decisions. Under ideal conditions with full information, they can seamlessly remove the distortion caused by the negative externality and increase a society’s welfare. This distortion is caused by overproduction and underpricing of carbon-related goods and services. The ideal level of emissions would be set under cap-and-trade, or be the outcome of an ideally set carbon tax. The ideal price of carbon permits would result from demand generated by government decree meeting an ideal fixed supply set by the government. The economic benefit of using the ideal carbon tax or the ideal permit price occurs because heterogeneous decision-makers will conceptually reduce emissions to the level that equates their marginal (incremental) emissions-reduction cost to the tax or permit price. When applying the theory to the real world, ideal conditions with full information do not exist. The economically efficient levels of emissions, the carbon tax, and the permit price cannot be categorically determined. The targeted level of emissions is often proposed by non-economists. The spatial extent and time span of the emissions target need to be considered. The carbon tax is bound to be somewhat speculative, which does not bode well for private-sector decision-makers who have to adjust their behavior, and for the achievement of a particular emissions target. The permit price depends on how permits are initially distributed and how well the permit market is designed. The effectiveness of either program is tied to monitoring and enforcement. Social justice considerations in the operation of tax programs often include the condition that they be revenue-neutral. This is more complicated in the permit scheme as much activity after the initial phase is among the emitters themselves. Based on global measurement of greenhouse gases, several models have been created that attempt to explain how emissions transform into concentrations, how concentrations imply radiative forcing and global warming potential, how the latter cause ecological and economic impacts, and how mitigation and/or adaptation can influence these impacts. Scenarios of the uncertain future continue to be generated under myriad assumptions in the quest for the most reliable. Several institutions have worked to engender sustained cooperation among the parties of the “global commons.” The balance of theory and empirical observation is intended to generate normative and positive policy recommendations. Cap-and-trade and carbon tax programs have been designed and/or implemented by various countries and subnational jurisdictions with the hope of reducing carbon-related emissions. Many analysts have declared that the global human society will reach a “tipping point” in the 21st century, with irreversible trends that will alter life on Earth in significant ways.


2021 ◽  
pp. 53-103
Author(s):  
Juan Castañeda Fernández

The aim of the paper is to propose a new version of the productivity norm proposed by Hayek in 1928, as a feasible way to develop monetary policy by actual central banks. With this proposal, we are able both to review the convenience of the stability price objective adopted by most central banks and to permit price variations according to the evolution of productivity in increasingly open and competitive markets. By using a nominal income objective, central banks can distinguish, for example, between unwelcome monetary deflations and falling prices brought about by increases in productivity. With this objective, the degree of competition and of openness of an economy can also be taken into account by central bankers. Key words: Hayek’s productivity norm, price stability, neutral monetary policy, monetary equilibrium. Clasificación JEL: E3, E52. Resumen: Con este trabajo hemos actualizado la regla de estabilización de la renta nominal propuesta por Hayek en 1928 como criterio de emisión válido para los bancos centrales en la actualidad. A partir de su aplicación, la estabilidad de precios deja de ser el objetivo de la política monetaria, permitiéndose en su lugar movimientos de pre-cios a lo largo del tiempo como consecuencia natural de variaciones en las condiciones productivas de la economía, en presencia de mer-cados potencialmente abiertos a la competencia. Con ello estaremos en condiciones de diferenciar la respuesta monetaria óptima del ban-co central ante distintos tipos de deflación. Palabras clave: Regla de productividad de Hayek, estabilización de precios, política monetaria neutral, equilibrio monetario.


Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Francisco J. André ◽  
Luis Miguel de Castro

This article focuses on the strategic behavior of firms in the output and the emissions markets in the presence of market power. We consider the existence of a dominant firm in the permit market and different structures in the output market, including Cournot and two versions of the Stackelberg model, depending on whether the permit dominant firm is a leader or a follower in the output market. In all three models, the firm that dominates the permit market is more sensitive to its initial allocation than its competitor in terms of abatement and less sensitive in terms of output. In all three models, output is decreasing and the permit price is increasing in the permit dominant firm’s initial allocation. In the Cournot model, permit dominance is fruitless in terms of output and profit if the initial allocation is symmetric. Output leadership is more relevant than permit dominance since an output leader always tends to, ceteris paribus, produce more and make more profit whether it also dominates the permit market or not. This leadership can only be overcompensated for by distributing a larger share of permits to the output follower, and only if the total number of permits is large enough. In terms of welfare, Stackelberg is always superior to Cournot. If the initial permit allocation is symmetric, welfare is higher when the same firm dominates the output and the permit market at the same time.


Animals ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 1096
Author(s):  
Dane Erickson ◽  
Carson Reeling ◽  
John G. Lee

Chronic wasting disease (CWD) has had a negative impact on deer license demand in Wisconsin since it was first found in the state in 2002. Prior work evaluates the effect of CWD on hunting permit sales, but only in the period immediately after the disease was discovered. We use data on hunting permit sales, permit price, and other demand shifters to estimate a model of deer permit demand for the period 1966–2015. We use the estimated model to quantify the effect of CWD on (1) hunter demand for deer permits; (2) hunter surplus from hunting; and (3) lost hunting permit revenues. Hunter participation declined by 5.4% after CWD was detected in 2002. Hunter surplus decreased by $96 million over this period, while permit revenues declined by nearly $17 million. The effect of CWD was greater on demand for firearm permits than for archery permits. We also find that the effects of CWD diminish over time in absolute terms. This is because permit demand would have started to decline in 2008 even in the absence of CWD. This finding implies efforts to control CWD and efforts at hunter recruitment are economic complements and should be pursued jointly to maximize hunter welfare.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Junming Zhu ◽  
Yichun Fan ◽  
Xinghua Deng ◽  
Lan Xue

Abstract Emissions trading scheme (ETS) has been adopted by an increasing number of countries and regions for carbon mitigation, but its actual effect depends on specific program design and institutional context. Before launching the world largest ETS, China experimented with seven independent regional pilots, whose effects are only indirectly explored. Here we provide firm-level evidence of the innovation effect directly from China’s pilot emissions trading, based on latest patenting information and a quasi-experimental design. China’s pilots increase low-carbon innovation of ETS firms by 5–10% without crowding out their other technology innovation. The increase from ETS firms accounts for about 1% increase of the regional low-carbon patents, while a similar increase from large non-ETS firms is also induced by the ETS. Most importantly, the effect is not associated with permit price, auction, or firm characteristics, but is driven by mass-based allowance allocation. A rate-based approach, however, is adopted by China’s national market.


Complexity ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jun Wang ◽  
Xianxue Cheng ◽  
Xinyu Wang ◽  
Hongtao Yang ◽  
Shuhua Zhang

The increased carbon emissions cause relatively climate deterioration and attract more attention of governments, consumers, and enterprises to the low-carbon manufacturing. This paper considers a dynamic supply chain, which is composed of a manufacturer and a retailer, in the presence of the cap-and-trade regulation and the consumers’ reference emission effects. To investigate the manufacturer’s behavior choice and its impacts on the emission reduction and pricing strategies together with the profits of both the channel members, we develop a Stackelberg differential game model in which the manufacturer acts in both myopic and farsighted manners. By comparing the equilibrium strategies, it can be found that the farsighted manufacturer always prefers to keep a lower level of emission reduction. When the emission permit price is relatively high, the wholesale/retail price is lower if the manufacturer is myopic and hence benefits consumers. In addition, there exists a dilemma that the manufacturer is willing to act in a farsighted manner but the retailer looks forward to a partnership with the myopic manufacturer. For a relatively high price of emission permit, adopting myopic strategies results in a better performance of the whole supply chain.


Energies ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wenhui Zhao ◽  
Xiongjiantao Bao ◽  
Guanghui Yuan ◽  
Xiaomei Wang ◽  
Hongbo Bao

China will impose both renewable portfolio standards (RPS) and emissions trading (ET) on the electricity industry, but the product competition in the retail market and the influence of the supply chain network structure has not been investigated. This paper studies policy effects by comparing equilibrium results under different supply chain network structures, and we use the concept of consumer environmental awareness to capture a product’s substitutability. Results indicate that: (1) Both increases in the permit price and the rise of the quota obligation reduces the aggregate profits of the supply chain, but the former rather than the latter increases the profits of the renewable power generating company; (2) the differential pricing improves the retailer’s flexibility in the charged price when confronting increases in the permit price and the quota obligation; (3) higher consumer environmental awareness makes the supply chain less profitable and increases the costs of ET suffered by the consumer; (4) the cooperation between the thermal power generating company and the retailer significantly increases the aggregated profits of the supply chain, although the cooperative profit is sensitive to environmental awareness. Moreover, the consumer suffers the highest costs that the retailer passes on them, and may prefer to feel that the emission cost and compliance cost are less affordable. In contrast, the cooperation between power generating companies removes the influence of environmental awareness, but the aggregated profits of the supply chain are smaller than in the decentralized decision scenario.


2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (3) ◽  
pp. 748-784 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kyle C. Meng

This paper develops a method for forecasting the marginal abatement cost (MAC) of climate policy using three features of the failed Waxman-Markey bill. First, the MAC is revealed by the price of traded permits. Second, the permit price is estimated using a regression discontinuity design (RDD) comparing stock returns of firms on either side of the policy's free permit cutoff rule. Third, because Waxman-Markey was never implemented, I extend the RDD approach to incorporate prediction market prices which normalize estimates by policy realization probabilities. A final bounding analysis recovers a MAC range of $5 to $19 per ton CO2e. (JEL G12, G14, Q52, Q54, Q58)


2016 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 248-260 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Xu ◽  
Shi-Jie Deng ◽  
Valerie M. Thomas

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